The committee was forced to rely on testimony from persons no longer in government, or on tips from persons in government who contacted investigators quietly because they feared losing their jobs if they co-operated openly.
Thanks to such testimony, it soon became apparent who had changed the strategic materials list to permit shipment of copper, aluminum, precision boring machines, and huge horizontal boring and drilling and milling machines to Iron Curtain countries.
“The downgrading and decontrol of approximately 150 of the items,” the McClellan subcommittee reported, “were recommended by personnel in our own Government agencies on the so-called Joint Operating Committees, contrary to advice of the experts and technicians of the Defense Department and in many instances against the advice of experts in their own agencies.”
There were indications at an early stage of the investigations that the revisions in the embargo list made the whole strategic list a complete farce. Simple jig boring machines were retained on the list as being prohibited from shipment to a potential enemy. However, the revised list allowed the shipment of more modern precision boring machines of much higher strategic value.
Initially the Eisenhower administration policy was not unified in barring access to testimony and records. But, as the subcommittee intensified its investigation, the requests for information ran into a stone wall of opposition from the executive agencies involved—the State Department, Defense Department, Commerce Department, and the Foreign Operations Administration. No one claimed that defense secrets were involved. The executive branch abandoned any pretense and fell back on the arbitrary refusal by simply citing President Eisenhower’s May 17, 1954, letter.
The arrogance of the executive branch was best demonstrated by the letter from Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks to Commerce Department employees. He wrote:
“You are instructed not to testify either in public or executive closed session with respect to any advice, recommendations, discussions and communications within the executive branch respecting any course of action in regard to East-West trade control or as to any information regarding international negotiation with the countries cooperating in East-West trade controls....”
Weeks tried to give some color of law to the claim of executive secrecy by citing three federal court cases, but the subcommittee declared none of the cases cited involved the right to withhold information from congressional committees.
It was Harold Stassen, then a Special Assistant to the President, who balked at giving information in a manner that most galled the subcommittee members.
“Are you willing to give us full, detailed, and complete information?” Chairman McClellan asked Stassen.