Constantly, and in everything, we behold the constitutional subordination of the States. But there are other provisions by which the States are expressly deprived of important powers. For instance: “No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.” Or, if the States may exercise certain powers, it is only with the consent of Congress. For instance: “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power.” Here is a magistral power accorded to Congress utterly inconsistent with the pretensions of State Rights. Then again: “No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.” Here, again, is a similar magistral power accorded to Congress; and as if still further to deprive the States of their much vaunted sovereignty, the laws which they make with the consent of Congress are expressly declared to be subject “to the revision and control of the Congress.” There is still another instance. According to the Constitution, “Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State”; but here mark the controlling power of Congress, which is authorized to “prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”
There are five other provisions of the Constitution by which its supremacy is positively established. (1.) “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” As Congress has the exclusive power to establish “an uniform rule of naturalization,” it may, under these words of the Constitution, secure for its newly entitled citizens “all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” in defiance of State Rights. (2.) “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.” According to these words, the States cannot even determine their associates, but are dependent in this respect upon the will of Congress. (3.) Not content with taking from the States these important functions of sovereignty, it is solemnly declared that the Constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties under the authority of the United States, “shall be the supreme law of the land,—anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” Thus are State Rights again subordinated to the National Constitution, which is erected into the paramount authority. (4.) This is done again by another provision, which declares that “the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution”; so that not only State laws are subordinated to the National Constitution, but the makers of State laws and all other State officers are constrained to declare allegiance to this Constitution, thus placing the State, alike through its acts and its agents, in complete subordination to the sovereignty of the United States. (5.) This sovereignty is further proclaimed in the solemn injunction, that “the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion.” Here are duties of guaranty and protection imposed upon the United States, by which their position is fixed as the supreme power. There can be no such guaranty without the implied right to examine and consider the governments of the several States, and there can be no such protection without a similar right to examine and consider the condition of the several States, subjecting them to the rightful supervision and superintendence of the National Government.
Thus, whether we regard the large powers vested in Congress, the powers denied to the States absolutely, the powers denied to the States without the consent of Congress, or those other provisions which accord supremacy to the United States, we find the pretension of State sovereignty without foundation, except in the imagination of its partisans. Before the Constitution such sovereignty may have existed; it was declared in the Articles of Confederation; but since then it has ceased. It has disappeared and been lost in the supremacy of the National Government, so that it can no longer be recognized. Perverse men, insisting that it still existed, and weak men, mistaking the shadow of former power for the reality, have made arrogant claims in its behalf. When the Constitution was proclaimed, and George Washington took his oath to support it as President, our career as a nation began, with all the unity of a nation. The States remained as living parts of the body, important to the national strength, and essential to those currents which maintain national life, but plainly subordinate to the United States, which then and there stood forth a nation, one and indivisible.
The new Government had hardly been inaugurated before it was disturbed by the pestilent pretension of State Rights, which has never ceased to disturb it since. Discontent with the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, negotiated by that purest patriot, John Jay, under instructions from Washington, in 1794, led Virginia, even at that early day, to commence an opposition to its ratification, in the name of State Rights. Shortly afterwards appeared the famous resolutions of Virginia and of Kentucky, usually known as the “Resolutions of ’98,” declaring that the National Government was founded on compact between the States, and claiming for the States the right to sit in judgment on the National Government, and to interpose, if they thought fit: all this, as you will see, in the name of State Rights. This pretension increased, till, at last, on the mild proposition to attach a prospective prohibition of Slavery as a condition to the admission of Missouri into the Union as a new State, the opposition raged furiously, even to the extent of menacing the existence of the Union; and this, too, was done in the name of State Rights. Ten years later the pretension took the famous form of Nullification, insisting that the National Government was only a compact of States, any one of which was free to annul an Act of Congress at its own pleasure; and all this in the name of State Rights. For a succession of years afterwards,—at the presentation of petitions against Slavery, petitions for the recognition of Hayti, at the question of Texas, at the Wilmot Proviso, at the admission of California as a Free State, at the discussion of the Compromises of 1850, at the Kansas Question,—the Union was menaced; and always in the name of State Rights. The menace was constant; and it sometimes showed itself on small as well as great occasions, but always in the name of State Rights. When it was supposed that Fremont was about to be chosen President the menace became louder, and mingling with it was the hoarse mutter of war; and all this audacity was in the name of State Rights.
