4. I come, in the last place, to the influence of the treaty on the revenue of our country; and here the custom-house is our principal witness. The means of determining this question are found in the authentic tables published from time to time in Reports of the Treasury, and especially in the report to Congress at this session, which I have in my hand.
Looking at these tables, we find certain unanswerable points. I begin with an estimate founded on the trade before the treaty. From this it appears, that, if no treaty had been made, and the trade had increased in the same ratio as before the treaty, Canada would have paid to the United States in the ten years of the treaty at least $16,373,880, from which she has been relieved. This sum is actually lost to the revenue of the United States. In return, Canada has given up $2,650,890, being the amount it would have collected, if no treaty had been made. This vast disproportion is to the detriment of the national revenue.
Here is another illustration, derived from the tables. During the ten years of the treaty the United States have actually paid in duties to Canada alone $16,802,962, while during this same period Canada has paid in duties to the United States the very moderate sum of $930,447. Here again is vast disproportion, to the detriment of the national revenue.
The same inequality is seen in another way. During the ten years of the treaty dutiable products of the United States have entered Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $84,347,019, while during this same period dutiable products of Canada and the other provinces have entered the United States only to the amount of $7,750,482. During this same period free products of the United States have entered Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $118,853,972, while free products of Canada and the other provinces have entered the United States to the amount of $178,500,184. Here, again, is vast disproportion to the detriment of the national revenue.
Add to these various results the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, just laid on our tables, in the following words:—
“The treaty [during the eight fiscal years 1855-63] has released from duty a total sum of $42,333,257 in value of goods of Canada more than of goods the produce of the United States.”[42]
This conclusion is in substantial harmony with that reached from an independent examination of the tables.
These various illustrations show that the revenue of the United States has suffered by the treaty, and that in this important particular its advantages are not shared equally by the two countries. Here, at least, it loses title to its name.
But its onerous character has become manifest in other forms since the adoption of our system of internal revenue. I need not remind the Senate of the extent to which we have gone in seeking out objects of excise,—and there are pending propositions in the same direction, seeking new objects; but it is notorious that such taxation is always graduated with reference to the tariff on the same objects, when imported from abroad. But here the Reciprocity Treaty steps forward with imperative veto. Thus, for instance, the lumber of our country is left free from excise, though I am assured it might well bear it, simply because no countervailing tax can be imposed upon lumber from the British provinces. Had a tax of five per cent been imposed upon the lumber of our country, I am assured, by those familiar with the subject, that we should have received at least $5,000,000,—all of which is lost to our annual revenue. This is only a single illustration.