Among the claimants of the present day there are doubtless many of character and virtue. It is hard to vote against them. But I cannot be controlled on this occasion by my sympathies. Everywhere and in every household there has been suffering which mortal power cannot measure. Sometimes it is borne in silence and solitude; sometimes it is manifest to all. In coming into this Chamber and asking for compensation, it invites comparison with other instances. If your allowance is to be on account of merit, who will venture to say that this case is the most worthy? It is before us now for judgment. But there are others, not now before us, where the suffering has been greater, and where, I do not hesitate to say, the reward should be in proportion. This is an appeal for justice. Therefore do I say, in the name of justice, Wait!
January 15th, the same bill being under discussion, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows:—
There is another point, on which I forbore to dwell with sufficient particularity when I spoke before. It is this: Assuming that this claimant is loyal, I honor her that she kept her loyalty under the surrounding pressure of rebellion. Of course this was her duty,—nor more nor less. The practical question is, Shall she be paid for it? Had she been disloyal, there would have been no proposition of compensation. As the liability of the Nation is urged on the single ground that she kept her regard for the flag truly and sincerely, it is evident that this loyalty must be put beyond question; it must be established like any other essential link of evidence. I think I do not err in supposing that it is not established in the present case,—at least with such certainty as to justify opening the doors of the Treasury.
But assuming that in fact the loyalty is established, I desire to go further, and say that not only is the present claim without any support in law, but it is unreasonable. The Rebel States had become one immense prison-house of Loyalty; Alabama was a prison-house. The Nation, at every cost of treasure and blood, broke into that prison-house, and succeeded in rescuing the Loyalists; but the terrible effort, which cost the Nation so dearly, involved the Loyalists in losses also. In breaking into the prison-house and dislodging the Rebel keepers, property of Loyalists suffered. And now we are asked to pay for this property damaged in our efforts for their redemption. Our troops came down to break the prison-doors and set the captives free. Is it not unreasonable to expect us to pay for this breaking?
If the forces of the United States had failed, then would these Loyalists have lost everything, country, property, and all,—that is, if really loyal, according to present professions. It was our national forces that saved them from this sacrifice, securing to them country, and, if not all their property, much of it. A part of the property of the present claimant was taken in order to save to her all else, including country itself. It was a case, such as might occur under other circumstances, where a part—and a very small part—is sacrificed in order to save the rest. According to all analogies of jurisprudence, and the principles of justice itself, the claimant can look for nothing beyond such contribution as Congress in its bounty may appropriate. It is a case of bounty, and not of law.
It is a mistake to suppose, as has been most earnestly argued, that a claimant of approved loyalty in the Rebel States should have compensation precisely like a similar claimant in a Loyal State. To my mind this assumption is founded on a misapprehension of the Constitution, the law, and the reason of the case,—three different misapprehensions. By the Constitution property cannot be taken for public use without “just compensation”; but this rule was silent in the Rebel States. International Law stepped in and supplied a different rule. And when we consider how much was saved to the loyal citizen in a Rebel State by the national arms, it will be found that this rule is only according to justice.
I have no disposition to shut the door upon claimants. Let them be heard; but the hearing must be according to some system, so that Congress shall know the character and extent of these claims. Before the motion of my colleague,[41] I had already prepared instructions for the Committee, which I will read, as expressing my own conclusion on this matter:—
“That the committee to whom this bill shall be referred, the Committee on Claims, be instructed to consider the expediency of providing for the appointment of a commission whose duty it shall be to inquire into the claims of the loyal citizens of the National Government arising during the recent Rebellion anywhere in the United States, classifying these claims, specifying their respective amounts, and the circumstances out of which they originated, also, the evidence of loyalty adduced by the claimants respectively, to the end that Congress may know precisely the extent and character of these claims before legislating thereupon.”