‘Hath to its plighted faith and vow forever firmly stood;
And though it promised to its loss, yet makes that promise good.’”[158]
In harmony with this exclamation of the plenipotentiary are the words of Vattel, an authority much quoted at the time: “To refuse an ally the succors we owe him, without any good ground of dispensation, is doing him an injury, … and there being a natural obligation to repair the damage caused by our fault, and especially by our injustice, we are bound to indemnify an ally for all the losses he may have sustained from our unjust refusal.”[159]
Since the signature of the treaties times had changed, and men had changed with them. There was no bad faith on either side, in the ordinary sense of the term, but intervening events and exigencies of self-defence had driven each into unexpected inconsistencies of conduct. If on one side there was neglect of original engagements, there was on the other equal neglect of international duties. The tornado in mad career uprooted old landmarks, and each was striving to find new lines of reciprocal relations. Franklin, signing the “guaranty,” did not expect so soon to call down upon his country the lightnings of an embattled world; nor did France, while formally conceding neutral rights on the ocean and assuring our national independence, expect so soon to become the plunderer of our commerce. But the great tragedy would have been less complete, if its domineering Nemesis had suffered the two republics to dwell in harmony together. They were whirled, on each side, into those questionable acts out of which have sprung the claims and counter-claims now under consideration.
A new French minister was at hand, accredited to President Washington, with fresh instructions. Differences on the obligations of the guaranty appeared in the Cabinet,—some holding that no necessity for decision existed, as France had made no demand,—and others, that, the Treaty of Alliance being plainly defensive, the guaranty did not apply to a war begun by France. After ample discussion, the Proclamation of Neutrality was adopted, April 22, 1793, destined to become a turning-point in our history. Chief Justice Marshall, whose opportunities of information were unquestionable, lets us know that the Proclamation “was intended to prevent the French minister from demanding the performance of the guaranty contained in the Treaty of Alliance.”[160] But before the Proclamation reached France, orders were issued there for the capture and confiscation of enemy goods on board neutral vessels; whereas it was stipulated with the United States that free ships should make free goods; so that, even if the denial of the guaranty was wrong, and the Proclamation, according to French accusation, “insidious,” the United States were not the first to offend.
On the day of the Proclamation came news by the journals that Genet, the new French minister, had landed in South Carolina, where, amid the darkest days of the Revolution, Lafayette had also first landed. Full of conviction that France had only to make herself heard in order to be sustained, Genet exalted himself conspicuously above the Government. By instructions from the Executive Council of the French Republic, dated 17th of January, 1793, he was enjoined “to penetrate profoundly the sense of the treaties of 1778, and to watch over the articles favorable to the commerce and navigation of the United States, and to make the Americans consider engagements which might appear onerous as the just price of the independence which the French nation had secured to them.” Not content with existing safeguards, the new minister was to negotiate a supplementary treaty, to fix more surely “the reciprocal guaranty of the possessions of the two powers.”[161] In this spirit he commenced a turbulent career, charging offensively that the President, before knowing what the minister had to communicate from the French Republic, was in a hurry “to proclaim sentiments on which decency and friendship should at least have drawn a veil,”—that he “took on himself to give to our treaties arbitrary interpretations absolutely contrary to their true sense,” and that “he left no other indemnification to France for the blood she spilt, for the treasure she dissipated, in fighting for the independence of the United States, but the illusory advantage of bringing into their ports the prizes made on their enemies without being able to sell them,”—and that the Secretary of War, on his communication of the wish of the Windward Islands “to receive promptly some fire-arms and some cannon, which might put into a state of defence possessions guarantied by the United States, had the front to answer, with an ironical carelessness, that the principles established by the President did not permit him to lend so much as a pistol.”[162] In another letter, the French minister, under date of June 8, 1793, requires that “the Federal Government should observe the public engagements contracted, and give to the world the example of a true neutrality, which does not consist in the cowardly abandonment of friends at the moment when danger menaces.”[163] And in still another letter, dated June 22, 1793, he declares that “it is in the conventional compacts, collectively, that we ought to seek contracts of alliance and of commerce simultaneously made, if we wish to take their sense and interpret faithfully the intentions of the people who cemented them, and of the men of genius who dictated them.”[164] All of which was followed by another letter, dated November 14, 1793, in which the minister says categorically: “I beg you to lay before the President of the United States, as soon as possible, the decree and the inclosed note, and to obtain from him the earliest decision, either as to the guaranty I have claimed the fulfilment of for our colonies, or upon the mode of negotiation of the new treaty I was charged to propose to the United States, and which would make of the two nations but one family.”[165] At last Genet was recalled, but the question of our engagements with France could not be dismissed. It was more menacing than any minister. Without it all the turbulence of Genet would have been as the idle wind.
