This region is distant enough from Great Britain; but there is an incident of past history which shows that distance from the metropolitan government has not excluded the idea of war. Great Britain could hardly be more jealous of Russia on these coasts than was Spain in a former day, if we listen to the report of Humboldt. I refer again to his authoritative work, “Essai Politique sur la Nouvelle-Espagne,”[27] where it is recorded, that, as early as 1788, even while peace was still unbroken, the Spaniards could not bear the idea of Russians in this region, and when, in 1799, the Emperor Paul declared war on Spain, the hardy project was formed of an expedition from the Mexican ports of Monterey and San Blas against the Russian colonies; on which the philosophic traveller remarks, in words which are recalled by the Vancouver manifesto, that, “if this project had been executed, the world would have witnessed two nations in conflict, which, occupying the opposite extremities of Europe, found themselves neighbors in the other hemisphere on the eastern and western boundaries of their vast empires.” Thus, notwithstanding an intervening circuit of half the globe, two great powers were about to encounter each other on these coasts. But I hesitate to believe that the British of our day, in any considerable numbers, have adopted the early Spanish disquietude at the presence of Russia on this continent.
5. Amity of Russia.—There is still another consideration concerning this treaty not to be disregarded. It attests and assures the amity of Russia. Even if you doubt the value of these possessions, the treaty is a sign of friendship. It is a new expression of that entente cordiale between the two powers which is a phenomenon of history. Though unlike in institutions, they are not unlike in recent experience. Sharers of common glory in a great act of Emancipation, they also share together the opposition or antipathy of other nations. Perhaps this experience has not been without effect in bringing them together. At all events, no coldness or unkindness has interfered at any time with their good relations.
The archives of the State Department show an uninterrupted cordiality between the two Governments, dating far back in our history. More than once Russia has proffered her good offices between the United States and Great Britain; once also she was a recognized arbitrator. She offered her mediation to terminate the War of 1812; and under her arbitration questions with Great Britain arising under the Treaty of Ghent were amicably settled in 1822. But it was during our recent troubles that we felt more than ever her friendly sentiments, although it is not improbable that the accident of position and of distance had influence in preserving these undisturbed. The Rebellion, which tempted so many other powers into its embrace, could not draw Russia from her habitual good-will. Her solicitude for the Union was early declared. She made no unjustifiable concession of ocean belligerence, with all its immunities and powers, to Rebels in arms against the Union. She furnished no hospitality to Rebel cruisers, nor was any Rebel agent ever received, entertained, or encouraged at St. Petersburg,—while, on the other hand, there was an understanding that the United States should be at liberty to carry prizes into Russian ports. So natural and easy were the relations between the two Governments, that such complaints as incidentally arose on either side were amicably adjusted by verbal explanations without written controversy.
Positive acts occurred to strengthen these relations. As early as 1861, the two Governments agreed to act together for the establishment of a connection between San Francisco and St. Petersburg by an inter-oceanic telegraph across Behring Strait; and this agreement was subsequently sanctioned by Congress.[28] Meanwhile occurred the visit of the Russian fleet in the winter of 1863, intended by the Emperor, and accepted by the United States, as a friendly demonstration. This was followed by a communication of the Secretary of State, dated 26th December, 1864, inviting the Archduke Constantine to visit the United States, where it was suggested that such a visit “would be beneficial to us and by no means unprofitable to Russia,” but “forbearing to specify reasons,” and assuring him, that, coming as a national guest, he “would receive a cordial and most demonstrative welcome.”[29] Affairs in Russia prevented the acceptance of this invitation. Afterwards, in the spring of 1866, Congress by solemn resolution declared the sympathies of the United States with the Emperor on his escape from the madness of an assassin,[30] and Mr. Fox, at the time Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was appointed to take the resolution of Congress to the Emperor, and, in discharge of this trust, to declare the friendly sentiments of our country for Russia. He was conveyed to Cronstadt in the monitor Miantonomoh, the most formidable ship of our navy, and thus this agent of war became a messenger of peace. The monitor and the minister were received in Russia with unbounded hospitality.
In relations such as I have described, the cession of territory seems a natural transaction, entirely in harmony with the past. It remains to hope that it may be a new link in an amity which, without effort, has overcome differences of institutions and intervening space on the globe.
SHALL THE TREATY BE RATIFIED?
Such are obvious considerations of a general character. The interests of the Pacific States, the extension of the national domain, the extension of republican institutions, the foreclosure of adverse British possession, and the amity of Russia,—these are the points we have passed in review. Most of these, if not all, are calculated to impress the public mind; but I can readily understand a difference of opinion with regard to the urgency of negotiation at this hour. Some may think that the purchase-money and the annual outlay that must follow might have been postponed another decade, while Russia continued in possession as trustee for our benefit; and yet some of the reasons for the treaty do not seem to allow delay.
At all events, now that the treaty has been signed by plenipotentiaries on each side duly empowered, it is difficult to see how we can refuse to complete the purchase without putting to hazard the friendly relations which happily subsist between the United States and Russia. The overtures originally proceeded from us. After a delay of years, and other intervening propositions, the bargain was at length concluded. It is with nations as with individuals. A bargain once made must be kept. Even if still open to consideration, it must not be lightly abandoned. I am satisfied that the dishonoring of this treaty, after what has passed, would be a serious responsibility for our country. As an international question, it would be tried by the public opinion of the world; and there are many who, not appreciating the requirement of our Constitution by which a treaty must have “the advice and consent of the Senate,” would regard its rejection as bad faith. There would be jeers at us, and jeers at Russia also: at us for levity in making overtures, and at Russia for levity in yielding to them. Had the Senate been consulted in advance, before the treaty was signed or either power publicly committed, as is often done on important occasions, it would be under less constraint. On such a consultation there would have been opportunity for all possible objections, and a large latitude for reasonable discretion. Let me add, that, while forbearing objection now, I hope that this treaty may not be drawn into a precedent, at least in the independent manner of its negotiation. I would save to the Senate an important power justly belonging to it.