Fifthly, in New Jersey, by whose Constitution the elective franchise was conferred upon “all inhabitants of this colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds, proclamation money, clear estate,”—also without any discrimination of descent or color.
Sixthly, in North Carolina, where Mr. Justice Gaston, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State in the case of The State v. Manuel, declared that “the Constitution extended the elective franchise to every freeman who had arrived at the age of twenty-one and paid a public tax; and it is a matter of universal notoriety, that, under it, free persons, without regard to color, claimed and exercised the franchise, until it was taken from free men of color a few years since by our amended Constitution.”[145]
To these authoritative precedents, drawn from the very epoch of the National Constitution, I might add other illustrations. I content myself with referring to the Constitution of Missouri, which, in speaking of “every free white male citizen,”[146] admits by implication that colored persons may be citizens, and to the Code of Alabama, which declares that certain sections “do not apply to or affect any free person of color who by the Treaty between the United States and Spain became a citizen of the United States, or the descendants of such.”[147]
But not only in six of the old thirteen States all freemen without distinction of color were citizens, but also under the Articles of Confederation they were citizens. By the fourth article it was expressly declared that “the free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.” The meaning of this clause, which is clear on its face, becomes clearer still, when it is known, that, while it was under discussion, on the 25th of June, 1778, the delegates from South Carolina moved to amend it by inserting between the words “free inhabitants” the word “white,” so that the character of a citizen should be restricted to white persons. This proposition was rejected,—two States only voting for it, eight States against it, and the vote of one State being divided; so that the term “free inhabitants” was left in its full significance, without any distinction of descent or color.
The Constitution of the United States next followed. And it contains not a sentence, phrase, or word of disfranchisement on account of descent or color, any more than on account of religion.
If the present question depended upon citizenship, you could not refuse to receive the petition. But it does not depend upon citizenship. The right to petition Congress is not an incident of the elective franchise. It exists where the elective franchise does not exist. The Constitution expressly secures it, not simply to citizens, but broadly and completely to THE PEOPLE, declaring, in the first article of its Amendments, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
The term people here naturally means all, without distinction of class, who owe allegiance to the Government. It is the American equivalent for subjects. If there were any doubt on this point, it would be removed by the clear and irresistible meaning of the term in other parts of the Constitution. Thus, in the clause constituting the House of Representatives, it is declared that it “shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.” Here is an obvious difference between the “people” and “electors.” The former is broader than the latter. It is the former that constitutes the basis of representation, and the Constitution then proceeds to declare that this basis “shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.” Whatever may be the position of the fractional class, nothing can be clearer than that all free persons, without distinction of color or descent, belong to the people, and, so belonging, they are solemnly and expressly protected by the Constitution in the right of petition.
The Constitution next provides for the “enumeration” of the people, and under this provision there is a decennial census of the whole people, without distinction of color or descent; and yet, while including all of African descent in your population, you refuse to receive their petitions.
The present proposition is aggravated by well-attested facts in our history. A colored man, Crispus Attucks, was the first martyr of our Revolutionary struggle. Throughout the long war of seven years, while national independence was still doubtful, colored men fought sometimes in the same ranks with the whites, and sometimes in separate companies, but always with patriotic courage, and often under the eye of Washington. The blood of the two races mingled, and, dying on the same field, they were buried beneath the same sod. And this same association was continued throughout the War of 1812, in all our naval contests, and especially in the Battle of Lake Erie under Perry, and of Lake Champlain under Macdonough, where colored men performed a conspicuous part. But no better testimony can be presented than the eloquent proclamation of General Jackson, before the Battle of New Orleans, where he calls upon the “free colored inhabitants of Louisiana” to take part in the contest as American soldiers, and speaks of them by implication as “fellow-citizens.”[148] “American soldiers” and “fellow-citizens”: such is the language of Andrew Jackson, when speaking of those whom you would despoil of a venerable right.