“During the transportation of the Expeditionary Force the Lurcher and Firedrake and all the Submarines of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla occupied positions from which they could have attacked the High Sea Fleet, had it emerged to dispute the passage of our transports. This patrol was maintained day and night without relief, until the personnel of our Army had been transported and all chance of effective interference had disappeared.
“These Submarines have since been incessantly employed on the Enemy’s Coast in the Heligoland Bight and elsewhere, and have obtained much valuable information regarding the composition and movement of his patrols. They have occupied his waters and reconnoitred his anchorages, and, while so engaged, have been subjected to skilful and well executed anti-submarine tactics; hunted for hours at a time by Torpedo Craft and attacked by gun-fire and torpedoes.
“At midnight on August 26th, I embarked in the Lurcher, and, in company with Firedrake and Submarines D.2, D.8, E.4, E.5, E.6, E.7, E.8, and E.9 of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla, proceeded to take part in the operations in the Heligoland Bight arranged for August 28th. The Destroyers scouted for the Submarines until nightfall on the 27th, when the latter proceeded independently to take up various positions from which they could co-operate with the Destroyer Flotillas on the following morning.
“At daylight on August 28th the Lurcher and Firedrake searched the area, through which the Battle Cruisers were to advance, for hostile Submarines, and then proceeded towards Heligoland in the wake of Submarines E.6, E.7, and E.8, which were exposing themselves with the object of inducing the enemy to chase them to the westward.
“On approaching Heligoland, the visibility, which had been very good to seaward, reduced to 5,000 to 6,000 yards, and this added considerably to the anxieties and responsibilities of the Commanding Officers of Submarines, who handled their vessels with coolness and judgment in an area which was necessarily occupied by friends as well as foes.
“Low visibility and calm sea are the most unfavourable conditions under which Submarines can operate, and no opportunity occurred of closing with the Enemy’s Cruisers to within torpedo range.
“Lieutenant-Commander Ernest W. Leir, Commanding Submarine E.4, witnessed the sinking of the German Torpedo-Boat Destroyer V.187 through his periscope, and, observing a Cruiser of the Stettin class close, and open fire on the British Destroyers which had lowered their boats to pick up the survivors, he proceeded to attack the Cruiser, but she altered course before he could get within range. After covering the retirement of our Destroyers, which had had to abandon their boats, he returned to the latter, and embarked a Lieutenant and nine men of Defender, who had been left behind. The boats also contained two Officers and eight men of V.187, who were unwounded, and eighteen men who were badly wounded. As he could not embark the latter, Lieutenant-Commander Leir left one of the Officers and six unwounded men to navigate the British boats to Heligoland. Before leaving he saw that they were provided with water, biscuit, and a compass. One German Officer and two men were made prisoners of war.
“Lieutenant-Commander Leir’s action in remaining on the surface in the vicinity of the enemy and in a visibility which would have placed his vessel within easy gun range of an enemy appearing out of the mist, was altogether admirable.
“This enterprising and gallant Officer took part in the reconnaissance which supplied the information on which these operations were based, and I beg to submit his name, and that of Lieutenant-Commander Talbot, the Commanding Officer of E.6, who exercised patience, judgment, and skill in a dangerous position, for the favourable consideration of Their Lordships.
“On September 13th, E.9 (Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton) torpedoed and sank the German Light Cruiser Hela six miles South of Heligoland.