The new system is to be organized under the supervision and direction of the "Reserve Bank Organization Committee," consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Comptroller of the Currency. The most important function of this committee is to determine, "with due regard to the convenience and the customary course of business," the number and area of the Federal Reserve districts into which the country is to be divided, and to designate the city in each district in which a Federal Reserve Bank is to be established. Not less than eight, nor more than twelve districts are to be created. This is a most difficult task. However carefully the initial lines of demarcation may be drawn, more or less modification is to be expected after there has been some experience with the working of the system. Changes in area of districts, and additional districts if the organization committee designates less than twelve, may be made at any time in the future by the Federal Reserve Board. While the rivalry of cities may tempt the committee to start the system with a larger number, it is to be hoped that it will be found feasible to begin with no more than eight or nine districts. The problems which will confront the management of the Federal Reserve Banks are in many respects unlike those with which our bankers have had experience. A somewhat higher average of capacity in the management may more confidently be looked for if the smaller number of banks is established. Moreover, especially at the outset, mere size will contribute not a little to the prestige of the banks, and so inspire public confidence in the new system. A greater variety of occupations in large areas will lessen, though not much, extremes of seasonal variation in demands for accommodation upon the federal reserve banks. Then, too, the task of the Federal Reserve Board in supervising and co-ordinating the system will be materially simplified, if the minimum rather than the maximum number of federal districts is decided upon.

Within sixty days after the passage of the act, in other words before February 22, 1914, national banks are required, and properly qualified state banks are invited, to signify their acceptance of the terms of the act. Within thirty days after the reserve districts have been designated, each national bank must subscribe to the capital of the reserve bank of its district an amount equal to 6 per cent. of its capital and surplus. One-sixth of this subscription is to be paid at the call of the organization committee, another sixth within three months, and still another within six months thereafter. The remaining half of the subscription may be called at any time by the Federal Reserve Board. All these payments are to be made in gold or in gold certificates. It will be observed that the exact time when the system will be established is uncertain. The organization committee is only required to designate the reserve districts as soon as is practicable; thirty days is then allowed for the banks to subscribe; and payments will begin sometime thereafter at the call of the committee....

After the minimum capital (four million dollars for any federal reserve bank) has been subscribed, the certificate of organization is to be executed by any five member banks designated for the purpose by the organization committee. The final duty of the committee will be to supervise all arrangements for the election of the six of the nine directors of each Federal Reserve Bank, who are to be chosen by the member banks. For electoral purposes the banks of each district are to be divided into three groups—each group to "contain as nearly as may be one-third of the aggregate number of the member banks ... and as nearly as may be banks of similar capitalization." While the number of banks in each group will be the same, the capitalization will be very different. All the banks with a capitalization above the average in a district will certainly be in one group; those of somewhat less than average capital, in the second group; while the third group will be composed of banks having a very small capitalization. Under this ingenious arrangement, it is evident that the direct influence of the banks of the large cities in selecting the directorates of the Federal Reserve Banks is limited. Local alignments are also avoided. On the other hand, this is not a grouping to which the banks have been accustomed in the past, and therefore there is some uncertainty as to whether at the outset it will be conducive to the selection of capable directorates.

Each group of banks is to choose two directors: a Class A director, who is to be an active banker representing the stock-holding banks, and a Class B director, who must be actively engaged in commerce, agriculture, or some other industrial pursuit in his district. The board of directors of each member bank is to elect a district reserve elector. Candidates for the position of director of a Federal Reserve Bank may be nominated by any member bank; but nomination is not necessary. Electors are to signify their first, second, and other choices for one director in each class on a preferential ballot.

