“You see from this that the operations of Mr. Remington give only too much of a glimpse of the most audacious frauds.”
Here is testimony tending at least to stimulate inquiry: Mr. Remington’s books altered three times, and the name of Richardson playing a criminal part. I quote this from an official document, and leave it.
Here, then, are six different sources of testimony, all prompting inquiry: first, the resolution of a committee of the French Assembly, showing suspicion of American officials; secondly, the cable dispatch of Squire, son-in-law and agent of Mr. Remington, declaring that “we have the strongest influences working for us, which will use all their efforts to succeed”; thirdly, the letter of Mr. Remington, reporting, in various forms and repetitions, that he is dealing with the American Government; fourthly, the testimony of M. Le Cesne, the Chairman of the French Armament Committee, made in open court and under oath, that the French “had an agreement with the American Federal Government, which had engaged to deliver free on board all the arms on account of France”; fifthly, the positive declaration of the London “Times” in the face of Europe, and reported by our Minister at Berlin, that rifled cannon and ammunition had been furnished to the French in enormous quantities by the War Department at Washington; and, sixthly, the testimony of a clerk of Mr. Remington, authenticated by the French Consul-General at New York, that Mr. Remington had altered his books three times, and also speaking of the criminal character of Richardson in the affairs of Mr. Remington. On this cumulative and concurring testimony from six different sources is it not plain that there must be inquiry? The Senate cannot afford to close its eyes. The resolution of the committee of the French Assembly alone would be enough; but reinforced as it is from so many different quarters, the case is irresistible. Not to inquire is to set at defiance all rules of decency and common-sense.
To these successive reasons I add the evidence, which has been much discussed, showing a violation of the statute authorizing the sale of “the old cannon, arms, and other ordnance stores, now in possession of the War Department, which are damaged or otherwise unsuitable for the United States military service or for the militia of the United States,”[22]—inasmuch as stores were sold which were not “damaged” or “otherwise unsuitable.” I think no person can have heard the debate without admitting that here at least is something for careful investigation. The Senator from Missouri has already exposed this apparent dereliction of duty, which in its excess ended in actually disarming the country, so as to impair its defensive capacity. One of the crimes of the Cabinet of Mr. Buchanan on the eve of the Rebellion was that the North had been disarmed. It is important to consider whether, in the strange greed for money or in the misfeasance of subordinates, something similar was not done when good arms were sold to France. The Chief of Ordnance, in his last Annual Report, which will be found in the Report of the Secretary of War, makes the following statement:—
“Now there are less than ten thousand breech-loading muskets in the arsenals for issue. This number of muskets is not half sufficient to supply the States with the muskets they are now entitled to receive under their apportionment of the permanent appropriation for arming and equipping the militia.”
Why, then, were breech-loading muskets exchanged for French gold? The Chief of Ordnance then proceeds:—
“This Department should, as soon as possible, be placed in a condition to fill all proper requisitions by the States upon it, and should also have on hand in store a large number of breech-loading muskets and carbines to meet any emergency that may arise.”
But these very breech-loading muskets have gone to France. The Chief of Ordnance adds:—