The bill before the Senate, which the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Edmunds] has shaped with so much care and now presses so earnestly, arises from this necessity. Had Abraham Lincoln been spared to us, there would have been no occasion for any such measure. It is a bill arising from the exigency of the hour. As such it is to be judged. But it does not meet the whole case. Undertaking to give protection, it gives it to a few only, instead of the many. It provides against the removal of persons whose offices, according to existing law and Constitution, are held by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Its special object is to vindicate the power of the Senate over the offices committed to it according to existing law and Constitution. Thus vindicating the power of the Senate, it does something indirectly to protect the citizen. In this respect it is beneficent, and I shall be glad to vote for it.
The amendment goes further in the same direction. It provides that all agents and officers appointed by the President or by the head of a Department, with salaries exceeding $1,000, shall be appointed only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and it further proceeds to vacate all such appointments made since 1st July last past, so as to arrest the recent process of “kicking out.” The proposition is simple; and I insist that it is necessary, unless you are willing to leave fellow-citizens without protection against tyranny. Really the case is so plain that I do not like to argue it, and yet you will pardon me, if I advert to certain objections which have been made.
We have been told that the number of persons it would bring before the Senate is such that it would clog and embarrass the public business,—in other words, that we have not time to deal with so many cases. This is a strange argument. Because the victims are numerous, therefore we are to fold our hands and let the sacrifice proceed. But I insist that just in proportion to the number is the urgency of your duty. Every victim has a voice; and when these voices count by thousands, you have no right to turn away and say, “They are too numerous for the Senate.” This is my answer to the objection founded on numbers.
But this is not all. You did not shrink, during the war, from the numerous nominations of military officers, counting by thousands; nor did you shrink from the numerous nominations of naval officers, counting by thousands. The power over all these you never relaxed, and I know well you never will relax. You know, that, even if unable to consider carefully every case, yet the power over them enables you to interpose a veto on any improper nomination. The power of the Senate is a warning against tyranny in the Executive. But it is difficult to see any strong reason for this power in the case of the army and navy which is not applicable also to civil officers. This I should say in tranquil times; but there is another reason peculiar to the hour. Even if in tranquil times I were disposed to leave the appointing power as it is, I am not disposed to do so now.
Then, again, we are told that we must not abandon the system of our fathers. I have already answered this objection precisely, in saying, that, whatever may have been the system of the Fathers, it is inadequate to the present hour. But I am not satisfied that the proposition moved by me is inconsistent with the system of the Fathers. The officers of the Internal Revenue did not exist then, and the inferior officers of the customs were few in number and with small emoluments. But all district attorneys and marshals, even if their salary was no more than two hundred dollars, were subject to the confirmation of the Senate.
Mr. Edmunds. And so they are yet.
Mr. Sumner. And so they are yet. But can the Senator doubt, that, if, at the time when those officers were made subject to the confirmation of the Senate, weighers and gaugers and inspectors had been as well paid as they are now, they, too, would have been brought under the control of this body? I cannot.
Mr. Edmunds. I do not think they would.
Mr. Sumner. But even if the Senator does not accept the view which I present on the probable course of our fathers, he cannot resist the argument, that, whatever may have been the old system, we must act now in the light of present duties. I repeat, a system good for our fathers may not be good for this hour, which is so full of danger.
Then, again, we are told, with something of indifference, if not of levity, that it is not the duty of the Senate to look after the “bread and butter” of officeholders. This is a familiar way of saying that these small cases are not worthy of the Senate. Not so do I understand our duties. There is no case so small as not to be worthy of the Senate, especially if in this way you can save a citizen from oppression and weaken the power of an oppressor.