The subject of inquiry was Senator McCarthy’s severe tongue lashing of Brigadier General Ralph Zwicker, of Camp Kilmer, N. J. Major General Kirke B. Lawton, a former commanding general of Fort Monmouth, N. J., refused to testify about conversations with General Zwicker. He claimed “executive privilege” under the May 17, 1954, letter from President Eisenhower.
Edward Bennett Williams, who was serving as counsel for Senator McCarthy, questioned the applicability of the May 17 letter: “Don’t you know, General, that order of May 17, 1954, referred only to the Government Operations Committee and the hearing then in session which was commonly known as the Army-McCarthy hearing?”
General Lawton replied that he had been advised that the May 17 letter “not only applied to the so-called Mundt committee [the Special Committee for the Army-McCarthy hearings] but it applies to this or any other.”
Chairman Watkins excused General Lawton and wrote Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson asking clarification. Defense Secretary Wilson replied that Generals Lawton and Zwicker would be allowed to testify and produce documents unless their action would be “in violation of national security regulations or a violation of the President’s order of May 17, 1954.”
There could be little doubt now that the Defense Department intended to make the May 17, 1954, letter a part of its basic doctrine with all of the great blanket of secrecy that this would provide. I was now more concerned than ever, for I had hoped that the May 17 letter was the one-shot secrecy claim that so many of my colleagues thought it was. But again the name of Joe McCarthy was mixed up in the investigation, and in 1954 it would have been difficult to get any cool thinking on a subject that remotely touched on the controversial Wisconsin Republican.
Still, I couldn’t help worrying that the new and expanded doctrine of “executive privilege” was just too convenient a cover for those who wished to hide their activities from Congress, the press, or the public. It could be used by the incompetent as well as the corrupt.
This doctrine of an “inherent right” of persons in the executive departments to refuse testimony or documents threatened our whole system of government. It seemed a naked claim of an authority for unlimited secrecy, without regard for laws or the spirit of a democracy. By claiming a right to withhold all information on opinions, conclusions, recommendations, or suggestions, this doctrine could allow the secrecy blanket to be dropped over virtually every document in most agencies, for there are few governmental documents that do not contain some opinions or suggestions. It carried within it, in short, the seeds of dictatorship.
It seemed strange to me that this doctrine would be set forth in the administration of a President who would be regarded as one of the mildest Chief Executives, and certainly one of the least inclined toward dictatorial action. I was not worried that President Eisenhower would try to use it as a tool for totalitarianism. But with this doctrine in force a man who was inclined toward totalitarian methods might readily administer the laws as he pleased.
CHAPTER VI
Secrecy Fix on Dixon and Yates
Not until the summer of 1955 did it become apparent that the May 17, 1954, Eisenhower letter would be used on matters unrelated to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Throughout the fall and winter of 1954, I spoke and wrote about the potential danger of “executive privilege” as it had been applied in the Army-McCarthy hearings and in the McCarthy censure hearings. A few persons saw it my way. But the general tendency to believe that the letter was written solely to deal with Senator McCarthy held fast, and a general faith prevailed that the Eisenhower administration would not use it to cover up mistakes, corruption, or improprieties.