The ample discussion of the facts in this case, and their singular plainness, supersede the necessity of all details. The atmosphere about Mr. Thomas and his acts are harmonious. From the beginning we find him enveloped in coldness and indifference while his country was in peril. Observing him more closely, we are shocked by two acts of positive disloyalty, one of which is the natural prelude of the other. The first muttering of the Rebellion found him a member of the Cabinet of Mr. Buchanan; but when this uncertain President proposed the succor of our troops at Charleston, already menaced with war, Mr. Thomas withdrew from the patriotic service. He resigned his seat, following the lead of Cobb, Thompson, and Floyd. A man is known by the company he keeps. His company at this time were traitors, and the act they united in doing was essentially disloyal. As the Rebellion assumed the front of war, they all abandoned their posts: some to join the Rebellion and mingle with its armies; Mr. Thomas, more prudently, to watch the course of events in Maryland, ready to lift his arm also, if his State pronounced the word. This concerted desertion was in itself a conspiracy against the Government; and in the case of Mr. Thomas, who was Secretary of the Treasury, it was a blow at the national credit, which it was his special duty to guard. It was an act of disloyalty to be blasted by indignant history, even if your judgment fails now. And this was the first stage in this record.
Meanwhile the war rages. Armies are marshalled; battles ensue; Washington itself is beleaguered; the Republic trembles with peril. But Mr. Thomas continues in the seclusion of his home, enveloped in the same disloyal atmosphere, and refusing always the oath of allegiance. At last, in 1863, an only son arrives at the age of eighteen. Though still a minor, he is already of the military age. Naturally filled with the sentiments of his father’s fireside, he seeks to maintain them by military service. He is like his father, but with the ardor of youth instead of the caution of years. He avows his purpose to enlist in the Rebel army, thus to levy war against his country, and adhere to its enemies. All this was treason,—plain, palpable, unquestionable, downright treason. Instead of detaining his son,—instead of keeping him back,—instead of interposing a paternal veto,—instead of laying hands gently upon him,—instead of denouncing him to the magistrate,—all of which the father might have done,—he deliberately lets him go, and then, to cap the climax of criminal complicity, furnishes the means for his journey and his equipment. He gives one hundred dollars. The father is not rich, and yet he gives this considerable sum. Few soldiers started with such ample allowance. Thus it stands: the father, who has already deserted his post in the Cabinet, and has refused to take the oath of allegiance to his country, contributes a soldier to the Rebellion, and that soldier is his only son; to complete and assure the great contribution, he contributes a sum of money also. If all this accumulated disloyalty, beginning in a total renunciation of every patriotic duty, and finally consummated by an act of flagrant, unblushing enormity, is not “aid and comfort” or “countenance” or “encouragement” to the Rebellion, it is difficult to say what can be. There must be new dictionaries for these familiar words, and they must receive a definition down to this day unknown. They must be treated as thread or gossamer, when they should be links of iron.
On an occasion like the present, where the moral guilt is so patent, I hesitate to employ technical language. The simplest phrase is the best. But the law supplies language of its own. Regarding the act of Mr. Thomas in the mildest light, it was “misprision of treason,” according to every definition of that crime which can be found in the books. Lord Hale, whose authority, in stating the rules of Criminal Law, is of the highest character, says, under this head: “Every man is bound to use all possible lawful means to prevent a felony, as well as to take the felon; and if he doth not, he is liable to a fine and imprisonment.”[83] Lord Coke, another eminent authority, says: “If any be present when a man is slain, and omit to apprehend the slayer, it is a misprision.”[84] The same rule is, of course, applicable to treason. Mr. Bishop, who in his remarkable work on the Criminal Law has compressed the result of all the authorities, says: “Misprision of felony is a criminal neglect, either to prevent a felony from being committed by another, or to bring to justice a person known to be guilty of felony. Misprision of treason is the same of treason.”[85] Then again he says, citing Hawkins, Blackstone, East, and Russell, all familiar names in our courts, each an oracle:—
“The doctrine of misprision, as now understood, may be stated as follows: To make a man liable for a crime committed through the physical volition of another, his own will must in some degree concur in or contribute to the crime. But when it is treason or felony, and he stands by while it is done, without using the means in his power to prevent it, though his will concurs not in it,—or when he knows of its having been in his absence committed, but neither makes disclosure of it to the authorities nor does anything to bring the offender to punishment,—the law holds him guilty of a breach of the duty due from every man to the community wherein he dwells and the government which protects him.”[86]
I adduce these authorities in order to show, that, by the Common Law, as illustrated by some of its best names, Mr. Thomas is beyond all question an offender. Clearly he did not use “the means in his power” to prevent the treason of his son, nor did he “make disclosure of it to the authorities,” according to the received rule of law.
But the statutes of the United States leave us no room for doubt or indulgence. According to the precise text, the present case is anticipated and provided for. The Statute of Crimes, adopted in 1790, at the beginning of the National Government, after declaring the punishment of treason, proceeds to declare the punishment of “misprision of treason,” as follows:—
“That, if any person or persons, having knowledge of the commission of any of the treasons aforesaid, shall conceal and not as soon as may be disclose and make known the same to the President of the United States or some one of the Judges thereof, or to the President or Governor of a particular State or some one of the Judges or Justices thereof, such person or persons, on conviction, shall be adjudged guilty of misprision of treason, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding seven years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars.”[87]
Apply these plain words to the present case. Nobody can doubt that Mr. Thomas had “knowledge” of the treason of his son, and, having this knowledge, failed to “disclose and make known the same” to the President of the United States or the other proper authorities. Abraham Lincoln was at the time President. There is no pretence that the father communicated the crime of the son to this patriot magistrate, or to any other loyal officer by whom he could have been arrested. Therefore, beyond all question, on the facts of the case, the father is guilty under the statute, and liable to seven years of imprisonment and a fine of one thousand dollars. And now, instead of seven years of imprisonment and a fine of one thousand dollars, it is proposed to give him six years of trust and honor as a Senator of the United States, with an annual allowance of five thousand dollars.
According to the old law, the indictment against Mr. Thomas would allege, that, “not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the Devil,” he perpetrated his crime. And now, with this crime unatoned for, he comes here to ask your support and countenance. We are to forget all that he did, “moved and seduced” by evil instigation, and welcome him to this Chamber, instead of handing him over to judgment.