Mr. Benjamin. I think, Mr. President, I have a right to set the record straight upon that point. I rose in the Senate on the occasion referred to, as will be perfectly well recollected by every Senator present, and put a respectful question to the Senator from Massachusetts. Instead of a reply to my question, he put a question to me, which I answered, and then I put my question. Instead of replying to that, he again put a question to me. Considering that as an absolute evasion of the question which I put to him, I declined having anything further to say in the discussion.
Mr. Sumner. The Senator from Louisiana will pardon me, if I suggest that there is an incontrovertible fact which shows that the evasion was on his part. The record testifies not only that he did not reply, but that I was cut off from replying by efforts and votes of himself and his friends. Let him consult the "Congressional Globe," and he will find it all there.[172] I can conceive that it might be embarrassing for him to reply, since, had he declined to carry out the clause in question, it would be awkward, at least, to vindicate the Fugitive Slave Act, which is derived from an identical clause in the Constitution. And yet there are Senators on this floor, who, careless of the flagrant inconsistency, vindicate the exercise of power by Congress under the "fugitive" clause, while their own States at home deny any power of Congress under the associate clause, on the "privileges of citizens," assume to themselves complete right to determine the obligations of this clause, and then, in practical illustration of their assumption, ruthlessly sell into Slavery colored citizens of the North.
Mr. Butler [interrupting]. Does the Senator allude to my State?
Mr. Rusk. No,—to mine.
Mr. Butler. If he means South Carolina, I will reply to him.
Mr. Sumner. I do allude to South Carolina, and also to other Southern States,—but especially to South Carolina. If I allude to these States, it is not to bring up and array the hardships of individual instances, but simply to show the position occupied by them on a constitutional question, identical with that in the Fugitive Act. And now, at the risk of repetition, if I can have your attention for a brief moment, without interruption, I will endeavor to state anew this argument.
The rules of interpretation, applicable to the clause of the Constitution securing to "the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States," are equally applicable to its associate clause, forming part of the same section, in the same article, and providing that "persons held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." Of this there can be no doubt.
If one of these clauses is regarded as a compact between the States, to be carried out by them respectively, according to their interpretation of its obligations, without intervention of Congress, then the other must be so regarded; nor can any legislative power be asserted of Congress under one clause which is denied under the other. This proposition cannot be questioned. Now mark the consequences.
Congress, in abstaining from all exercise of power under the first clause, when required to protect the liberty of colored citizens, while assuming power under the second clause, in order to obtain the surrender of fugitive slaves, shows an inconsistency, which becomes more monstrous when it is considered that in the one case the general and commanding interests of Liberty are neglected, while in the other the peculiar and subordinate interests of Slavery are carefully assured; and such an exercise of power is an alarming evidence of that influence of Slavery in the National Government which has increased, is increasing, and ought to be overthrown.
Looking more precisely at these two clauses, we arrive at the true conclusion. According to express words of the Constitution, in the Tenth Amendment, "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"; and since no powers are delegated to the United States in the clause relating to "privileges and immunities of citizens," or in the associate clause of the same section, relating to the surrender of "persons held to service or labor," therefore all legislation by Congress, under either clause, must be an assumption of undelegated powers, and an infraction of rights secured to the States respectively, or to the people: and such, I have already said, is the Fugitive Slave Act.
I might go further, and, by the example of South Carolina, vindicate to Massachusetts, and every other State, the right to put such interpretation upon the "fugitive" clause as it shall think proper. The Legislature of South Carolina, in a series of resolutions adopted in 1844, asserts the following proposition:—
"Resolved, That free negroes and persons of color are not citizens of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution, which confers upon the citizens of one State the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."[173]