Mr. Drake’s amendment was rejected. Another, thereupon offered by Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, and as subsequently amended, requiring members of the Legislature before taking or resuming their seats, and State officers before entering upon office, to make oath to past loyalty or removal of disabilities, was adopted. Other provisions, against exclusion from civil rights on account of race or color, either by future amendments of the existing State Constitution or by rescinding the State’s ratification of any amendment to the National Constitution, were moved as “fundamental conditions” of admission. In an argument, January 14th, maintaining the validity of such conditions, the pending question being on a provision of this character offered by Mr. Drake, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows:—
Mr. President,—Something has been said of the term by which this proposition should be designated. One will not call it “compact,” finding in this term much danger, but at the same time he refuses to the unhappy people in Virginia now looking to us for protection such safeguard as may be found in this proposition. For myself, Sir, I make no question of terms. Call it one thing or another, it is the same, for it has in it protection. Call it a compact, I accept it. Call it a law, I accept it. Call it a condition, I accept it. It is all three,—condition, law, compact,—and, as all three, binding. The old law-books speak of a triple cord. Here you have it.
My friend from Wisconsin [Mr. Carpenter] falls into another mistake,—he will pardon me, if I suggest it,—which I notice with regret. He exalts the technical State above the real State. He knows well what is the technical State, which is found in form, in technicality, in privilege, if you please,—for he has made himself to-night the advocate of privilege. To my mind the State is the people, and its highest office is their just safeguard; and when it is declared that a State hereafter shall not take away the right of any of its people, here is no infringement of anything that belongs to a State. I entreat my friend to bear the distinction in mind. A State can have no right or privilege to do wrong; nor can the denial of this pretension disparage the State, or in any way impair its complete equality with other States. The States have no power except to do justice. Any power beyond this is contrary to the Harmonies of the Universe.
Since the Senator spoke, I sent into the other room for the Declaration of Independence, in order to read a sentence which is beyond question the touchstone of our institutions, to which all the powers of a State must be brought. Here it is:—
“We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America in general Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States.”
And then it proceeds to say that—
“They have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.”
Here is the claim, with its limitation,—the great claim, and its great limitation. The claim was Independence; the limitation was Justice.
“Which independent States may of right do”: nothing else, nothing which a State may not of right do. Now, Sir, bear in mind, do not forget, that there is not one thing prohibited by these fundamental conditions that a State may of right do. Therefore, Sir, in the name of Right, do I insist that it is binding upon the State. It is binding, even if not there; and it is binding, being there. Its insertion is like notice or proclamation of the perpetual obligation.