The proposition to found representation on voters instead of population may be seen, first, in what it does not, and, secondly, in what it does.
Seeing it in what it does not, all will confess that it does not carry into the Constitution itself the idea of Inequality of Rights, thus defiling that unspotted text; that it gives no sanction to the acknowledged tyranny of taxation without representation; that it makes no concession to State Rights, at a moment when we are recovering from a terrible war waged against us in the name of State Rights; that it does not recognize an oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, and monopoly founded on color; that it does not petrify in the Constitution the wretched pretension of a white man’s government; that it does not assume, what is false in Constitutional Law, that color can be a “qualification” for a voter; that it does not positively tie the hands of Congress in fixing the meaning of a republican government, so that under the guaranty clause it will be constrained to recognize an oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, and monopoly founded on color, together with the tyranny of taxation without representation, as not inconsistent with such a government; that it does not positively tie the hands of Congress in completing and consummating the abolition of Slavery according to the second clause of the Constitutional Amendment; that it does not install recent rebels in permanent power over loyal citizens; that it does not show forth in unmistakable character as a compromise of human rights, the most questionable of any in our history. All these things, so offensive to the conscience and the reason, this proposition avoids. In all these respects it is at least blameless.
On the other hand, without inflicting any stigma upon the Constitution or upon the Republic, without abandoning any principle, without making any concession to the States, without tying the hands of Congress, and without any compromise of human rights, it does rearrange the basis of representation so as to accomplish all that is proposed even by the most sanguine supporters of the other attempt, and it does this effectually, without the opportunity for evasion afforded by the other proposition. The alleged inequality in operation, owing to excess of females over males in certain States, may make you hesitate; but better take representation founded on voters, even with any such alleged inequality, than do a grievous wrong. Better wrong yourselves than wrong others.
Let me confess that I was tempted to this proposition by the conviction that I was carrying out the cherished idea of Massachusetts embodied in her own Constitution. According to a recent Amendment, the representation in both branches of the Legislature is founded on “legal voters,” and not on population. Here are the words.
“A census of the legal voters of each city and town on the first day of May shall be taken and returned into the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth.… The enumeration aforesaid shall determine the apportionment of Representatives for the periods between the taking of the census.
“The House of Representatives shall consist of two hundred and forty members, which shall be apportioned by the Legislature, at its first session after the return of each enumeration as aforesaid, to the several counties of the Commonwealth, equally, as nearly as may be, according to their relative numbers of legal voters, as ascertained by the next preceding special enumeration.…
“The Senate shall consist of forty members. The General Court shall, at its first session after each next preceding special enumeration, divide the Commonwealth into forty districts of adjacent territory, each district to contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of legal voters, according to the enumeration aforesaid.… Each district shall elect one Senator.”[252]
Obviously, in adopting this rule, Massachusetts has followed what seems a correct principle. Representative government is an invention of modern times. It was unknown in antiquity. Athens was a democracy where the people met in public assembly for the government of the state: there was no representative body chosen by the people for this purpose. The public assembly was practicable in that age, as the state was small, and the assembly seldom exceeded six thousand citizens,—a large town meeting, or mass meeting, which Milton has termed “that fierce democratie.” But where the territory was extensive and the population scattered and numerous, there could be no assembly of the whole body of citizens. To meet this precise difficulty the representative system was devised. By a machinery so obvious that we are astonished it was not employed in the ancient commonwealths, the people, though scattered and numerous, are gathered, through their chosen representatives, into a small and deliberative assembly, where, without tumult or rashness, they may consider and determine all questions which concern them. In every representative body properly constituted the people are practically present.
If, then, the representative body is a substitute for the people themselves meeting in primary assemblies, it would seem that it must be founded upon the people who compose the primary assemblies,—in other words, upon legal voters. Ordinarily there may be little difference between the proportion of legal voters and the proportion of population; but, strictly, the representative system is the agent of legal voters, and therefore the logic of the case is better satisfied, if it be founded on legal voters rather than on population. With me this is no new idea. On another occasion, in my own State, I asserted it. This was in a Convention for revising the Constitution of Massachusetts, as long ago as 1853. Pardon me, if I read a brief passage from a speech in that Convention, not from any importance which I attach to it, but as showing how completely at that time this rule seemed to me just.
“A practical question arises here, whether this rule should be applied to the whole body of population, including women, children, and unnaturalized foreigners, or to those only who exercise the electoral franchise,—in other words, to voters. It is probable that the rule would produce nearly similar results in both cases, as voters, except in few places, would bear a uniform proportion to the whole population. But it is easy to determine what the principle of the Representative system requires. Since its object is to provide a practical substitute for meetings of the people, it should be founded, in just proportion, on the numbers of those who, according to our Constitution, can take part in those meetings,—that is, upon the qualified voters. The representative body should be a miniature or abridgment of the electoral body,—in other words, of those allowed to participate in public affairs.”[253]