This means reductions of wages and discharge of workmen. Some writers have urged that the workingman receives a fixed wage and does not assume industrial risks, which are borne by the capitalist or entrepreneur. Such a statement is fallacious. The employee participates in the risks of modern industry and suffers from a business derangement far more severely than his employer. The capitalist secures less profits but with his accumulated savings ordinarily endures no real privation, while large numbers of the workers with little or no savings face actual hunger or starvation. Demands upon charitable organizations increase, bread lines grow longer, and suffering becomes widespread and intense until the crisis and the ensuing depression are over....
The Crisis of 1907 in the Light of History
[232]... From one point of view ... every economic crisis is a financial crisis. For since values are expressed in terms of money, and since the modern business superstructure is erected on the basis of credit, every economic revulsion expresses itself through the medium of a change in prices; and since the bank is the center of credit operations, every crisis inevitably involves a revolution in the conditions of credit. From this point of view, all crises may be declared to be financial crises.
From another standpoint, however, a distinction may be drawn between financial crises proper and commercial or industrial crises in the larger sense. There may be a financial panic or crisis due primarily to temporary and sudden oscillations in the condition of the money market or in the price of securities. Such oscillations, sharp and sudden though they be, may have but little relation, whether of effect or of cause, to the general commercial and industrial interests. Of this character, for instance, were the original Black Friday in England, in 1745, its namesake, the famous Black Friday in 1869 in New York, as well as many spasmodic fluctuations due either to political rumors like that which followed the Venezuelan Message of 1895, or to temporary speculative manipulations, like the Northern Pacific "squeeze" of 1901. Of a distinctly different nature are those wider disturbances which are traceable to more general economic causes and which, even though they culminate in acute financial trouble, are followed by an industrial and commercial depression of more or less magnitude.
Into which category is to be put the crisis of 1907; and if in the latter, what were its causes?
At the outset it must be remembered that crises are essentially modern phenomena. We have had financial transactions, and that, too, on a large scale, for many centuries and in many civilizations. But crises, in contradistinction to temporary panics, have existed in England only since the middle of the eighteenth, and in other countries only since the beginning of the nineteenth, century. The first crisis in England, barring the financial flurry connected with the South Sea Scheme in 1720, was that of 1763, followed by the minor disturbances of 1772 and 1783, and the more widespread convulsions of 1793, 1810, and 1825. The first crisis in the United States was that of 1817; and it was not until 1837 that we find the first international crisis, spreading from the United States to England and then to France. In Germany the period of important crises was ushered in even later.
Crises, in other words, are products of modern economic life. Modern economic life, however, has as its basal characteristic industrial capitalism, with the factory system and the newer methods of production for a wide market. This transition to modern industrial capitalism began in England in the latter half of the eighteenth century, was initiated in America in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, and took place on the continent at a later date, last of all in Germany. The explanation of crises must therefore be sought in some feature of our modern capitalistic life.
The current explanations may be divided into two categories. Of these the first includes what might be termed the superficial theories. Thus it is commonly stated that the outbreak of a crisis is due to lack of confidence—as if the lack of confidence was not in itself the very thing which needs to be explained. Of still slighter value is the attempt to associate a crisis with some particular governmental policy, or with some action of a country's executive. Such puerile interpretations have commonly been confined to countries like the United States, where the political passions of a democracy have had the fullest sway. Thus the crisis of 1893 was ascribed by the Republicans to the impending Democratic tariff of 1894; and the crisis of 1907 has by some been termed the "Roosevelt panic," utterly oblivious of the fact that from the time of President Jackson, who was held responsible for the troubles of 1837, every successive crisis has had its presidential scapegoat, and has been followed by a political revulsion. The crisis of 1857 helped to weaken the Democrats; the crisis of 1873 resulted in a popular majority for Tilden; the crisis of 1884 put Cleveland into the presidential chair; and the crisis of 1893, with the ensuing depression, brought the Republicans back to power.
Opposed to these popular, but wholly unfounded, interpretations is the second class of explanations, which seek to burrow beneath the surface and to discover the more occult and fundamental causes of the periodicity of crises. Here we find an interesting and progressive series of attempts to grapple with the difficulties of the problem. For a long time economists and business men advanced the theory of overproduction, forgetful of the fact that there really cannot be any such phenomenon as too much actual production of wealth.
With the disappearance of this doctrine there came into prominence its variant, which put the emphasis on relative, rather than absolute, or universal overproduction, that is, the overproduction of some things and the underproduction of others. This theory also failed to command general assent, for the reason that no one could show in what respects there was any underproduction of wealth, or any lack of particular products during the years preceding a crisis. Others again, have sought the causal fact in underconsumption, alleging that the larger consumption of wealth will in itself take up all the slack of production, and thus obviate a crisis. This explanation also is inadequate, because it overlooks the fact that the real falling off in consumption comes after the crisis has developed and not before; in fact, the period of prosperity which precedes a crisis is generally marked by a prodigious increase in consumption.