Thus, while Great Britain was saved from the restitution of the ships, Portugal was compelled to suffer.
Such are historic precedents furnished by Great Britain to illustrate the case of the Florida. In face of this long array, it is difficult to see how British critics or British ministers can venture to reproach us.
From this review it appears, that, where ships have been captured in neutral waters, their restitution was at least on one occasion positively refused by a British minister of commanding authority, while on other occasions it was avoided from destruction of the ships. If the American commander who undertook this business at Bahia had done it completely, there would be little difficulty now. There were fire and water both at his service. He might have burned the Florida or scuttled her at once, and his offence would have been no greater than now, while, according to the precedents, his Government would have been relieved from embarrassment.
But there are peculiar circumstances which distinguish this instance from every other. They may be mentioned under two heads: I shall only allude to them.
First. The Florida was illegitimate and piratical in origin and conduct, being little more than a lawless gypsy of the sea,—born contrary to the Law of Nations, and living in constant defiance of that law.
Secondly. The Florida pretended to belong to a Rebel combination of slave-masters, now engaged in rebellion for the sake of Slavery. Though certain foreign powers, including Brazil, have conceded to this Rebel combination what are called “belligerent rights,” yet the extent of this concession is undecided. Of course, it is much less than a recognition of national independence. Every presumption must be against such a Rebel combination, having such an object. The indecent haste with which “belligerent rights” were originally conceded cannot be forgotten now; nor can we neglect the well-founded argument, that, in the absence of prize courts belonging to the pretended power, any such concession on the ocean was flagrantly unjust, and, when we consider its wide-spread consequences, to be reprehended always by our Government, as it must be by impartial history. Assuming that the restitution of a ship belonging to an independent power, as to France or England, might be properly required, it does not follow that such restitution should be required in a case like the present, where the pretended owner is not an independent power, and where the ship was lawless in origin and conduct,—or, in other words, that Brazil should expect the United States to restore the Florida, that it might be handed over again to the support of a slaveholding Rebellion and to burn more ships.
I call attention to these considerations without expressing any final opinion. The case of Koszta, forcibly taken by an American frigate from an Austrian ship-of-war in the territorial waters of Turkey, shows how the conduct of governments is sometimes inconsistent with strict law. An explanation and apology were promptly offered to Turkey, whose neutrality had been violated; but this was all. There was no offer on our part to surrender Koszta; nor was there any demand by Turkey for his restitution. But the present case is stronger than that of Koszta.