The following day being Tuesday and the day during which the Johannesburg malcontents would decide whether they would surrender or fight, everybody was on the tenter hooks of expectation and anxiety to know what would be decided.
The High Commissioner, who had been in Pretoria since Saturday the 4th January, had recommended the Reform Committee to surrender to the Government, as it was useless for them to attempt a struggle. Sir Jacobus de Wet, the British agent, had advised the British subjects to return to ways of peace and order.
The Reform Committee might have wished to proceed to extremes, but they saw that they had not a leg to stand upon. No more outside help could be hoped for. The High Commissioner had acted honourably and in good faith to the Government of the South African Republic, and in the only way he could act without sacrificing British honour. He had assured the malcontents that they could not expect British aid if they went beyond the pale of the law.
Being unable to obtain outside help, and as even the majority of Johannesburg refused to fight except those who received one pound sterling a day, the Reform Committee did the only thing left them to do, and surrendered unconditionally to the Government.
Of course they did not acknowledge that they surrendered because they could not do anything else, and because they knew that with Jameson’s defeat their whole plot had failed. No, they only surrendered to please the High Commissioner, and as they would not fight (to please the High Commissioner), they declared that they expected the High Commissioner to fight for them and obtain for them their demands. In fact, they shifted the whole responsibility of past, present and future on to the High Commissioner, and consequently on to the Imperial Government. When Steve heard of the surrender he threw up his hat and shouted hurrah, and ran to the telegraph office and sent the following telegram to his mother:—
‘Dear Mother,—Johannesburg has surrendered unconditionally. South Africa may reckon on some years of peace again; no fear of further disturbances.’
Foolish Steve. He did not think that England would interfere after all and keep the country in a state of unrest and uncertainty for months after, through holding out hopes to the discontented that she would force the Government to accede to their demands.
This uncertainty was kept up for months, and this uncertainty obtains to this very day when I write this (15th April 1896). England took it upon herself, after everybody thought that all was settled, and after the President had already promised certain privileges to the discontented, to dictate to the South African Republic what she should do and what she should not do, and this in contradiction to the London Convention, which she had only just declared she would uphold in its entirety.
It is true that Mr Chamberlain sent what he called friendly advice only, but everybody knew that it was intended to be taken as a demand. And how was this advice sent?
Mr Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, drew up a long despatch in which he raked up long forgotten incidents of South African history. He reminded President Kruger of past friendliness shown by England to the Transvaal and Afrikanders. But he forgot to mention one incident of the overwhelming number of times that England had acted in an unfriendly and even unjust manner. He reminded the Government of the South African Republic that England had shown mercy in Bechuanaland to certain Afrikanders who had resisted English pretensions there. But Mr Chamberlain forgot to mention Slachtersnek, where Boers were hung like felons on a gallows for resisting England. He forgot to mention Boomplaats, where Boers again were shot—murdered—for fighting for their own country and for hard-earned freedom.