It is observable that Increase Mather does not express or intimate, in this passage, any objection to the introduction of spectral evidence. When we come to consider Cotton Mather's Breviate of the trial of George Burroughs, we shall see how slight and inadequate was what Increase Mather could have heard, at the Trial, to prove that Burroughs had exhibited strength which the Devil only could have supplied. The most trivial and impertinent matter was all that was needed, to be added to spectral testimony, to give it fatal effect. The value, by the way, of Increase Mather's averment, that "more than that which is called Spectre Evidence" was adduced against the persons convicted, is somewhat impaired by the admission of Cotton Mather, just before quoted, that "divers were condemned," against whom it was the "chief evidence."
In stating the objection, by some, to the admission of spectral evidence, on the ground that the Devil might assume the shape of an innocent person, and if that person was held answerable for the actions of that spectral appearance, it would be in the power of the Devil to convict and destroy any number of innocent and righteous people, and thereby "subvert Government and disband and ruin human society," Cotton Mather gets over the difficulty thus: "And yet God may sometimes suffer such things to evene, that we may know, thereby, how much we are beholden to him, for that restraint which he lays upon the infernal spirits, who would else reduce a world into a chaos."
This is a striking instance of the way in which words may be made, not only to cover, but to transform, ideas. A reverent form of language conceals an irreverent conception. The thought is too shocking for plain utterance; but, dressed in the garb of ingenious phraseology, it assumes an aspect that enables it to pass as a devout acknowledgment of a divine mystery. The real meaning, absurd as it is dreadful, to state or think, is that the Heavenly Father sometimes may, not merely permit, but will, the lies of the Devil to mislead tribunals of justice to the shedding of the blood of the righteous, that he may, thereby show how we are beholden to Him, that a like outrage and destruction does not happen to us all. He allows the Devil, by false testimony, to bring about the perpetration of the most horrible wrong. It is a part of the "Rectoral Righteousness of God," that it should be so. What if the Courts do admit the testimony of the Devil in the appearance of a spectre, and, on its strength, consign to death the innocent? It is the will of God, that it should be so. Let that will be done.
But however the sentiment deserves to be characterized, it removes the only ground upon which, in that day, spectral evidence was objected to—namely, that it might endanger the innocent. If such was the will of God, the objectors were silenced.
In concluding the examination of the question whether Cotton Mather denounced, or countenanced, the admission of spectral testimony—for that is the issue before us—I feel confident that it has been made apparent, that it was not in reference to the admission of such testimony, that he objected to the "principles that some of the Judges had espoused," but to the method in which it should be handled and managed. I deny, utterly, that it can be shown that he opposed its admission. In none of his public writings did he ever pretend to this. The utmost upon which he ventured, driven to the defensive on this very point, as he was during all the rest of his days, was to say that he was opposed to its "excessive use." Once, indeed, in his private Diary, under that self-delusion which often led him to be blind to the import of his language, contradicting, in one part, what he had said in another part of the same sentence, evidently, as I believe, without any conscious and intentional violation of truth, he makes this statement: "For my own part, I was always afraid of proceeding to convict and condemn any person, as a confederate with afflicting Demons, upon so feeble an evidence as a spectral representation. Accordingly, I ever protested against it, both publicly and privately; and, in my letter to the Judges, I particularly besought them that they would, by no means, admit it; and when a considerable assembly of Ministers gave in their advice about that matter, I not only concurred with them, but it was I who drew it up."
This shows how he indulged himself in forms of expression that misled him. His letter to "the Judges" means, I suppose, that written to Richards; and he had so accustomed his mind to the attempt to make the Advice of the Ministers bear this construction, as to deceive himself. That document does not say a word, much less, protest, against the "admission" of that evidence: it was not designed, and was not understood by any, at the time, to have that bearing, but only to urge suggestions of caution, in its use and management. Charity to him requires us to receive his declaration in the Diary as subject to the modifications he himself connects with it, and to mean no more than we find expressed in the letter to Richards and in the Advice. But, if he really had deluded himself into the idea that he had protested against the admission of spectral evidence, he has not succeeded, probably, in deluding any other persons than his son Samuel, who repeated the language of the Diary, and our Reviewer.
The question, I finally repeat, is as to the admission of that species of evidence, at all, in any stage, in any form, to any extent. Cotton Mather never, in any public writing, "denounced the admission" of it, never advised its absolute exclusion; but, on the contrary recognised it as a ground of "presumption." Increase Mather stated that the "Devil's accusations," which he considered spectral evidence really to be, "may be so far regarded as to cause an enquiry into the truth of things." These are the facts of history, and not to be moved from their foundation in the public record of that day. There is no reason to doubt that all the Ministers, in the early stages of the delusion, concurred in these views. All partook of the "awe," mentioned by Mather, which filled the minds of Juries, Judges, and the people, whenever this kind of testimony was introduced. No matter how nor when, whether as "presumption" to build other evidence upon or as a cause for further "enquiry," nothing could stand against it. Character, reason, common sense, were swept away. So long as it was suffered to come in, any how, or to be credited at all, the horrid fanaticism and its horrible consequences continued. When it was wholly excluded, the reign of terror and of death ceased.