But in the autumn of 1860, on the election of Abraham Lincoln, the case became much worse. Scarcely was the result known by telegraph, before the country was startled by other intelligence, to the effect that certain States at the South were about to put in execution the long pending threat of Secession, of course in the name of State Rights. First came South Carolina, which, by Ordinance adopted in a State Convention, undertook to repeal the original Act by which the Constitution was adopted in this State, and to declare that South Carolina had ceased to be one of the States of the Union. At the same time a Declaration of Independence was put forth by the State, which proceeded to organize as an independent community. This example was followed successively by other States, which, by formal Acts of Secession, undertook to dissolve relations with the Union, always, be it understood, in the name of State Rights. A new Confederation was formed by these States, with a new Constitution, and Jefferson Davis at its head; and the same oaths of loyalty by which the local functionaries of all these States had been bound to the Union were now transferred to this new Confederation, of course in utter violation of the Constitution of the United States, but always in the name of State Rights. The Ordinances of Secession were next maintained by war, which, beginning with the assault upon Fort Sumter, convulsed the whole country, till, at last, all the States of the new Confederation were in open rebellion, which the Government of the United States is now exerting its energies, mustering its forces, and taxing its people to suppress. The original claim, in the name of State Rights, has swollen to all the proportions of an unparalleled war, which, in the name of State Rights, now menaces the national life.
The pretensions in the name of State Rights are not all told. While the Ordinances of Secession were maturing, and before they were yet consummated, Mr. Buchanan, who was then President, declined to interfere, on the ground that what had been done was by States, and that it was contrary to the theory of our Government “to coerce a State,” thus making the pretension of State Rights the apology for imbecility. Had the President then interfered promptly and loyally, it cannot be doubted that this whole intolerable crime might have been trampled out forever. And now, when it is proposed that Congress shall organize governments in these States, which are absolutely without loyal governments, we are met by the objection founded on State Rights. The same disastrous voice which from the beginning of our history has sounded in our ears still makes itself heard; but, alas! it is now on the lips of friends. Just in proportion as it prevails, it is impossible to establish the Constitution again throughout the Rebel States. State Rights are fully triumphant, if, first, in their name Rebel governments can be organized, and then again in their name Congressional governments to replace the Rebel governments can be resisted. If they can be employed, first to sever the States from the Union, and then to prevent the Union from extending its power over them, State Rights are at once sword and buckler to the Rebellion. It was through the imbecility of Mr. Buchanan that the States were allowed to use the sword: God forbid that now, through any similar imbecility of Congress, they shall be allowed to use the buckler!
And here we are brought to the practical question destined to occupy so much of public attention. It is proposed to bring the action of Congress to bear directly upon the Rebel States. This may be by the establishment of provisional governments under authority of Congress, or simply by making the admission or recognition of the States depend upon the action of Congress. The essential feature of the proposition is, that Congress shall assume jurisdiction of the Rebel States. A bill authorizing provisional governments in these States was introduced into the Senate by Mr. Harris, of the State of New York, and was afterwards reported from the Judiciary Committee of that body; but it was left with unfinished business, when the late Congress expired on the fourth of March. The opposition to this proposition, so far as I understand it, assumes two forms: first, that these States are always to be regarded as States, with much vaunted State Rights, and therefore cannot be governed by Congress; and, secondly, that, if any government is to be established over them, it must be simply a military government, with a military governor appointed by the President, as is the case with Tennessee and North Carolina. But State Rights are as much disturbed by a military government as by a Congressional government. The local government is as much set aside in one case as in the other. If the President, within State limits, can proceed to organize a military government to exercise all the powers of the State, surely Congress can proceed to organize a civil government within the same limits for the same purpose; nor can any pretension of State Rights be effective against Congress more than against President. Indeed, the power belongs to Congress by a higher title than it belongs to President: first, because a civil government is more in harmony with our institutions, and, wherever possible, is required; and, secondly, because there are provisions of the Constitution under which this power is clearly derived.
Assuming, then, that the pretension of State Rights is as valid against one form of government as against the other, and still further assuming, that, in the case of military governments, this pretension is practically overruled by the President at least, we are brought again to consider its efficacy when advanced against Congressional governments.