On these Resolutions Mr. Sumner, March 27th, spoke as follows:—
MR. PRESIDENT,—Entering again upon this discussion, I perform a duty which cannot be avoided. I wish it were otherwise, but duty is a taskmaster to be obeyed. On evidence now before the Senate, it is plain that the Navy of the United States, acting under orders from Washington, has been engaged in measures of violence and of belligerent intervention, being war without the authority of Congress. An act of war without the authority of Congress is no common event. This is the simplest statement of the case. The whole business is aggravated, when it is considered that the declared object of this violence is the acquisition of foreign territory, being half an island in the Caribbean Sea,—and still further, that this violence has been employed, first, to prop and maintain a weak ruler, himself a usurper, upholding him in power that he might sell his country, and, secondly, to menace the Black Republic of Hayti.
Such a case cannot pass without inquiry. It is too grave for silence. For the sake of the Navy, which has been the agent, for the sake of the Administration, under which the Navy acted, for the sake of Republican Institutions, which suffer when the Great Republic makes itself a pattern of violence, and for the sake of the Republican Party, which cannot afford to become responsible for such conduct, the case must be examined on the facts and the law, and also in the light of precedent, so far as precedent holds its torch. When I speak for Republican Institutions, it is because I would not have our great example weakened before the world, and our good name tarnished. And when I speak for the Republican Party, it is because from the beginning I have been the faithful servant of that party and aspire to see it strong and triumphant. But beyond all these considerations is the commanding rule of Justice, which cannot be disobeyed with impunity.
THE QUESTION STATED.
The question which I present is very simple. It is not, whether the acquisition of the island of San Domingo, in whole or part, with a population foreign in origin, language, and institutions, is desirable, but whether we are justified in the means employed to accomplish this acquisition. The question is essentially preliminary in character, and entirely independent of the main question. On the main question there may be difference of opinion: some thinking the acquisition desirable, and others not desirable; some anxious for empire, or at least a sanitarium, in the tropics,—and others more anxious for a Black Republic, where the African race shall show an example of self-government by which the whole race may be uplifted; some thinking of gold mines, salt mountains, hogsheads of sugar, bags of coffee, and boxes of cigars,—others thinking more of what we owe to the African race. But whatever the difference of opinion on the main question, the evidence now before us shows too clearly that means have been employed which cannot be justified. And this is the question to which I now ask the attention of the Senate.
REASON FOR INTEREST IN THE QUESTION.
Here, Sir, I venture to relate how and at what time I became specially aroused on this question. The treaty for the annexion of the Dominican people was pending before the Senate, and I was occupied in considering it, asking two questions: first, Is it good for us? and, secondly, Is it good for them? The more I meditated these two questions I found myself forgetting the former and considering the latter,—or rather, the former was absorbed in the latter. Thinking of our giant strength, my anxiety increased for the weaker party, and I thought more of what was good for them than for us. Is annexion good for them? This was the question on my mind, when I was honored by a visit from the Assistant Secretary of State, bringing with him a handful of dispatches from San Domingo. Among these were dispatches from our Consular Agent there, who signed the treaty of annexion, from which it distinctly appeared that Baez, while engaged in selling his country, was maintained in power by the Navy of the United States. That such was the official report of our Consular Agent, who signed the treaty, there can be no question; and this official report was sustained by at least one other consular dispatch. I confess now my emotion as I read this painful revelation. Until then I had supposed the proceeding blameless, although precipitate. I had not imagined any such indefensible transgressions.
These dispatches became more important as testimony when it appeared that the writers were personally in favor of annexion. Thus, then, it stood,—that, on the official report of our own agents, we were engaged in forcing upon a weak people the sacrifice of their country. To me it was apparent at once that the acquisition of this foreign territory would not be respectable or even tolerable, unless by the consent of the people there, through rulers of their own choice, and without force on our part. The treaty was a contract, which, according to our own witnesses, was obtained through a ruler owing power to our war-ships. As such, it was beyond all question a contract obtained under duress, and therefore void, while the duress was an interference with the internal affairs of a foreign country, and therefore contrary to that principle of Non-Intervention which is now a rule of International Law. As this question presented itself, I lost no time in visiting the Navy Department, in order to examine the instructions under which our naval officers were acting, and also their reports. Unhappily, these instructions and reports were too much in harmony with the other testimony; so that the State Department and Navy Department each contained the record of the deplorable proceedings, and still they pressed the consummation. I could not have believed it, had not the evidence been explicit. The story of Naboth’s Vineyard was revived.
Violence begets violence, and that in San Domingo naturally extended. It is with nations as with individuals,—once stepped in, they go forward. The harsh menace by which the independence of the Black Republic was rudely assailed came next. It was another stage in belligerent intervention. As these things were unfolded, I felt that I could not hesitate. Here was a shocking wrong. It must be arrested; and to this end I have labored in good faith. If I am earnest, it is because I cannot see a wrong done without seeking to arrest it. Especially am I moved, if this wrong be done to the weak and humble. Then, by the efforts of my life and the commission I have received from Massachusetts, am I vowed to do what I can for the protection and elevation of the African race. If I can help them, I will; if I can save them from outrage, I must. And never before was the occasion more imminent than now.