THE MACHINERY OF OUR FOREIGN SERVICE.
Report of a lecture delivered by Hon. Eugene Schuyler in the National Museum, Washington, D. C., on Saturday, February 28th.
This topic is especially interesting from the fact that so little is known of it except by those in the service of the government whose duties are connected with the foreign service. The government of the United States, in uneventful times at least, is a despotism in the hands of five or six men, working under and through constitutional forms, and subject only to the penalty which is always exacted from very grave mistakes. These men are the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the standing Committee on Appropriations, and the chairman of the standing Committee on Ways and Means. In times of disorder, others are added to this list, both from the Senate and from the Cabinet officers. The chairmen of committees for other branches of the service also, at such times, rise into prominence. Without the consent of some one, two or three of these dignitaries no important step in public affairs can be taken. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury are the only Cabinet officers who in ordinary times can influence, not only the policy of the government, but also the welfare of the country, without the permission of Congress; it may be, even without the knowledge of the President.
The currency question, the silver coinage, the position taken recently by the Clearing House in New York, and the state of the gold market, show how a sudden emergency may induce, if not compel, the Secretary of the Treasury to take action which might strongly affect for good or for evil the most vital interests of the nation. Nor is it otherwise with the Secretary of State, who by an intemperate or ill-timed insistence on national or individual rights, or by even a want of tact may cause irritations hard to be appeased. On the other hand, by an ignorance of precedence, an unguarded admission or an act of good nature, he may give up rights which the nation has jealously claimed for a century, or has held in reserve for future use. However, judging by the past, I think our Secretary of State will do none of these things. This official is selected with greater care than any other public officer. He is usually a statesman of high rank or of long experience, and frequently a cautious and shrewd lawyer into the bargain. The possibilities of diplomatic mistakes, however, are such that it is necessary for the Secretary of State to be surrounded by thoroughly trained and skilled subordinates. This department is among the earliest of the great divisions of the administration created by Congress in 1789 for facilitating public business, and during the first forty years of our national existence was in reality, as now in rank, the leading department of the government. Years ago, indeed, our foreign policy was of far more consequence to the country than our domestic policy, although we still had to struggle, if not for our existence, at least for our position and our national rights. The Secretary of State, therefore, is the leading statesman of the party, and at one time in the nation’s history was almost sure of succeeding to the presidency. The duty of the Secretary of State not only is the supervision and management of all the foreign relations of the United States, but also those duties which in other countries are generally given to the Keeper of the Seals, or to the Minister of Justice: such, for instance, as the keeping, promulgation, and publication of the laws; the custody of the great seal, and the preservation of the government archives, as well as the charge of all special relations between the general government and the several states. The first Assistant Secretary is to be considered as a political officer, in the full confidence of his chief, able to advise him, and even at times to replace him; while the second and third Assistant Secretaries have by necessity and custom become permanent officers. The affairs of the department are managed with great secrecy, not only because the officials are careful and trustworthy persons, but because the general public, as a rule, is but slightly interested in matters pertaining to our foreign relations, save when some great subject is under dispute. In England, France or Italy the case is different, since the Minister of Foreign Affairs has a place in Parliament, and can be interrogated at any time with regard to particular questions arising with foreign countries, by which means the public can not help being more or less informed on such matters, even though the progress of negotiations may be kept secret. Here the only method for obtaining such information is by a resolution of either house of Congress, asking from the President the papers on the question in point, and making an investigation, if considered necessary, through the Committee on Foreign Affairs. These papers, however, may be refused, if thought by the President that their publication would be disadvantageous to the interests of the government. There is probably no other country, even Russia or Germany not excepted, where so little is known by the public of the negotiations carried on at any one time by the Secretary of State. This has great advantages, enabling the government to conduct with tranquility a negotiation which may be extremely necessary, and often to settle disputes which, if public opinion were excited, might result in a breach of friendly relations. On account of this quiet way of doing business, many people are of the opinion that very little work is done by the State Department. Clerks often work till late at night and all Sunday, sometimes, preparing commercial and statistical information in response to a question asked in Congress. The work of the chief clerk, in one sense, is the hardest of all, for he has to work in a public room, accessible to all, must inspect every paper that comes in or goes out, must carry the whole business of the department in all its details in his head, must see every one who calls, assist those who have legitimate business, listen to others, giving “suave answers, but no information,” and withal be patient and keep his temper. During the last fiscal year the real expense of the State Department to the nation was less than $400,000; since the total sum expended ($1,288,355.28) was in great part met by the fees, which amounted to $899,652.67.
