Should submarines be seen approaching, a surface vessel would do well to turn her stern to the attacking flotilla, presenting as small a target as possible, and deflecting the torpedoes by her propeller race.
The escape of the Battle Cruiser Queen Mary and the Light Cruiser Lowestoft, during the action in the Heligoland Bight, as described in the dispatch of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., demonstrates what may be done by the skilful use of the helm on surface warships to frustrate submarine attacks. So interesting, and informative as to the actual fighting between British warships and hostile submarines, in this dispatch that I give it here in full. It should, however, be studied in conjunction with the comprehensive report—the first in the history of Naval warfare detailing submarine attack and reconnaissance—from Commodore Roger J. B. Keyes, C.B., of the British submarines, given on page 28.
“H.M.S. Lion,
1st September, 1914.
“Sir,—I have the honour to report that on Thursday, 27th August, at 5 a.m., I proceeded with the First Battle Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser Squadron in company, to rendezvous with the Rear-Admiral, Invincible.
“At 4 a.m., 28th August, the movements of the Flotillas commenced as previously arranged, the Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron supporting. The Rear-Admiral, Invincible, with New Zealand and four Destroyers having joined my flag, the Squadron passed through the pre-arranged rendezvous.
“At 8.10 a.m. I received a signal from the Commodore (T), informing me that the Flotilla was in action with the enemy. This was presumably in the vicinity of their pre-arranged rendezvous. From this time until 11 a.m. I remained about the vicinity ready to support as necessary, intercepting various signals, which contained no information on which I could act.
“At 11 a.m. the Squadron was attacked by three Submarines. The attack was frustrated by rapid manœuvring and the four Destroyers were ordered to attack them. Shortly after 11 a.m., various signals having been received indicating that the Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) were both in need of assistance, I ordered the Light Cruiser Squadron to support the Torpedo Flotillas.
“Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T), stating that he was being attacked by a large Cruiser, and a further signal informing me that he was being hard pressed and asking for assistance. The Captain (D), First Flotilla, also signalled that he was in need of help.
“From the foregoing the situation appeared to me critical. The Flotillas had advanced only ten miles since 8 a.m., and were only about twenty-five miles from two enemy bases on their flank and rear respectively. Commodore Goodenough had detached two of his Light Cruisers to assist some Destroyers earlier in the day, and these had not yet rejoined. (They rejoined at 2.30 p.m.). As the reports indicated the presence of many enemy ships—one a large Cruiser—I considered that his force might not be strong enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rapidly, so at 11.30 a.m. the Battle Cruisers turned to E.S.E., and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to be of any value the support must be overwhelming and carried out at the highest speed possible.