And yet, for a while, each party seems to have practised a certain reserve. Genet stormed, but the Government at home was tranquil. The “guaranty” was suspended, even in discussion. France forbore to press it, and the United States were happy to avoid the over-shadowing question. The Secretary of State, in instructions to Mr. Monroe, dated June 10, 1794, while “insisting upon compensation for the captures and spoliations of our property and injuries to the persons of our citizens by French cruisers,” was careful to add: “If the execution of the guaranty of the French islands by force of arms should be propounded, you will refer the Republic of France to this side of the water.”[166] Mr. Monroe, in his correspondence, under date of September 15, 1794, says: “This Republic had declined calling on us to execute the guaranty, from a spirit of magnanimity, and strong attachment to our welfare”; but he reveals his anxiety lest an attempt to press our case “might give birth to sentiments of a different kind, and create a disposition to call on us to execute that of the Treaty of Alliance.”[167] In another letter, dated November 7, 1794, describing an interview with the very able Diplomatic Committee, our plenipotentiary confesses the embarrassment he encountered, when M. Merlin three times asked, “Do you insist upon our executing the treaty?” and he gives his reply, that he “was not instructed by the President to insist on it, nor did he insist on it”; and he avows that in his opinion such insistence would have been impolitic, as “exciting a disposition to press us on other points, upon which it were better to avoid any discussion.”[168] There is other testimony of this nature, unnecessary to produce. Suffice it to say, that for some time there was a lull, soon to be followed by a storm.
French forbearance is more remarkable, when it is considered that the occasion for the “guaranty” had begun to be urgent. Even before Howe’s great victory of June, over the French fleet, the British navy swept the sea, rendering all French possessions insecure. Martinique, San Domingo, St. Lucia, and Guadeloupe were lost to the Republic in the spring of 1794, so that the British historian has written: “Thus, in little more than a month, the French were entirely dispossessed of their West India possessions, with hardly any loss to the victorious nation.”[169] But the “guaranty” was invoked by the impatient colonists, who, without waiting the slower movement of the French Republic, appealed directly to our Congress for “divers necessary succors, of provision, ammunition, and even men,” and in impassioned language pictured “England come to take possession of the French colonies in the name of a king without dominions, and North America, witness to that political perfidy, not able to lend a helping hand against an unworthy treachery.”[170] The French Government at home did not share the fury of the colonists. According to Mr. Monroe, in his letter of December 2, 1794, whatever may have been their desires at a previous stage, they did not now wish us to “embark with them in the war,” but “would rather we would not, from an idea it might diminish their supplies from America,” and “if the point depended on them, they would leave us to act in that respect according to our own wishes”; at the same time they looked to us for “aid in the article of money.”[171] This moderation, although a temporary waiver, was in no respect a renunciation of rights. According to Mr. Jefferson, in a letter written some months after his retirement from the Cabinet, and addressed to Mr. Madison, under date of April 3, 1794, the “guaranty” was still obligatory. “As to the guaranty of the French islands,” he wrote, “whatever doubts may be entertained of the moment at which we ought to interpose, yet I have no doubt but that we ought to interpose at a proper time, and declare both to England and France that these islands are to rest with France, and that we will make a common cause with the latter for that object.”[172] Such was American testimony.
The West India islands were lost without causing an apparent smart at home; but it was different, when the news came of Mr. Jay’s negotiation in England. The Republic was stung to the quick, and, when the treaty became known, did not conceal its indignant anger. In a formal note, dated March 9, 1796, it set forth its complaints, dwelling especially upon the “inexecution of the treaties,” and upon the formation of the recent treaty with Great Britain, in which the United States “knowingly and evidently sacrificed their connections with the Republic.”[173] In conversation with Mr. Monroe, the French minister said “that France had much cause of complaint against us, independently of our treaty with England, but that by this treaty ours with them was annihilated.”[174] The year closed with the recall of Mr. Monroe, and with a notice from the French Government “that it will no longer recognize nor receive a Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States, until after a reparation of the grievances demanded of the American Government, and which the French Republic has a right to expect”; and then, adding ingratitude to the list of our offences, it declared an equal expectation “that the successors of Columbus, Raleigh, and Penn, always proud of their liberty, will never forget that they owe it to France.”[175] Meanwhile, M. Adet, the French plenipotentiary in Philadelphia, was addressing our Government in similar strain, calling for the discharge of our engagements, and heaping reproaches: “The undersigned, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, now fulfils to the Secretary of State of the United States a painful, but sacred duty. He claims, in the name of American honor, in the name of the faith of treaties, the execution of that contract which assured to the United States their existence, and which France regarded as the pledge of the most sacred union between two people the freest upon earth.” And he charges the Government of the United States with “sacrificing France to her enemies,” “forgetting the services that she had rendered it,” and “throwing aside the duty of gratitude, as if ingratitude was a Governmental duty.”[176] From this time forward the claims of the United States never failed to encounter the counter-claims of France.