“Mr. Luther Martin [of Maryland] urged the question on the whole. He did not like many parts of it.… He was willing, however, to make trial of the plan, rather than do nothing.”
“Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] did not approve of a reconsideration of the clause relating to money bills. It was of great consequence. It was the corner-stone of the accommodation.”[35]
At a still later stage Mr. Pinckney moved to strike out the section on money bills, “as giving no peculiar advantage to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the Government.” Mr. Gorham “was against allowing the Senate to originate, but was for allowing it only to amend.” Mr. Gouverneur Morris urged, that it was “particularly proper that the Senate should have the right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness, and so as to prevent delay of business in the other House.” To all this Colonel Mason replied, in the strong language which seems to have been natural to him, that he “was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To strike out the section was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part.”[36]
I might adduce other authorities; but here surely is enough to show that the provision was in reality one of the important compromises of the Constitution.
This brings me, Sir, to the precise meaning of the provision. The seeming indefiniteness of the term, “bills for raising revenue,” may alone furnish apology for the present debate. It may be argued, that, while the Senate is placed under certain restrictions, it may nevertheless originate “appropriation bills.” This, of course, is a question of interpretation. Does this interdict upon the Senate extend to bills by which money is appropriated to the support of Government, as well as to bills by which it is directly obtained? Are appropriation bills included under the term, “bills for raising revenue”? Now I cannot accord with opinions so confidently expressed by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter], and the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs], that it was clearly the intention of the Constitution to concede to the Senate the power of originating all appropriation bills; nor, on the other hand, do I assert that such exercise of power is in the strict sense unconstitutional. I approach the question as an inquirer anxious to find the real purpose.
Several considerations seem to shed light on the path to our conclusion.
First. The compromise between the small States and large States can be made completely effective, according to obvious intent of the authors of the Constitution, only by interdicting the Senate from originating the great appropriation bills. If this interdict is restricted simply to tariff bills, which occur only at rare intervals, it becomes a very inadequate compensation for the surrender by the large States to the small States in the constitution of the Senate. According to the reason of the rule, the great appropriation bills must be equally within its intendment. The reason is as strong in one case as in the other.
In the debates of the Convention, Dr. Franklin said:—
“As it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the second branch from meddling with money bills, he could not but remark, that it was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money, and how it had been disposed of.”