But the Enabling Act declares that “the constitution, when formed, shall be republican.” This is a fundamental condition. And here I repeat what I have so often said, but which at this hour cannot be too often sounded in the ears of the Senate. I affirm with confidence, that a constitution which denies the first principle of human rights cannot be republican in form. Do you answer, that there are States having such constitutions? Then I reply: We are not called to sit in judgment on those constitutions; we have no power to revise them; we are not to vote upon them; but we are called to sit in judgment upon this constitution, to revise it, and to vote upon it. You are now to declare by your votes whether this constitution which tramples upon the principle of human equality is republican in form. I insist that it is not.

Still further, this Enabling Act declares that “the constitution shall not be repugnant to the principles of the Declaration of Independence.” Need I ask you, What is the first principle of the Declaration of Independence? Is it not, in solemn words, that “all men are created equal,” and that all just government stands on “the consent of the governed”? Does any one deny that these are the words? You know them by heart; your children learn them in their earliest infancy; and whatever is done in the Territory is to be brought to this great ordinance, as to a touchstone. Such is the requirement of the Enabling Act. Therefore, even if you argue that the Enabling Act is authority for this proceeding, then do I reply, that this community has not in any respect brought itself within its terms. It has not complied with its requirements of principle or of proceeding. The proceedings were not according to the Enabling Act; the principles are in defiance of the Enabling Act. Tried by either standard, the whole effort must miserably fail.

Mr. Sumner was here interrupted by Mr. Trumbull, who, quoting from the Territorial election law of 1861 a provision requiring voters to be citizens, remarked, that, while he would not be understood as saying that in his opinion a colored person is not a citizen, such was the understanding in Colorado. Mr. Sumner replied:—

The Governor of the Territory, whose message I hold in my hand, does not put upon the statute the interpretation the Senator does.[278] I have great respect for the opinion of my friend, as he knows; but on this matter I submit, that the Governor of the Territory, on the spot, in a formal communication to the Legislature, is a better authority even than my honorable friend.

Mr. Trumbull. Better than the statute?

Mr. Sumner. I am coming to that. The statute enumerates first in the class of voters citizens of the United States; and my honorable friend himself is obliged to confess that in his opinion colored persons are citizens of the United States. He does not doubt it. If he did, it would be my duty to remind him of an opinion by the Attorney-General of the United States, in 1862, more than a year prior to the Enabling Act, declaring colored persons citizens of the United States.[279] I refer to this opinion with something more than respect: I refer to it with reverence. I do think, humbly speaking, that this opinion was one of the most remarkable and one of the grandest acts in the history of the late Administration. I do not doubt that hereafter, when the annals of these times are written, the historian will dwell with honest pride upon that admirable document, where one man reversed the whole policy of the Nation, fixing the law of this country forever,—that all colored persons are citizens of the United States. And that was the law of Colorado. The Senator from Illinois does not doubt it. Therefore, when the Territorial Legislature added the words “citizens of the United States,” it did not alter the case by a hair’s breadth: all persons could vote, without distinction of color. The Senator is informed that no colored persons did vote. I have been informed the contrary. But I insist, that, beyond all question, by the Territorial statute colored persons were entitled to vote.

Mr. President, such are the facts against the admission of Colorado as a State into this Union. I do not see how you can admit it, without, in the first place, injustice to its own population, at this moment unable to bear the burdens of a State government; secondly, without injustice to the other States, which ought not to find themselves “paired” in this Chamber by two Senators from this small community; and, in the third place, without sacrificing a principle which at this moment is of incalculable importance to the peace of the country. In other times we have heard the cry, No more Slave States! There is kindred cry which must be ours,—No more States with inequality of rights! Against all this I catch a whisper, not an argument. It is breathed that we need two more votes on this floor. Sir, there is something that you need more than two more votes. It is constancy in the support of that great principle so essential to the harmony of the Republic. Better far than any number of votes will be loyalty to this commanding cause. Tell me not that it is expedient to create two more votes in this Chamber. Nothing can be expedient that is not right. If I were now about to pronounce the last words that I could ever utter in this Chamber, I would say to you, Senators, do not forget that right is always the highest expediency. You can never sacrifice the right without suffering for it.

April 25th, the question was taken on Mr. Wilson’s motion to reconsider, and was carried,—Yeas 19, Nays 13. The bill was again before the Senate.

Mr. Sumner then moved his proviso, that the Act should not take effect except upon the fundamental condition that within the State there should be no denial of the elective franchise or of any other rights on account of color or race, which was lost,—Yeas 7, Nays 27.