Surely, Sir, this is enough, and more. From authentic documents, including the very muster-rolls of the Revolution, we learn the small contributions of men and the military weakness of the Southern States, particularly of South Carolina, as compared with the Northern States; and from the very lips of South Carolina herself, on four different occasions,—by a Committee, by one of her Representatives in Congress, by her historian, and by an eminent citizen,—we have the confession, not only of weakness, but that this weakness was caused by Slavery. And yet, in the face of this combined and authoritative testimony, we are called to listen, in the American Senate, to the arrogant boast, from a venerable Senator, that American Independence was achieved by the arms and treasure of "slaveholding communities": an assumption baseless as the fabric of a vision, in any way it may be interpreted,—whether as meaning baldly that Independence was achieved by those Southern States, the peculiar home of Slavery, or that it was achieved by any strength or influence which came from that noxious source. Sir, I speak here for a Commonwealth of just renown, but I speak also for a cause which is more than any Commonwealth, even that which I represent; and I cannot allow the Senator to discredit either. Not by Slavery, but in spite of Slavery, was Independence achieved. Not because, but notwithstanding, there were "slaveholding communities," did triumph descend upon our arms. It was the inspiration of Liberty Universal that conducted us through the Red Sea of the Revolution, as it had already given to the Declaration of Independence its mighty tone, resounding through the ages. "Let it be remembered," said the Nation, speaking by the voice of the Continental Congress, at the close of the war, "that it has ever been the pride and boast of America, that the rights for which she contended were THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN NATURE."[129] Yes, Sir, in this behalf, and by this sign, we conquered.
Such, Sir, is my answer on this head to the Senator from South Carolina. If the work which I undertook has been done thoroughly, he must not blame me. Justice demanded that it should be thorough. But, while thus repelling insinuations against Massachusetts, and assumptions for Slavery, I would not unnecessarily touch the sensibilities of that Senator, or of the State which he represents. I cannot forget, that, amidst all diversities of opinion, we are bound together by ties of a common country,—that Massachusetts and South Carolina are sister States, and that the concord of sisters ought to prevail between them; but I am constrained to declare, that, throughout this debate, I have sought in vain any token of that just spirit which within the sphere of its influence is calculated to promote the concord whether of State or of individuals.
And now, for the present, I part with the venerable Senator from South Carolina. Pursuing his inconsistencies, and exposing them to judgment, I had almost forgotten his associate leader in the wanton personal assault upon me in this long debate,—I mean the veteran Senator from Virginia [Mr. Mason], who is now directly in my eye. With imperious look, and in the style of Sir Forcible Feeble, that Senator undertakes to call in question my statement, that the Fugitive Slave Act denies the writ of Habeas Corpus; and in doing this, he assumes a superiority for himself, which, permit me to tell him now in this presence, nothing in him can warrant. Sir, I claim little for myself; but I shrink in no respect from any comparison with that Senator, veteran though he be. Sitting near him, as has been my fortune since I had the honor of a seat in this chamber, I have come to know something of his conversation, something of his manners, something of his attainments, something of his abilities, something of his character,—ay, Sir, and something of his associations; and, while I would not disparage him in any of these respects, I feel that I do not exalt myself unduly, that I do not claim too much for the position which I hold or the name which I have established, when I openly declare, that, as Senator of Massachusetts, and as man, I place myself at every point in unhesitating comparison with that honorable assailant. And to his peremptory assertion, that the Fugitive Slave Act does not deny the Habeas Corpus, I oppose my assertion, peremptory as his own, that it does,—and there I leave that issue.
Mr. President, I welcome the sensibility which the Senator from Virginia manifests at the exposure of the Fugitive Slave Act. He is the author of that enormity. From his brain came forth the soulless monster. He is, therefore, its natural guardian. The Senator is, I believe, a lawyer. And now, since at last he shows parental solicitude to shield his offspring, he must do more than vainly parry the objection that it denies the great writ of Habeas Corpus. It is true, Sir, if anything but Slavery were in question, such an objection, if merely plausible, would be fatal; but it is not to be supposed that the partisans of an institution founded on denial of human rights can appreciate the proper efficacy of that writ. Sir, I challenge the Senator to defend his progeny,—not by assertion, but by reason. Let him rally all the ability, learning, and subtilty which he can command, and undertake the impossible work.
Let him answer this objection: The Constitution, by an amendment which Samuel Adams hailed as a protection against the usurpations of the National Government, and which Jefferson asserted was its very "foundation," has solemnly declared that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Stronger words could not be employed to limit the powers under the Constitution, and to protect the people from all assumptions of the National Government, particularly in derogation of Freedom. By the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, which the Senator is reputed to accept, this limitation of the powers of the National Government is recognized and enforced. The Senator himself is understood, on all questions not affecting the claims of Slavery, to espouse this rule in its utmost strictness. Let him now indicate, if he can, any article, clause, phrase, or word in the Constitution which gives to Congress any power to establish a "uniform law throughout the United States" on the subject of fugitive slaves. Let him now show, if he can, from the records of the National Convention, one jot of evidence inclining to any such power. Whatever its interpretation in other respects, the clause on which this bill purports to be founded gives no such power. Sir, nothing can come out of nothing; and the Fugitive Slave Act is, therefore, without any source or origin in the Constitution. It is an open and unmitigated usurpation.
When the veteran Senator of Virginia has answered this objection, when he is able to find in the Constitution a power which is not to be found, and to make us see what is not to be seen, then let him answer another objection. The Constitution has secured the inestimable right of Trial by Jury "in suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." Of course Freedom is not susceptible of pecuniary valuation; therefore there can be no question that the claim for a fugitive slave is within this condition. In determining what is meant by "suits at Common Law," recourse must be had to the Common Law itself, precisely as we resort to that law in order to determine what is meant by "Trial by Jury." Let the Senator, if he be a lawyer, undertake to show that a claim for a fugitive slave is not, according to early precedents and writs,—well known to the framers of the Constitution, especially to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and John Rutledge, of South Carolina, both of whom had studied law at the Temple,—a suit at Common Law, to which, under the solemn guaranty of the Constitution, is attached the Trial by Jury, as an inseparable incident. Let the Senator show this, if he can.
And, Sir, when the veteran Senator has found a power in the Constitution where none exists, and has set aside the right of Trial by Jury in a suit at Common Law, then let him answer yet another objection. By the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, a claim for a fugitive slave is declared to be a case under the Constitution,[130] within the judicial power; and this judgment of the Court is confirmed by common sense and Common Law. Let the Senator show, if he can, how such exalted exercise of judicial power can be confided to a single petty magistrate, appointed, not by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but by the Court,—holding his office, not during good behavior, but merely during the will of the Court,—and receiving, not a regular salary, but fees according to each individual case. Let the Senator answer this objection, if, in any way, by twist of learning, logic, or law, he can.
Thus, Sir, do I present the issue directly on this monstrous enactment. Let the author of the Fugitive Slave Bill meet it. He will find me ready to follow him in argument,—though I trust never to be led, even by his example, into any departure from those courtesies of debate which are essential to the harmony of every legislative body.