No diplomat ever worked under more disheartening handicaps, for the Federalists in Philadelphia hated him, and months went by without a line of instructions or news from the State Department. Meanwhile, Washington was being poisoned against him by Federalist politicians who had his ear, and in the spring of 1796 Madison wrote Monroe that his enemies had ‘been base enough to throw into circulation insinuations that you have launched into all the depths of speculation’ and ‘purchased the magnificent estate of the late Prince of Condé.’[1312] Pickering and Wolcott were planning his recall that spring and writing Hamilton about it.[1313] The latter was easily persuaded.[1314] Some one else should be sent—some one not so friendly to the French. That the leaders of the English party were not averse to giving offense to France is shown in the astounding suggestion that William Smith, spouter of pro-English speeches, written by Hamilton, that had been printed and circulated in England, should be sent.[1315] It required no blundering by Monroe to pave the way for his recall—the politicians were sparing him that trouble.
He had officially informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Jay was not to negotiate a commercial treaty, and would sign none that was in conflict with the Franco-American Treaty—because those were his instructions. When, with rumors to the contrary flying over Paris, on the completion of the treaty, he had, on the strength of a solemn and utterly false assurance from Jay, reiterated that there was no conflict. When the document reached Paris, the French were bitterly resentful and Monroe was discredited and crippled. Even so, he probably prevented a declaration of war by representing that such a course would throw America into the arms of England—and this was charged against him by those Federalist leaders who sought war. Then he was recalled; and at the farewell audience an offensive speech by the French official, which Monroe unpardonably failed to resent, gave his enemies more ammunition.
III
With the refusal to receive Pinckney, the crisis came. To the war hawks it was a golden hour—war and no negotiations. Pickering and Wolcott fumed over the suggestion of an extraordinary mission. Hamilton, the sanest and most prescient of them all, realizing the importance of a united country in case of war, proposed sending an embassy of three, including one Jeffersonian of distinction. For almost five months a spirited debate of the leaders continued. In January, Hamilton had written Washington urging an extraordinary mission, including Madison, to conciliate the French, with Pinckney, who was not distasteful to them, and George Cabot, to moderate the Gallicism of the other two, to supply commercial information, and to represent the friends of the Administration.[1316] Two months later, in a similar recommendation to McHenry, he proposed Jefferson instead of Madison, and Jay in the place of Cabot. Then he would have a day of fasting and prayer for the opening of Congress, an embargo, an increase in the revenue, the use of convoys, and qualified letters of marque for merchantmen to arm and defend themselves.[1317] The same day he wrote the same suggestion for Pickering.[1318]
It was at this juncture that Hamilton began to run foul of the pro-English war craze of Pickering, who questioned the plan because the Democrats favored it. All the more reason for it, replied Hamilton. Unhappily, there was a prevalent feeling that the Administration wanted war and this should be counteracted.[1319] To Wolcott, he wrote in the same strain the next day.[1320] Even the usually pliant Wolcott was in rebellious mood and replied with an attack on Madison as a frequenter of M. Adet’s parties, whom that Minister wished sent, and who would wreck the negotiations, and ‘throw the disgrace of failure on the friends of the Government.’[1321] Clearly it was time for Hamilton to assume his imperial manner, and he did, in a sharp rebuke to his protégé against ‘passions that prevent the pliancy to circumstances which is sometimes indispensable.’ Then ‘what risk can attend sending Madison, if combined, as I propose, with Pinckney and Cabot,’ he added.[1322] Realizing now the importance of bringing up his congressional reserves, he wrote to William Smith by the same mail.[1323]
The insurgency against the plans of the Federalist chief was now in full blast. Tracy was writing Wolcott—‘No man will be sent on this business but a decided Federalist.’[1324] Jeremiah Smith having informed Cabot of the dispute, the latter wrote Wolcott that he could see no possibility of finding new messengers ‘with the expectation that they will not be kicked.’[1325] The same day—less circumspect outside Administration circles—he wrote Jeremiah Smith that a new embassy ‘would be disgraceful.’[1326] Ames had been won over by Hamilton, but the day after the extra session began, Cabot wrote Wolcott that his mind was ‘still as unsatisfied as at first.’[1327] Four days before the session opened, Hamilton was bringing pressure to bear on Pickering, declaring the mission ‘indispensable to silence the Jacobin criticism and promote union among ourselves.’ But by this time he had changed the personnel of his mission—Rufus King, rabidly pro-English, should be sent with Pinckney and Jefferson.[1328] Meanwhile, McHenry was receiving letters from Maryland Federalists urging war,[1329] but Hamilton’s masterful methods had won the Cabinet, and when Adams took the opinions of the Ministers he received replies that had been dictated, and, in the case of McHenry, written in large part, by the Federalist chief.[1330]
All the while Adams had been receiving volunteered advice, though it does not appear that Hamilton thought it worth while to communicate with him direct. He had received a letter from Knox urging Jefferson because of the compliment that would be implied in his rank. This touched Adams where he was ticklish. ‘The circumstance of rank is too much,’ he replied. ‘What would have been thought in Europe if the King of France had sent Monsieur, his eldest brother, as an envoy? What of the King of England if he had sent the Prince of Wales? Mr. Jefferson is in a sense in the same situation. He is the first prince of the country, and the heir apparent to the sovereign authority.’[1331] Ah, ‘Bonny Johnny,’ lucky that this letter did not fall into the hands of Bache with its references to the ‘prince’ and the ‘heir apparent’!
However, in a discussion of the mission with Jefferson, the President had suggested Madison. The wary Democratic chief received the suggestion with caution, for the experience of Monroe offered little inducement to a Democrat to subject his reputation to the mercies of the man-eating Pickering. Certainly the suggestion received no encouragement. The President and his most dangerous opponent had a friendly chat and parted friends—not soon to meet in conference again. The sage of Monticello had never been more courteous or courtly, the man from Braintree never calmer nor more kindly, but the hour had passed for a coalition. Jefferson was out for scalps, not olive branches.[1332]
Thus the time came when Adams had to take the bit in his mouth in the naming of the envoys. One day Fisher Ames had a long talk with him in urging Cabot, as a compliment to the Northern States, and the next day the envoys were named—with Cabot out. He was eliminated because Adams knew that Talleyrand was familiar with Cabot’s bitter hostility to France, and the President refused thus to ‘gratify the passions of a party.’[1333] That was ominous enough; but when he disregarded the almost unanimous protest of the Hamiltonians and named Elbridge Gerry along with Pinckney and Marshall, the gage of battle was thrown down. From that hour, the high-flying Federalists knew that John Adams would be no man’s man and no man’s parrot. Thus early, the small cloud on the horizon widened and darkened.
The proud old patriot of Braintree had been given a shock on the opening day of the extra session when Senator Tracy spread a lengthy letter before him on the table in the ex-cathedra manner of one disclosing the tablets of Moses. The squat little President read it with rising wrath. It was a letter from Hamilton, setting forth in detail ‘a whole system of instructions for the conduct of the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives.’ He read it through and returned it to Tracy. ‘I really thought the man was in a delirium,’ Adams wrote afterwards.[1334] And the cloud on the horizon grew more ominous.