I had not intended to say a word on this occasion; but I could not listen to the remarks of the Senator, so harsh and unfeeling toward a whole race, belonging to the human family, like himself, without interposing a solemn protest.
Since this debate began, I have sent to the Law Library for a volume containing the authoritative words of a distinguished Southern jurist, a slaveholder, with regard to the electoral franchise. It has been a question, in what States, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, colored persons enjoyed this franchise. I say nothing now about the more northern States; but there is a State, sometimes referred to, with regard to which there is peculiar evidence: I mean North Carolina. The enjoyment of the electoral franchise by colored persons in that State for a long time after the Constitution is not a matter of doubt. Her most eminent magistrate, the late Mr. Justice Gaston, accomplished as a jurist and as a man, whom I remember well in most agreeable personal intercourse, laid down the law of his State in emphatic words. Pronouncing the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the case of The State v. Manuel, in 1838, he said:—
“Slaves manumitted here become freemen, and therefore, if born within North Carolina, are citizens of North Carolina; and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State.… The Constitution extended the elective franchise to every freeman who had arrived at the age of twenty-one and paid a public tax; and it is a matter of universal notoriety, that, under it, free persons, without regard to color, claimed and exercised the franchise, until it was taken from free men of color a few years since by our amended Constitution.”[342]
There is still another case, that of The State v. Newsom, which was decided in 1844, where the Supreme Court of North Carolina, after citing the opinion of Judge Gaston from which I have just read, proceeds:—
“That case underwent a very laborious investigation, both by the bar and the bench.… The case was brought here by appeal, and was felt to be one of great importance in principle. It was considered with an anxiety and care worthy of the principle involved, and which gave it a controlling influence and authority on all questions of a similar character.”[343]
Therefore not hastily or carelessly did the Supreme Court of North Carolina declare colored persons to be voters under the State Constitution.
Such was the constitutional law of North Carolina, fashioned by our fathers under the influence of the Declaration of Independence. Sir, I am content with that law. I do not think the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Cowan], though he represents a Northern State, can mend that law from a Slave State. Nor do I think that any of us on this floor can feel humbled, if our judgment is postponed to that of Judge Gaston of North Carolina, who did not hesitate to declare positively the constitutional law of human rights, by virtue of which colored persons are citizens. And if they are citizens, how can you deny them the electoral franchise?
I am content to leave the question here, adding, that, as I understand it, I shall deem it my duty to vote against all propositions creating any discrimination of color. At this moment of revolution, when our country needs the blessing of Almighty God and the strong arms of all her children, this is not the time for us solemnly to enact injustice. In duty to our country, and in duty to God, I plead against any such thing. We must be against Slavery in its original shape, and in all its brood of prejudice and error.
This bill was never considered again; but the question of colored suffrage in Washington reappeared.
May 24th, Mr. Wade, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, reported a joint resolution to amend the charter of the city of Washington, which was read twice and considered as in Committee of the Whole. In reporting it, he said: “It relates to the registration of voters; and if it is to be passed at all, it ought to be passed immediately. I believe there is no objection to it. It alters none of the present qualifications of voters, but improves the present law as to registration, which is very defective.”