I have no purpose of raising any question with regard to the validity of this statute prescribing the election of Senators in joint meeting. Constant usage is in its favor; and yet I have no hesitation in saying that it has always seemed to me inconsistent with a just construction of the National Constitution. Senators are to be “chosen by the Legislature”; but the Legislature is composed of two separate bodies, defined by the State Constitution. Senators, therefore, should be chosen by the two bodies separately. So it has always seemed to me, and the practice of my own State is accordingly. In this opinion I am sustained by so eminent an authority as Chancellor Kent, who, after setting forth the usage, proceeds to express his dissent from it as a just construction of the National Constitution. His language is explicit:—
“I should think, if the question was a new one, that, when the Constitution directed that the Senators should be chosen by the Legislature, it meant, not the members of the Legislature per capita, but the Legislature in the true technical sense, being the two Houses acting in their separate and organized capacities, with the ordinary constitutional right of negative on each other’s proceedings.”[1]
It is difficult to resist this conclusion, especially when it is considered that in any other way the smaller body is actually swamped by the larger. In a joint meeting the Senate loses its relative power. I adduce this, not for criticism, but only for illustration. Even admitting that the received usage of choosing Senators in joint meeting is consistent with the National Constitution, it is clear that it should not be extended; and this is the precise question before us. Contrary to all usage or precedent, and without any direct sanction in the Constitution or statutes of New Jersey, the Legislature has undertaken in joint meeting, not only to choose a Senator, but also to prescribe the manner of choosing him. Finding that it could not choose according to existing usage, it adopted the resolution declaring that the election should be determined by a minority of votes instead of a majority.
In this resolution two questions arise: first, can the Legislature itself, by legislative act, substitute a minority for a majority in the election of Senators, and thus set aside a great and traditional principle? and, secondly, can it do this in a “joint meeting,” without any previous legislative act? It is enough for the present occasion, if I show, that, whatever may be the powers of the Legislature by legislative act, it can have no such extraordinary power in the questionable assembly known as “joint meeting.” But we shall better understand the second question, after considering the first.
To what extent can a Legislature substitute a minority for a majority in any of its proceedings? In most cases the question is controlled by the express language of the State Constitution; but I present the question now independently of any State Constitution.
In considering the power of the Legislature, it is important to put aside any influence that may be attributed to the unquestioned usage of choosing Representatives and other officers by plurality of votes. Because the people choose by plurality, it does not follow that a Legislature may. From time immemorial, the rule in the two cases has been different, unless we except the New England States, where, until recently, even popular elections were by a majority. But the origin of the practice in New England testifies to the rule.
It is proper for us to interrogate the country from which our institutions are derived, for the origin of the rule. Indeed, where a word is used in the Constitution having a previous signification or character in the institutions of England, we cannot err, if we consider its import there. I think we do this habitually. Mr. Wirt, in his masterly argument on the impeachment of Judge Peck, develops this idea.
“The Constitution secures the trial by jury. Where do you get the meaning of a trial by jury? Certainly not from the Civil or Canon Law, or the Law of Nations. It is peculiar to the Common Law; and to the Common Law, therefore, the Constitution itself refers you for a description and explanation of this high privilege, the trial by jury, and the mode of proceeding in those trials.… The very name by which it is called into being authorizes it to look at once to the English archetypes for its government.”[2]
Following this statement, so clearly expressed, the words “Legislature” and “holding elections,” in the National Constitution, which belonged to the political system of England, may be explained by that system,—so, at least, that in case of doubt we shall find light in this quarter.