ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT.
In entering upon the discussion of the Articles of Impeachment, I confess my regret that so great a cause, on which so much depends, should be presented on such narrow ground, although I cannot doubt that the whole past must be taken into consideration in determining the character of the acts alleged. If there has been a violation of law and Constitution, the apologists of the President then insist that all was done with good intentions. Here it is enough, if we point to the past, which thus becomes part of the case. But of this hereafter. It is unnecessary for me to take time in setting forth the Articles. The abstract is enough. They will naturally come under review before the close of the inquiry.
Of the transactions embraced by the Articles, the removal of Mr. Stanton has unquestionably attracted most attention, although I cannot doubt that the scandalous harangues are as justly worthy of condemnation. But the former has been made the pivot of the impeachment,—so much so that the whole case seems to revolve on this transaction. Therefore I shall not err, if, following the Articles, I put this foremost.
This transaction may be brought to the touchstone of the National Constitution, and also of the Tenure-of-Office Act. But since the allegation of violation of this Act has been so conspicuous, and this Act may be regarded as a Congressional interpretation of the power of removals under the National Constitution, I begin with the questions arising under it.
TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACT.
The general object of the Tenure-of-Office Act was to protect civil officers from removal without the advice and consent of the Senate; and it was made in express terms applicable to “every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” To this provision, so broad in character, was appended a proviso:—
“Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”[198]
As this general protection from removal without the advice and consent of the Senate might be productive of embarrassment during the recess of the Senate, it was further provided, in a second section, that, during such recess, any person, except judges of the United States courts, may be suspended from office by the President on reasons assigned, which it is made his duty to report to the Senate within twenty days after its next meeting, and if the Senate concurs, then the President may remove the officer and appoint a successor; but if the Senate does not concur, then the suspended officer shall forthwith resume his functions.
On this statute two questions arise: first, as to its constitutionality, and, secondly, as to its application to Mr. Stanton, so as to protect him from removal without the advice and consent of the Senate.