In addition to the six directors chosen by the banks, three directors (Class C) are to be appointed by the Federal Reserve Board. Two of these must be persons of "tested banking experience," one to serve as chairman of the board of directors and district reserve agent, the other as deputy chairman and deputy reserve agent. These reserve agents are the official representatives of the Reserve Board, through whom it will exercise its powers of supervision and control over the reserve banks. The act contains no provision regarding the officers to whom the operation of the banks will be entrusted. Presumably each board of directors will appoint one of its members (probably one of the Class A directors) as president and manager. The term of office of all directors is three years, but at the outset they are to be classified so that the term of one director of each of the three classes shall expire annually. The appointment of Class C directors will be the first duty of the Federal Reserve Board; inasmuch as the organization of the system can hardly be completed before the beginning of the summer, the appointment of this board could be deferred until that time. The selection of these directors for each of the eight or more Federal Reserve Banks is, however, no small task in itself; and since public confidence in the new system will largely be based at the outset upon the character of the Federal Reserve Board, its early selection is much to be desired.

The Federal Reserve Board itself is to consist of seven members: the Secretary of the Treasury and Comptroller of the Currency ex officio, and five members appointed by the President of the United States by and with the [advice and] consent of the Senate. Of the five appointed members, at least two must be persons experienced in banking or finance. Not more than one shall be appointed from any federal reserve district, and due regard is to be given to the different commercial, industrial, and geographical divisions of the country. The term of office of the appointed members is ten years; but those first selected are to serve one for two, one for four years, and so on, so that the term of office of one member may expire every two years.

Under this arrangement a majority of the board, in the absence of death and resignation, will never be reconstituted at any one time. Each President will select two of the appointed members: one in the second year of his term of office, and one in the fourth. The Secretary of the Treasury will, of course, be a new member appointed at the beginning of each presidential term. The term of office of the Comptroller of the Currency is for five years, so that here a variable element is introduced. It may happen that some Presidents will never appoint more than three members during their term of office. Generally, however, each President will appoint four members; but the last appointment, giving a majority on the board, will not be made until his final year of office. Lack of continuity and the possibility of a political board were much greater under the provisions for selecting the Federal Reserve Board which were in the measure at various stages while it was passing through Congress. The arrangements finally adopted would seem to make it reasonably certain that the Federal Reserve Board will be free from both these defects.

Organization of the system will be complete[289] with the selection of the members of the Federal Advisory Council. This Council is to consist of as many members as there are Federal Reserve districts, the board of directors of each Federal Reserve Bank selecting one member. The function and powers of the council are purely consultative. It is to meet regularly four times each year at Washington, and at other times there or elsewhere if deemed necessary by the Council itself. It is authorized to confer directly with the Federal Reserve Board, to call for information, and make oral or written representations concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board. It may prove to be an important part of the organization, but this does not seem probable. With a scattered membership and holding regular meetings only at long intervals, it is not to be expected that the Council will be in close touch with the Federal Reserve Board, or in a position to formulate policies and urge them effectively. From individual members of the Council, the Federal Reserve Board should secure valuable information regarding conditions in different parts of the country; but the work of the council itself as an organized body seems likely to be of a formal and perfunctory nature. The importance of the Council would doubtless have been measurably increased if the proposal had been adopted that its chairman should sit, even though without a vote, on the Federal Reserve Board.

CAPITAL, EARNINGS, DEPOSITS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS

Since the capital stock of each of the Federal Reserve Banks is to be exactly 6 per cent. of the capital and surplus of the member banks in its district, it will always be subject to slight variations. If all national banks enter the system at the outset, the total subscribed capital of the Federal Reserve Banks will be a little more than one hundred million dollars. Subscriptions may perhaps fall somewhat below this amount, since with the exception of the reserve agent banks, no penalty attaches to failure to subscribe until twelve months after the passage of the act. Few state banking institutions will enter the system at the beginning. In many states legislation is necessary to permit them to invest in the stock of the Federal Reserve Banks, and to enable them to count balances with the Federal Reserve Banks as a part of their required reserves. It is to be presumed also, that such institutions, since they can enter at any time, will wait to see whether the system is working to the satisfaction of neighboring national banks.[290]