On this second trial the amendment was adopted,—Yeas 21, Nays 8.
Mr. Sumner offered the following:—
“And be it further enacted, That there shall be no elections of State or National officers under any new constitution until after the same has been approved by Congress.”
This was objected to by Mr. Trumbull, as out of order under the rule, and so decided by the Senate.
Mr. Sumner then moved the following amendment:—
“And be it further enacted, That in each of these States all judgments and decrees of court which have not been voluntarily executed, and which have been rendered subsequently to the date of the Ordinance of Secession in each State respectively, shall be subject to appeal to the highest court in the State, organized after the State shall be admitted again by Congress into the Union; but no such appeal shall be allowed, unless the motion for the same shall have been lodged in the court, or clerk’s office of the court, in which the decree was rendered, within sixty days after the governor appointed under this Act shall have entered upon the discharge of the duties of his office, and for all judgments rendered subsequently to such date, within sixty days after the same have been rendered.”
Mr. Trumbull objected to it as out of order under the rule. Mr. Sumner said:—
My attention has often been called to the necessity of such a provision, by gentlemen from the South, and especially by lawyers there. They tell me that without some such provision the grossest injustice will be done. Throughout the whole Rebellion the local tribunals were sitting to administer justice; yet it was not justice, but injustice, that they administered. Under their decrees private rights were overthrown; and I doubt not that my friend from Illinois has recently read the account of an extensive injustice in Texas, where private property to an almost incalculable amount was taken away by these unjust decrees.
Should there not be a remedy? I think all will say that there should be. This is, if I may so express myself, the last time of asking. If those States are once organized as States and received into the Union, I know not if we have the power of applying a remedy. That we have now I am sure. I cannot doubt our constitutional power at this moment to set aside all those decrees, so far as they have not been voluntarily submitted to, or subject them, according to the provision of my amendment, to appeal in a higher tribunal after the reorganization of justice in these States. Is not the provision reasonable? Is it not to serve the ends of justice? If you do not accept it now, can you accept it at any time hereafter? And if you do not accept it now or hereafter, will not these parties go without remedy? On that question I do not pronounce dogmatically. I do not mean to say that they will be absolutely without remedy; but I do not easily see their remedy. I see difficulties in the way, while at this moment I see no difficulties in the way.
Then I encounter the objection that this is not in order. Why not? Is it not to carry out your Reconstruction Bill, to smooth difficulties, to remove wrong, to establish justice? It may not have been specially foreshadowed in the original bill or the supplemental bill; but I submit that it is entirely germane to both those bills. Besides, it is commended by an intrinsic justice, which should make it acceptable at any time.