Charles Sumner: his complete works, volume 17 (of 20)

by Charles Sumner

The change from a Ten-Forty bond to a Ten-Twenty bond, as proposed by the Committee, is a change, so far as I can perceive, made up of disadvantages. To the nation there is the same rate of interest, and there is the same fixed period during which this interest must be paid; while, on the other hand, the period of optional payment is reduced from thirty years to ten years. If there be advantage in this reduction, I do not perceive it. If at the expiration of ten years we are in a condition to pay, we may do so as readily under a Ten-Forty as under the Ten-Twenty proposed. If during the subsequent ten years of option our advancing credit enables us to command a lower rate of interest, surely we may do so just as favorably under one as under the other. There is no benefit within the bounds of imagination, so far at least as I can discern, which will not redound to the nation from Ten-Forties as much as from Ten-Twenties. On the other hand, it is within possibilities, from disturbance in the money markets of the world, or from other unforeseen circumstances, that it may not be convenient during the short optional period of the Committee to obtain the necessary coin without a sacrifice. The greater latitude of payment leaves the nation master of the situation, to pay or not to pay, as is most for the national advantage.

Furthermore, the loan proposed by the Committee has not, to my mind, the elements of success promised by the other loan. It is assumed in both cases that the coin for the redemption of the existing obligations shall be obtained in Europe. Then we must look to the European market in determining the form of the new loan. Now I have reason to believe that a coin loan to the amount of $500,000,000 may be obtained in Europe on Ten-Forties at par, provided the new bonds are of the same form and purport as the Ten-Forties which are already so popular, and provided further that the proceeds of the loan are applied to the payment in coin at par of the Five-Twenties of 1862. The reasons are obvious. The Ten-Forties have a good name, which is much to start with. It is like the credit or good-will of an established mercantile house, which stands often instead of capital; and then the fact that the proceeds are to be absorbed in the redemption of the first Five-Twenties, so often assailed, will most signally attest the determination of the country to maintain its credit. These advantages cost nothing, and it is difficult to see why they should be renounced.

We must not make an effort and fail. Our course must be guided by such prudence that success will be at least reasonably certain. For the nation to offer a loan and be refused in the market will not do. Here, as elsewhere, we must organize victory. Now it is to my mind doubtful, according to the information within my reach, if the loan proposed by the Committee can be negotiated successfully at par. Bankers there may be who would gladly see themselves announced as financial agents of the great Republic; but it remains to be seen if there are any competent to handle a loan of $500,000,000 who would undertake it on the terms of the Committee. I am clear that it is not prudent to make the experiment, when it is easy to offer another loan with positive advantages sufficient to turn the scale. Washington, in his Farewell Address, said, “Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground?” In the same spirit I would say, Why forego the advantages of a well-known and peculiar security? Why quit our Ten-Forties to stand upon a security which is unknown, and practically foreign, whether at home or abroad?

In the loan proposed by the original bill we find assurance of success, with the promise of reduced taxation, Repudiation silenced, and the coin reserves in the banks strengthened by sales in Europe, it may be, $150,000,000. Should the amendment of the Committee prevail, I see small chance of any near accomplishment of these objects, and meanwhile our financial question is handed over to prolonged uncertainty.

I pass now to the substitute of the Committee for the second and third sections of the original bill. Here again the amount is changed from $500,000,000 to $400,000,000. I am not aware of any reason for this change; nor is there, indeed, any peculiar reason, as in the case of the Five-Twenties of 1862, for the amount of $500,000,000. The question between the two amounts may properly be determined by considerations of expediency, among which will be that of uniformity with outstanding loans. A more important change is in the time the bonds are to run, which is Fifteen-Thirty years for the bonds at four and a half per cent., and Twenty-Forty years for the bonds at four per cent. Here occurs again the argument with regard to the inferiority of Ten-Twenties, as compared with Ten-Forties. By the same reason the Fifteen-Thirties will be inferior to the Fifteen-Fifties, and the Twenty-Forties will be inferior to the Twenty-Sixties, of the original bill.

The prolongation of the bond is in the nature of compensation for the reduction of interest. Already we have established the ratio of compensation for such reduction,—already for a loan at six per cent. we have offered Five-Twenties, but for a loan at five per cent. we have offered Ten-Forties,—and I see no reason why by a tentative process we should so materially change this standard as is now proposed. The experiment can do no good, while it may do harm. It is in the nature of a restriction on our discretion, and a limitation of the duration of the bond, which, I apprehend, must interfere essentially with its marketable character. While the prolongation of time enlarges the option of the nation, it increases the value of the bond in the market. That which is most favorable to the nation is most favorable to the market value of the bond; and that which is unfavorable to the nation is unfavorable also to the market value of the bond, rendering its negotiation and sale more difficult and protracted. Thus at every turn are we brought back to the original proposition.

Against this conclusion is the argument founded on the idea of English consols. It is sometimes said, If the short term of Five-Twenty years is the standard for a six per cent. bond with a graduation to Twenty-Sixty for a four per cent. bond, why may we not go further, and establish consols at three per cent., running, if you please, to eternity?—The technical term “consols” is an abbreviation for the consolidated debt of Great Britain, and in the eyes of a British subject has its own signification. It means a debt never to be paid, or at least it is an inscribed debt carrying no promise of payment. I would not have any debt of the United States assume either the form or name of consols. I would rigidly adhere to definite periods of payment. This is the American system, in contradistinction to the British system. I would not only avoid the idea that our debt is permanent, but I would adhere to the form of positive payment at some fixed period, and keep this idea always present in the minds of the people. Without the requirement of law, I doubt if the debt would be paid. Political parties would court popularity by a reduction of taxation. The Treasury of the United States, like the British Treasury, would always be without a surplus, and the national debt would be recognized as a burden to be endured forever. Therefore do I say, No consols.

There is another consideration, having a wide influence, but especially important at the West and South, which should induce us to press for a reduction of the interest on our bonds; and here I present an argument which, if not advanced before, is none the less applicable.