John Adams, in his Defence of the American Constitutions, written immediately anterior to the National Constitution, concurs with Hamilton.
“But, of all the words in all languages, perhaps there has been none so much abused in this way as the words Republic, Commonwealth, and Popular State. In the Rerum-Publicarum Collectio, of which there are fifty and odd volumes, and many of them very incorrect, France, Spain, and Portugal, the four great Empires, the Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman, and even the Ottoman, are all denominated Republics.”[67]
In his old age the patriarch expressed himself in the same sense, and with equal force.
“The customary meanings of the words Republic and Commonwealth have been infinite. They have been applied to every government under heaven: that of Turkey, and that of Spain, as well as that of Athens and of Rome, of Geneva and San Marino.”[68]
And then again he said:—
“In some writing or other of mine, I happened, currente calamo, to drop the phrase, ‘The word Republic, as it is used, may signify anything, everything, or nothing.’ For this escape I have been pelted, for twenty or thirty years, with as many stones as ever were thrown at St. Stephen, when St. Paul held the clothes of the stoners. But the aphorism is literal, strict, solemn truth. To speak technically, or scientifically, if you will, there are monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical republics. The government of Great Britain and that of Poland are as strictly republics as that of Rhode Island or Connecticut under their old charters.”[69]
In the latter remark, Mr. Adams simply repeats his treatise, where he calls England and Poland “monarchical or regal republics.”[70]
It is plain that our fathers, when they adopted the “guaranty” of “a republican form of government,” intended something certain, or which, if not certain on the face, could be made certain. But this excludes the authority of incongruous and inconsistent examples. They did not use words to signify “anything, everything, or nothing”; nor did they use words which were as applicable to England and Poland as to the United States. Therefore I cannot err in putting aside examples which, however they illustrate republican government in times past, are utterly out of place as a guide to the interpretation of the National Constitution. Something better must be found: nor is it wanting.
I put aside, also, definitions of European writers and lexicographers anterior to the National Constitution; for all these have the vagueness and uncertainty of political truth at that time in Europe. Among these, none is of higher authority than Montesquieu, who brought to political science study, genius, and a liberal spirit. But even this great writer, who profited by all his predecessors, quickens and elevates without furnishing a satisfactory guide. He taught that “Virtue” was the inspiring principle of a republic, and by “virtue” he means the love of country, which, he says, is the love of equality.[71] This is beautiful, and makes Equality a foremost principle; but, with curious inconsistency, he includes “democracy” and “aristocracy” under the term “Republic,”—the former being where the people in mass have the sovereign power, and the latter “where the sovereign power is in the hands of part of the people.” When defining “democracy,” he expresses the importance of the suffrage as a fundamental of government, saying, among other things, that it is as important to regulate by whom the suffrage shall be given as in a monarchy to know who is the monarch.[72] But among all these glimpses of truth there is no definition of “a republican form of government” which can help us in interpreting the National Constitution. Surely an aristocracy, “where the sovereign power is in the hands of part of the people,” cannot find a just place in our political system. It may be “a republican form of government” according to Montesquieu, but it cannot be according to American institutions.
One of the ablest among the modern predecessors of Montesquieu was John Bodin, also a Frenchman, who wrote nearly two centuries earlier. Like the ancient writers, he uses the term “republic” to embrace monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, which he calls “three kinds of republics,”—tria rerumpublicarum genera. If the republic is in the power of one, penes unum, it is a monarchy; if in the power of a few, penes paucos, it is an aristocracy; if in the power of all, penes universos, it is a democracy. Proceeding further, he says that a democracy is “where all or the major part of all the citizens, omnes aut major pars omnium civium, collected together, have the supreme power.”[73] Here the philosopher plainly follows the rule of jurisprudence in regard to corporations; but this definition seems to sanction the exclusion of part of the citizens, less than a majority, while it is inadequate in other respects. It says nothing of equality of rights, or of that great touchstone of the republican idea, the dependence of taxation upon representation.