It was thirty miles from Sterkfontein to my commando, but, notwithstanding this, I sent an order that 1,500 men, under Generals J.B. Wessels, C.C. Froneman and De Villiers, should come up with all haste and bring three guns with them.

During the time that must necessarily elapse before the arrival of this force, I sent men out to visit the farms of those burghers who had gone home after the fall of Bloemfontein, with orders to bring them back to the front.

By the evening of the 1st of April I had all the men of the district together; but it was then too late to make a start.

At ten o'clock the following morning the English left Dewetsdorp, and marched towards Reddersburg. Directly I received news of this, I sent word to the Generals, that they must hasten to Reddersburg; while I, with the men who had rejoined, made my way to the north, so as to take up a position on the enemy's flank. I had with me one hundred and ten men in all. Many of them were without rifles, having given up their arms at Bloemfontein. Others were provided with serviceable achterlaaiers, but had little or no ammunition, because they had already fired off their cartridges in mere wantonness in the belief that they might have to give up their rifles any day. My handful of burghers were thus as good as unarmed.

During our march I kept the English continually under surveillance. They were unable to advance very rapidly, as the bulk of their force was made up of infantry. But they were too far ahead for the commandos whom I had sent in pursuit to be able to get at them; and for me, with the handful of almost unarmed burghers which I commanded, to have attempted an attack would have been worse than folly.

On the evening of the 2nd of April, the English encamped on the hill to the west of a farm called Oollogspoort; whilst we off-saddled to the north of them, on Mr. Van der Walt's farm. The enemy, however, was not aware of the position of our laager.

The following morning, at four o'clock, I sent a third report to the commandos. They had been some way on the road to Dewetsdorp, and thus, far out of the course to Reddersburg, when my second report reached them; and now my despatch rider met only Generals Froneman and De Villiers with seven hundred men and three guns, and was too late to prevent General Wessels from going on to Dewetsdorp.

Shortly after sunrise General Froneman received my report. He had been riding all night through without stopping, and many of his horses were already tired out. But as my order was that the Generals were to leave behind those who were unable to proceed, and to hasten on at once without so much as off-saddling, he did not wait to be told twice, but pushing forward with all speed, arrived on the 3rd of April at Schwarskopjes on the Kaffir River. He had left Sanna's Post on the afternoon of the previous day.

Those who consider that he was marching with seven hundred men and three Krupp guns, and that his horses were so exhausted that some of them had to be left behind, will agree with me that he did a good day's work in those twenty-four hours.

Fortunately for us, it was not at that time the habit of the English to start on their march before the sun had risen. And, by another lucky chance, our opponents were off their guard, and quite unsuspicious of attack, although they must, undoubtedly, have heard something of what had happened at Sanna's Post.