Both these propositions are opposed as informal and inoperative, because without machinery or penalty. Such is the objection, if I understand it. As it has been made, I answer it. Each on its face is an Act of Congress prohibiting denial of certain rights on account of color. In this respect each is at least a Congressional interpretation of the Constitution, and it is by no means clear that it could not be enforced in the courts. The bill which has already passed the House of Representatives, striking out the word “white” in the electoral laws of the District of Columbia, is without machinery or penalty; but it is at least a Congressional declaration, to be followed, of course, by other legislation with proper machinery and penalty; and this is the precise character of the measures presented by the Senator from Illinois and myself. Objection, if valid at all, must be equally valid against the bill for enfranchisement in the District of Columbia, and against every other Congressional declaration without machinery or penalty. It is, at most, one of form, which I put aside and advance to the substance. The question is too vast and the times are too serious for a special demurrer. It must be tried on its merits. The question is on the power of Congress to establish equality of political rights, at least in the Rebel States. If Congress has this beneficent power, then exercise it in such form as shall seem best, with machinery and penalty or without machinery and penalty; but, in God’s name, exercise it, for the sake of the country, which suffers from your delay.
Has Congress power to secure equality of political rights, at least in the Rebel States? I do not at this time raise the question of its power throughout the United States, but in the Rebel States. If this question were less transcendent in its relations, or if it could be approached calmly and without prejudice, in the light of reason, I cannot doubt the judgment. But you must bring to its determination the same simple desire for truth, undisturbed by external influences, which would control a judicial tribunal; for, in the determination of your powers under the Constitution, you are a judicial tribunal. It will not be enough to deny the beneficent power, or to mock at those who find it in the Constitution. You must answer their arguments.
1. I need not dwell on what has been so often discussed and so much misunderstood; and yet I must remind you of the power of Congress over the Rebel States from the necessity of the case; because, after the overthrow of legitimate governments, whose members were sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, there was no other rule possible for these States than that of Congress,—precisely as the Territories, according to Chief Justice Marshall, in a famous judgment, fell under “the power and jurisdiction of the United States” from the necessity of the case.[257] I do not say that a State becomes a technical Territory, as that term is understood among us; but I do say, that, in the lapse of the Rebel States, and in the absence of legitimate governments with members sworn to support the Constitution, these States fell under “the power and jurisdiction of the United States,”—meaning, practically, Congress,—until such time as they are reorganized according to the requirement of the Constitution. In the exercise of such a power and jurisdiction thus cast upon it, Congress must see that all loyal citizens, without distinction of color, take part in the formation of the new governments.[258]
2. Nor need I dwell on another source of power, found in the rights of war; but this, too, must be made plain. Nobody doubts that the United States were justified in asserting supremacy in the Rebel States by force of arms. But the war, when once begun, was subject to all the conditions of war, according to the rights of war found in the Law of Nations,—doubly obligatory on us, first, because we belong to the family of nations, and, secondly, because the Law of Nations is expressly recognized by the Constitution itself. Now, according to the rights of war found in the Law of Nations, a conquering power is justified in requiring not only indemnity for the past, but security for the future. It depends upon the people of the United States, represented in Congress, to determine the guaranties of this security. In support of this conclusion, I ask attention to a familiar authority, whose statement seems to cover the case. I read from Vattel:—
“The whole right of the conqueror comes from that just self-defence which comprehends the maintenance and prosecution of his rights. When, therefore, he has entirely subdued a hostile nation, he may undoubtedly, in the first place, do himself justice with regard to that which gave rise to the war, and indemnify himself for the expenses and damages it has caused him; he may, according to the exigency of the case, impose penalties upon the conquered nation by way of example; he may even, if prudence require, render it incapable of doing harm so easily in future.”[259]
The offending party, when conquered, may be rendered incapable of doing harm so easily in future. This is according to natural justice. Then again the same familiar authority says:—