From this time forward, the discussion proceeded in the press, in public meetings, and in Congress, followed by the measures of Reconstruction, including especially the requirement by Congress of the colored suffrage in the reorganization of the Rebels and in their new Constitutions,[175] all of which assumed the power of Congress.
At this moment our domestic relations all hinge upon one question,—How to treat the Rebel States. No patriot citizen doubts the triumph of our arms in the suppression of the Rebellion. Early or late triumph is inevitable,—perhaps by sudden collapse of the bloody imposture, or perhaps by slower and more gradual surrender. For ourselves, we are prepared for either alternative, and shall not be disappointed, if constrained to wait yet a little longer; but when the day of triumph comes, political duties will take the place of military. The victory won by our soldiers must be assured by wise counsels, so that its hard-earned fruits shall not be lost.
The relations of the States to the National Government must be carefully considered,—not too boldly, not too timidly,—that we may understand in what way or by what process the transition from Rebel forms may be most surely accomplished. If I do not greatly err, it will be found that the powers of Congress, thus far so effective in raising armies and supplying moneys, will be important, if not essential, in fixing the conditions of perpetual peace. But there is one point on which there can be no question. The dogma and delusion of State Rights, as mischievously interpreted, which did so much for the Rebellion, must not be allowed to neutralize all that our arms have gained.
Already, in a remarkable instance, the President has treated the pretension of State Rights with proper indifference. Quietly and without much discussion, he has constituted military governments in the Rebel States, with governors nominated by himself: all of which testifies against the old delusion. Strange will it be, if this extraordinary power, amply conceded to the President, is denied to Congress. Practically, the whole question is opened here. Therefore to this aspect of it I ask your first attention.
Already four military governors have been appointed: one for Tennessee, one for South Carolina, one for North Carolina, and the other for Louisiana. So far as known, the appointment of each was by simple letter from the Secretary of War. But if this can be done in four States, where is the limit? It may be done in every Rebel State; and if not in every other State of the Union, it will be simply because the existence of a valid State government excludes the exercise of this extraordinary power. Assuming, that, as our arms prevail, it will be done in every Rebel State, we shall then have eleven military governors, all deriving authority from one source, ruling a population amounting to upwards of nine millions. And this imperatorial dominion, indefinite in extent, will also be indefinite in duration; for, if, under the Constitution and laws, it be proper to constitute such governors, it is clear that they may be continued without regard to time,—for years, if you please, as well as for weeks; and the whole region they are called to sway will be a military empire, with all powers, executive, legislative, and even judicial, derived from one man in Washington. Talk of “the one-man power!” Here it is with a vengeance. Talk of military rule! Here it is, in the name of a republic.
The bare statement of this case may put us on our guard. We may well hesitate to organize a single State under military government, when we see where such step leads. If you approve one, you must approve eleven, and the National Government may crystallize into military despotism.
In appointing military governors of States, we follow an approved example in certain cases beyond the jurisdiction of the National Constitution,—as in California and Mexico, after their conquest, and before peace. It is evident that in these cases there was no constraint from the Constitution, and we were perfectly free to act according to the assumed exigency. It may be proper to set up military governors for a conquered country beyond our civil jurisdiction, and yet it may be questionable if we should undertake to set up such governors in States that we all claim to be within our civil jurisdiction. At all events, the two cases are different, so that it is not easy to argue from one to the other.
In Jefferson’s Inaugural Address, where he develops what he calls “the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its administration,” he mentions “the supremacy of the civil over the military authority” as one of these “essential principles,” and then says:—
“These should be the creed of our political faith, the text of civil instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps, and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.”[176]