“My suggestion is, that by Joint Resolution of the two Houses of Congress the Executive be authorized to appoint a Commission to negotiate a treaty with the authorities of San Domingo for the acquisition of that island, and that an appropriation be made to defray the expenses of such Commission. The question may then be determined, either by the action of the Senate upon the treaty, or the joint action of the two Houses of Congress upon a resolution of annexation, as in the case of the acquisition of Texas.”
Thus by the open declaration of the President was the treaty rejected, while six months after the rejection he asks for a Commission to negotiate a new treaty, and an appropriation to defray the expenses of the Commission; and not perceiving the inapplicability of the Texas precedent, he proposes to do the deed by Joint Resolution of Congress. And yet during this intermediate period, when there was no unratified treaty extant, the same belligerent intervention has been proceeding, the same war-ships have been girdling the island with their guns, and the same naval support has been continued to the usurper Baez,—all at great cost to the country and by the diversion of our naval forces from other places of duty, while the Constitution has been dismissed out of sight like a discharged soldier.
Already you have seen how this belligerent intervention proceeded after the rejection of the treaty; how on the 21st July, 1870, Commodore Green reported that “a withdrawal of the protection of the United States and of the prospect of annexation at some future time would instantly lead to a revolution headed by Cabral”; how on the 28th August, 1870, Lieutenant Commander Allen reported Baez as “requesting the presence of a vessel on the north side of the island on account of an intended invasion by Cabral”; how at the same time the usurper cries out that he “deems the presence of a ship-of-war in the Bay of Manzanillo of immediate importance”; how on the 3d September, 1870, Commander Irwin reported that Baez “feared an outbreak,” and appealed to the Commander to “bring him some of his men that were at Azua,” which the obliging Commander did; how under date of September 2, 1870, the usurper, after declaring the necessity of a man-of-war at the port of San Domingo, says that “none would be more convenient than the Yantic for the facility of entering the river Ozama, owing to her size”; and how again under date of October 8, 1870, the usurper writes still another letter “to reiterate the necessity of the vessels now in that bay [Samana] coming to these southern coasts.” All these things you have seen, attesting constantly our belligerent intervention and the maintenance of Baez in power by our Navy, which became his body-guard and omnipresent upholder, and all after the rejection of the treaty. I leave them to your judgment without one word of comment, reminding you only that no President is entitled to substitute his kingly will for the Constitution of our country.
In curious confirmation of the first conclusion from the official document, the letter of Captain Temple to Mr. Wade should not be forgotten. This letter has found its way into the papers, and if not genuine, it ought to be. It purports to be dated, Tennessee, Azua Bay, February 24, 1871. Here is the first paragraph:—
“I understand that several of the gentlemen belonging to the expedition are to start to-morrow overland for Port-au-Prince. It may not have occurred to these gentlemen that by so doing they will virtually place themselves in the position of spies, and if they are taken by Cabral’s people, they can be hung to the nearest tree by sentence of a drum-head court-martial, according to all the rules of civilized warfare. For they belong to a nation that, through the orders of its Executive to the naval vessels here, has chosen to take part in the internal conflicts of this country; they come directly from the head-quarters of Cabral’s enemies; they are without arms, uniform, or authority of any kind for being in a hostile region. They are, in fact, spies. They go expressly to learn everything connected with the enemy’s country, and their observations are intended for publication, and thus indirectly to be reported back to President Baez. Surely Cabral would have a right to prevent this, if he can.”
It will be seen that the gallant Captain does not hesitate to recognize the existing rights of Cabral under the Laws of War, and to warn against any journey by members of the Commission across the island to Hayti,—as, if taken by Cabral’s people, they could be hung to the nearest tree by sentence of drum-head court-martial, “according to all the rules of civilized warfare”; and the Captain gives the reason: “For they belong to a nation that, through the orders of its Executive to the naval vessels here, has chosen to take part in the internal conflicts of this country.” Here is belligerent intervention openly recognized by the gallant Captain, and without the authority of Congress. If the gallant Captain wrote the letter, he showed himself a master of International Law whom Senators might do well to follow. If he did not write it, the instructive jest will at least relieve the weariness of this discussion.
SUMMARY.
Mr. President, as I draw to a close, allow me to repeat the very deep regret with which I make this exposure. Most gladly would I avoid it. Controversy, especially at my time of life, has no attraction for me; but I have been reared in the school of duty, and now, as of old, I cannot see wrong without trying to arrest it. I plead now, as I have often pleaded before, for Justice and Peace.