Mr. Justice Grier said, with great point:—
“To what purpose commit to Congress the power of regulating our intercourse with foreign nations and among the States, if these regulations may be changed at the discretion of each State?… It is, therefore, not left to the discretion of each State in the Union either to refuse a right of passage to persons or property through her territory, or to exact a duty for permission to exercise it.”[71]
But this is the very thing now done by New Jersey, which “exacts a duty” from passengers across the State.
I call attention also to the case of the Wheeling Bridge, where Congress, under peculiar circumstances, exercised this identical power. In this case the State of Pennsylvania denied the power of Virginia to authorize a bridge across the Ohio River obstructing navigation; but, under the pressure of public demand, and in the exercise of the very powers now invoked, Congress declared the Wheeling Bridge a lawful structure, anything in any State law to the contrary notwithstanding. The Supreme Court, after the passage of this Act, denied a motion to punish the owners of the bridge for contempt in rebuilding it, and affirmed that the Act declaring the Wheeling Bridge a lawful structure was within the legitimate exercise by Congress of its constitutional power to regulate commerce.[72] This very power is here invoked in a case more important and far more urgent than that of the Wheeling Bridge.
There is also another case. I refer to the Steubenville Bridge and Holliday’s Cove Railroad across the Ohio, in what is called the Panhandle of Virginia. This bridge was first attempted under a charter granted by Ohio; but Congress at last interfered, and enacted,—
“That the bridge partly constructed across the Ohio River at Steubenville, in the State of Ohio, abutting on the Virginia shore of said river, is hereby declared to be a lawful structure.”
“That the said bridge and Holliday’s Cove Railroad are hereby declared a public highway, and established a post-road for the purpose of transmission of mails of the United States.”[73]
Such are precedents of courts and of statutes, showing how completely this power belongs to Congress in the regulation of internal commerce. The authorities are plain and explicit. They cannot be denied. They cannot be explained away. It would be superfluous to dwell on them. There they stand like so many granite columns, fit supports of that internal commerce, in itself a chief support of the Union.