The hesitation which prevailed, therefore, in many quarters in regard to the ability of a government to overcome the conservatism of the East in its preference for coins of full bullion value has not been warranted by events. This demonstration is of importance if the exchange standard is to be considered for China. At present the Government of China is not perhaps strong enough and sufficiently centralised to assure its subjects that it can give a definite gold value to a token coin and maintain it honestly and efficiently. The trial of the system, however, in the Philippines, in British India, and in the Straits Settlements, in all of which there are many Chinese, has probably so far cleared the air upon this point that the Chinese Imperial Government would be able to establish the gold exchange system if it did so under sufficient guarantees to the financial world that it would be honestly and intelligently maintained.

Next in importance to the settlement of this question of native willingness to accept the new system may be considered the degree of difficulty in maintaining it. It is not surprising, perhaps, that when it was proposed in an incomplete form for British India, it should have been denounced as a "fair weather" device—"a leap in the dark," which would not stand the test of business depression, deficient crops, and an unfavourable balance of trade.[83]

The most serious difficulty which has been foreseen by critics of the gold exchange system relates to the sufficiency of the exchange funds. Up to the period of the general panic of 1907 and the crop failure in India in the spring of 1908, it might fairly be said, perhaps, that the system had not been subjected to any but "fair weather" conditions. The experience of India, however, has thrown striking light upon the possibilities and limitations of the system in time of stress. The test in India has been of such magnitude, moreover, that its results are much more conclusive than any test which might have been afforded in a smaller country dealing with a less enormous mass of token coins. If the test had come before the exchange funds had acquired a respectable size, the system might have been allowed to break down, through timidity and delay in taking proper measures of protection, and discredit have thus been cast upon it before it had been fairly tried.

What happened in India was that the failure of the crops deprived the country of the usual means of compensating by exports the heavy imports of foreign goods which had been contracted for. It became necessary, under the settled principles of exchange, to find gold to fill the gap. Usually the exchange account substantially balanced itself by the sale in London of Council drafts upon the Indian Government to obtain gold to pay the interest on the debt held in England. These drafts were purchased by importers in London, and used to pay for the Indian crops; but all through the spring of 1908 purchasers for drafts failed to appear, because there had been no considerable exports of Indian crops to be paid for. Hence Council drafts were without a market, and for a moment it seemed that the link which bound the Indian monetary system to the gold market of London had been severed, and that the silver rupee might drop as disastrously as the Mexican dollar before its free coinage was suspended. This would have added the influence of an appalling disaster to the burden already imposed upon Indian finance by the failure of the crops, for it would have compelled the Indian importer of English goods to find a greatly increased number of rupees to meet his gold obligations in London. Obviously, it was a disaster which, if it had occurred, would have invited the bankruptcy of the country, reflected lasting disgrace upon English financial foresight, and perhaps even have led to organised revolt.

The Indian Government had available for meeting the crisis about £18,500,000, principally invested in securities in London. This fund, known as the gold standard reserve, was distinct from the currency reserve, consisting of gold received for currency notes, which amounted in the spring of 1908 to about £12,000,000. It was against the former fund that the Indian Government felt compelled to offer to sell exchange in India. Such offers were made for a time in limited amounts of £500,000 each, but they proved substantially adequate for meeting the demand, and by early summer the demand fell below the supply. The offer of exchange in this form for rupees maintained the value of the rupee coinage, contracted the amount of rupees in circulation in India, and enabled the Indian merchants to meet their obligations without the loss which they must have suffered if the currency had been allowed to depreciate in gold value. The actual sales of bills upon the exchange funds in London reached, between March 26th and August 13th, 1908, the considerable total of £8,058,000. Of this amount about £2,000,000 was taken from the currency reserve in gold, which was "earmarked" at the Bank of England, incidentally affording relief to the London money market which was keenly appreciated. Most of the remainder was obtained by the sale of securities to an amount which reduced such holdings from £14,019,676 on March 31st to £9,415,708 on July 31st.

The test to which the Indian system, as the most important example of the gold exchange standard, was thus subjected was perhaps of a higher importance than was realised by those in the thick of the conflict. It was plainly intimated, however, in the annual report on financial conditions for 1908 that, if necessary, the Indian Government would have issued short-dated securities in order to still further replenish the exchange funds in London. This would have been the true means of meeting the situation if the existing fund had been unduly impaired. The argument against it would have been that the demand was indefinite, and might become so large as to be unmanageable. The fact that the demand for exchange was met without the issue of new securities and without trenching upon the reserve funds beyond the amount of £8,000,000 out of £18,500,000 affords pretty strong evidence that there is a natural limit to such demands.

It is in this principle, that there is a natural limit to the possible drain upon the exchange funds, that the security of the new system lies.... It is only the supply of local currency on the margin of possible export demands which needs to be safeguarded. The substratum, which can never leave the country unless under the influence of an almost inconceivable economic cataclysm, is analogous in some respects to the "authorised" circulation of the Bank of England. It represents the irreducible minimum below which the local need for currency can never fall. If the supply on the margin of the international exchange movement is adequately guarded, then the whole system is secure. If it were conceivable that the demand for exchange would equal the whole amount of the local currency, or even the half of it, then it would be necessary to maintain exchange funds equal to the whole amount of token coins or the half of them in order to insure safety. But obviously this could never be the case.

This argument against the exchange standard is only a repetition of the dilemma sometimes presented by untrained minds in regard to bank-notes: what would happen if all the notes should be presented at one time for redemption? That question has been answered by banking experience; the question in regard to the gold exchange system has been and must be answered by experience in substantially the same manner. No country can be subjected to such stress as to consent to part with its entire monetary circulation, or even the half of it. On the contrary, every influence which tends to contract the circulation tends to create a condition which makes further contraction more difficult. Rates for the loan of money are affected, prices of imported goods are influenced, imports fall off and exports increase, and inevitably in the modern money market local equilibrium is restored, often with considerable strain, but none the less without pulling down the pillars of the financial temple.

The experience of last spring in India proves the adequacy of a reserve of 15 or 20 per cent. of the circulation to maintain the steady parity of a token coinage. There is apparently no evidence that serious distrust of the rupee arose, even when the Government was hesitating as to just what steps should be taken to meet the demand for exchange. Even if such distrust had arisen, however, it could have expressed itself through financial channels only by the demand for drafts on London. These would not have been very valuable to the average local tradesman except as he was able to sell them back again to the banks for the very rupees which had aroused his distrust. In this respect the gold exchange standard may be said to put a brake upon the disposition to export currency from fear alone, when the exportation is not demanded by the balance of trade.

If any mistake was made in the management of the Indian currency, it was in the investment of too large a proportion of the gold standard reserve in securities. While investment in securities is naturally attractive because of the income earned, and while it is not subject to just criticism while kept within certain limits, the possession of actual gold to a considerable amount is highly desirable. It would not be necessary, perhaps, that such gold should be "earmarked." If the Indian Government had a large deposit account in such an institution as the Union of London and Smith's Bank, or the London City and Midland, it would possess for the purposes of the Indian Government the character of gold. Drafts against such a deposit could be sold without the discount or delay which might be required in disposing of securities. It seems highly desirable, therefore, in spite of the prudence with which the recent pressure was met, that at least 30 or 40 per cent. of the gold standard reserve should in the future be kept either in "earmarked" gold or in the form of demand deposits.