Washington cover-up

by Clark R. Mollenhoff

I headed at once for his apartment. When I arrived, Dr. Schwartz had the trunk and two boxes of documents ready to go. Mrs. Schwartz was nervous about her husband’s going, however. I assured her that for practical political reasons it was unlikely that the House would take action against Dr. Schwartz for delivering the documents to a United States Senator. As quickly as possible we carried the heavy trunk and boxes to my car. At the Mayflower Hotel, we hired a porter to wheel them on a baggage cart to the apartment of Senator Williams. While we were at the Williams apartment, Dr. Schwartz received an urgent telephone call from his wife. He took it in private in another room. Mrs. Schwartz said she had been called by a reporter who told her that since Senator Williams was a Republican, he would probably turn the documents over to Sherman Adams at the White House. The fear was groundless, but Mrs. Schwartz was frantic and made her husband promise to leave the Williams apartment and take the documents with him.

Dr. Schwartz returned to the room and told the Senator it had been suggested that the documents might be taken to Senator Wayne Morse, the Oregon Democrat. We excused ourselves to go telephone Senator Morse and left Senator Williams alone with the documents. I made the call. As I was certain he would—for I had previously talked with him about the regulatory agency scandals—Morse assured me he was interested in reviewing any documents Schwartz had available.

When we arrived at his apartment, Senator Morse greeted us calmly and assured us that he wanted the documents because of his official interest in the regulatory agencies, and we left them with him. Now we felt certain we had created a situation in which it would be virtually impossible for the House to avoid going forward with the investigation. The word would move fast that the files had been examined by a leading Democratic Senator and a leading Republican Senator. It would create a good many complex problems for any House members inclined to ignore or hide the evidence and leads that Schwartz had accumulated.

Before the Schwartz files were returned to the House subcommittee, Senator Morse read them. It was reported to me that most, if not all, of the documents were photographed before they were sent on to Representative Oren Harris, the Arkansas Democrat who was chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Until now it appeared Sherman Adams had erected a total shield from investigations by Congress. He had used “executive privilege” to avoid testimony in the Dixon-Yates case. He had been able to make his contacts at the Securities and Exchange Commission without undergoing questioning by the investigating subcommittee which was examining why the SEC had postponed a hearing on Dixon-Yates at a crucial point.

It was Sherman Adams who scribbled his initials on papers to indicate he had approved them for President Eisenhower’s signature. Sherman Adams was on the telephone daily to United States senators and congressmen on knotty legislative and patronage matters. Sherman Adams ironed out the problems between cabinet officers, and he dipped his hand into virtually every department from the first months of the Eisenhower administration. Always it was understood that Sherman Adams was speaking for President Eisenhower, or was acting for President Eisenhower. Even when he didn’t say, “This is what the President wants,” it was understood he was speaking for President Eisenhower.

The legend grew that Sherman Adams was cold and clean as New Hampshire granite—a barrier against the corrupting influence of personal and political favoritism. Coming on the heels of the Truman administration, such a reputation was much admired even when it was known that Adams was not well liked. There were countless stories of his undiplomatic, even rude, treatment of Republican political figures who were interested in a return to some good plain political patronage. It all added to the legend that Sherman Adams was one of the finest influences the Eisenhower administration had brought to Washington.

But there were also those stories of the calls that Sherman Adams made on members of the so-called “independent regulatory agencies.” One might commend the White House for keeping a firm hand on agencies directly under the control of the White House, but the regulatory agencies were another matter. Politics were supposed to be kept out.

Shortly after the midnight ride with Dr. Schwartz, I came into the possession of copies of two letters from “Sherm” Adams to “Murray” Chotiner, an attorney for North American Airlines. In the letters, “Sherm” had informed “Murray” that he had discussed the North American Airlines case with the acting head of the CAB. It appeared to be a one-party contact with an official of the CAB during the period when a case was being decided. It appeared to be a direct violation of the rules of the CAB if Adams had done what he stated in the letter he had done for Chotiner, a politically influential California lawyer. I wrote my story on the facts available in the secret files of the House subcommittee.

I caught President Eisenhower’s eye early in the February 26, 1958, press conference and he recognized me with a trace of reluctance.