The State Department has not sole authority for the administration of foreign affairs, for the consideration and approval of the Senate is required, not only regarding nominations to diplomatic and consular posts made by the President, but also regarding treaties made with foreign powers before they can be ratified. It is fortunate, however, that the Senate can only affirm or reject a treaty; but, owing to the wording of the article of our Constitution, which says that the President “with the consent and advice of the Senate shall conclude treaties,” the Senate considers that it has the right to amend a treaty already negotiated, a practice which causes great difficulty, as frequently a Senator to whom the subject under discussion is not quite clear, insists on the addition of two or three words to an instrument, which causes a long delay and frequently protracted negotiations. Treaties are discussed in secret session, partly because the Senate is acting as a privy council to the President, and partly because, if the debates were open, things might be said which would give offense to foreign governments. As to this latter point, I can only observe that the practice of debating a treaty in open session has not been found to work badly in those countries in which it is the habit.
A feeling of jealousy has been growing up between the House of Representatives and the Senate, and has become very evident during the last few months, the House maintaining that, as it alone was empowered to initiate measures touching the revenue, the President had no right to negotiate a commercial treaty without previously consulting that body. I do not think that this contention is supported by the Constitution, but at the same time the practice of our government has changed so much of recent years, in giving larger and larger powers to the lower House, that it is not without some reason that such a view is supported. In order to obviate such disputes, the Secretary of the State Department, before making a commercial treaty and engaging the country in a new commercial system, should, as was done in the negotiation of the Mexican treaty, ask Congress for authority to conclude it. Again, the powers allowed by the Senate to its standing committees form another obstacle to the ratification of treaties, since it is impossible, except by an actual vote of the Senate, to compel the committee to report to the full Senate a treaty which has already been referred to it for consideration. In the Senate committees are elected; in the House they are named by the Speaker. The sub-committee of three, which is in charge of the appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service, is generally named by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and in nine cases out of ten is composed of persons possessing no previous acquaintance with the subject. To the sub-committee are presented the estimates made up by the Secretary of State, and a bill is then prepared. It can raise a grade here, establish a consul there, pare down a salary in one place, or abolish a mission in another. Of course some of the changes made by this sub-committee are often very excellent, and even necessary but its main idea seems to be to reduce the appropriation to the lowest limit from motives of economy; not that the nation at large cared for a saving of ten or twenty thousand dollars, but because by gaining the reputation of being economical, constituents might believe its members worthy of a new election. The bill is next reported to the House, where party strength is drilled to support the committees. Every amendment is there voted down, for the men whose salaries are sometimes retroactively voted down, are too far away to be heard. From the House the bill is passed to the Senate. The general theory of the Senate committees is to reject every change made by the House, and to hold pretty closely to the law of the last Congress, restoring what had been omitted, and adding some appropriations for unforeseen expenses, secret service money, or as technically expressed, for “expenses in carrying out the Neutrality Act,” etc. The Senate generally passes the amended bill with slight debate, except in unusual cases. The House next, on motion of the sub-committee, is wont to reject without debate all the Senate amendments, and very often suggests a committee of conference. In like manner the Senate refuses to recede from its amendments, and accepts the conference. Then a secret meeting is held of the two sub-committees, who bargain with each other, giving and taking, each yielding part, and reporting the results to their respective houses in such a technical form that it is impossible to understand it without a careful examination of all the papers. This the clerk reads hastily, and it is passed without debate, often containing new matter never before proposed in the open House. I am not blaming either body, but simply explaining a system which is becoming the habitual way of passing all appropriation bills. How can an already underpaid consul perform his duties properly and vigorously, when every few months he has to consider the chances of having his salary cut down, or when engaged in an important investigation by order of his government, he is quietly informed that his salary ceased a month or six weeks before?
The interests of our country demand that our diplomatic and consular service should be fixed by a general law, subject of course to necessary changes, to be recommended by the department, and not undergo this annual tinkering, to which no other branch of the government and no other class of officials are subjected.