“Nipsic,—1 11-inch and 2 9-inch.
“Seminole,—1 11-inch and 4 32-pounders of 4,200 pounds.
“Tennessee,—On spar-deck 2 11-inch, 2 9-inch, 2 100-pounders, and 1 60-pounder; on gun-deck, 16 9-inch.
“The ships now [February 17, 1871] in those waters are, as far as is known to the Department, the Congress, the Nantasket, the Yantic, and the Tennessee.”[15]
Twelve mighty war-ships, including two, if not three, powerful monitors, maintained at the cost of millions of dollars, being part of the price of the pending negotiation. Besides what we pay to Baez, here are millions down. Rarely have we had such a fleet in any waters: not in the Mediterranean, not in the Pacific, not in the East Indies. It is in the waters of San Domingo that our Navy finds its chosen field. Here is its flag, and here also is its frown. And why this array? If our purpose is peace, why these engines of war? If we seek annexion by the declared will of the people, spontaneous, free, and unanimous, as was the boast of Spain, why these floating batteries to overawe them? If we would do good to the African race, why begin with violence to the Black Republic?
Before the Commissioners left our shores, there were already three war-ships with powerful armaments in those waters: the Congress, with fourteen 9-inch guns and two 60-pounder rifles; the Nantasket, with six 32-pounders of 4,500 pounds, and one 60-pounder rifle; and the Yantic, with one 11-inch gun and two 9-inch. And then came the Tennessee, with two 11-inch and two 9-inch guns, two 100-pounders and one 60-pounder, on its spar-deck, and sixteen 9-inch guns on its gun-deck, to augment these forces, already disproportioned to any proper object. The Commissioners are announced as ministers of peace; at all events, their declared duty is to ascertain the real sentiments of the people. Why send them in a war-ship? Why cram the dove into a cannon’s mouth? There are good steamers at New York, safe and sea-worthy, whose presence would not swell the array of war, nor subject the Great Republic to the grave imputation of seeking to accomplish its purpose by violence.
TRAGICAL END OF SPANISH OCCUPATION.
If while negotiating with the Dominicans for their territory, and what is more than territory, their national life, you will not follow Spanish example and withdraw your war-ships with their flashing arms and threatening thunder, at least be taught by the tragedy which attended even this most propitious attempt. The same volumes of authentic documents from which I have read show how, notwithstanding the apparent spontaneousness, freedom, and unanimity of the invitation, the forbearance of Spain was followed by resistance, where sun and climate united with the people. An official report laid before the Cortes describes nine thousand Spanish soldiers dead with disease, while the Spanish occupation was reduced to three towns on the seaboard, and it was perilous for small parties to go any distance outside the walls of the City of San Domingo. The same report declares that twenty thousand troops, provided for a campaign of six months, would be required to penetrate “the heart of Cibao,”—more accessible than the region occupied by General Cabral, who disputes the power of Baez. At last Spain submitted. The spirit of independence prevailed once more on the island; and the proud banner of Castile, which had come in peace, amid general congratulations, and with the boast of not a Spanish bottom or Spanish soldier near, was withdrawn.