Submarine Mines.—Defence in Future Wars.—The very conspicuous part played by submarine mines, in the many wars that have taken place since the introduction of the torpedo as a legitimate mode of Naval warfare, when their manipulation was comparatively little understood, and construction very imperfect, proves that, with the experience so gained, and the vast improvements that have been, and are daily being effected, in all that appertains to the art of torpedo warfare, the protection of harbours, etc., will in future wars depend in a great measure on the adoption of a systematic and extensive employment of submarine mines.
The utility and power of this mode of coast defence has been fully exemplified in actual war, more especially during the Franco-German war (1870-1) and the late Turco-Russian war (1877-8).
Torpedoes in the Franco-German War.—In the former instance, the superiority of the French over the Germans, in the matter of ships, was more than neutralised, by the use on the part of the latter of electrical, mechanical, and dummy mines for the protection of their harbours, etc. In regard to the utility of the latter, it is on record that a certain German port was entirely defended by dummy mines, the Burgomaster of that place having been unable to obtain men to place the active mechanical ones in position, owing to the numerous and serious accidents that had previously occurred in other German ports at the commencement of the war, in mooring the latter kind of submarine mine.
The effect, so far as keeping the French fleet at a distance was concerned, was precisely the same, as though active instead of dummy mines had been employed, thus still further proving the vast moral power possessed by torpedoes.
Torpedoes in the Russo-Turkish War.—In the war of 1877, the Turks, though possessing a powerful fleet in the Black Sea and flotilla on the Danube, made little or no use of their superiority over the Russians in this respect. They failed to even attempt to destroy the bridges formed by the Russians over the Danube, nor did they make any attempt to capture Poti, re-take Kustendje, or to create diversions on the Russian coast in the Black Sea. Had the latter service alone been effectually carried out, by which means, a large force of the enemy would have been held in check, immense help would have been afforded to the Ottoman armies in Europe and Asia. Again, during the whole of the war, the Russian port of Odessa was never sighted, and Sebastopol only once by the Ottoman fleet.
Cause of Failure of the Ottoman Fleet.—The cause of this repeated neglect on the part of the Turkish fleet may be traced almost entirely to the assumption (which in nine out of ten cases was an erroneous one) on the part of the Naval Pashas and Beys that every Russian harbour, etc., was a mass of submarine mines, and this in several instances extending many miles to seaward.
So also, some of the many failures experienced by the Russians in their numerous torpedo boat attacks, were due in a great measure to an erroneous supposition on the part of the captain of the Russian steamer, Constantine (employed to convoy the torpedo boats), that the Turks had defended the entrance, to a distance of some miles to seaward, of their harbours, etc., and thus the torpedo boats were dispatched to the attack some miles off the entrance, causing them, owing to the darkness, to enter the harbour in which the Turkish vessels were lying, in a very straggling manner. And to a similar reason the failure of the Russians to capture Sulina, in the attack made on that place in October, 1877, was principally owing to their not daring to send their Popoffkas to attack from the sea.
One of the chief points of usefulness of an extensive and systematic employment of submarine mines, will be to minimise the number of vessels necessary for the protection of harbours, etc., thus enabling a far larger number of ships to operate at sea against those of an enemy, this especially applies to countries like England and America possessing a large extent of seacoast, numerous harbours, rivers, etc., which it would be necessary to defend in the event of war.
Science of Torpedo Warfare.—The science of defensive torpedo warfare may be considered to consist of:—
1.—The arrangement of the mines in positions, such that it would not be possible for a hostile vessel attempting to force a passage into a harbour, etc., defended by such means, to pass more than one line of them, without coming within the destructive radius of some one or other of the remaining mines.