The democrats followed up every advantage. Where was the spirit of ‘76? ‘Shall a paper system hold you in bondage?’[902] England would not dare, declared the Democratic Society of Philadelphia, but for the declaration of neutrality, interpreted as evidence of American cowardice.[903] And perhaps Smith of Charleston had given the English a wrong impression. Had he published his speech against the Madison Resolutions to show Americans he ‘despises their opinion’ or ‘to prove to Great Britain that he has been a faithful friend?’[904]
Under such encouragement some French sailors in American ports became cheeky and chesty. In a Charleston theater one of these having insulted a woman and been roughly handled, hastened to his ship with the story of an assault by English sympathizers. His fellows sallied forth to avenge the insult, making accessions to their ranks on the way by spreading the fictitious story of the incident. Armed with cutlasses, they descended on the theater as the people were pouring out, in an indiscriminate attack which included the wrecking of some carriages and the wounding of a few horses. The alarm bells were rung, and citizens rushed to the battle.[905]
Everywhere people were steeling themselves for war. In New York a mass meeting, held at the Coffee-House[906] was belittled by Noah Webster, the Hamiltonian editor. Both he and Fenno were clamoring for negotiations. ‘Why, to be sure, we must negotiate,’ sneered Bache. ’...The honor, the interest, the welfare of the United States are locked up in the funding system.’[907] Everywhere citizens were helping with fortifications. In New York the students of Columbia (King’s) formally tendered their services,[908] the house carpenters gave their labor,[909] and other trades followed. The country boiled with excitement. The Nation was rushing into war. Hamilton and his associates put their heads together to devise a method to prevent it.
III
The rage of the people could be held in check only by a definite action looking to the righting of wrongs, and since the last thing the commercial interests wanted was war, the only thing left was negotiation. Even though this finally failed, it might postpone the fatal day. The Federalists, in control, instinctively turned in the crisis to Hamilton as the safest man to negotiate. He above all was interested in preserving peace with England at all costs. His whole political system rested on the supremacy of the commercial element. He was the father of the national credit and it would collapse without the revenue from the imposts, the greater part of which came from English trade.
In the beginning no other name was considered in the Federalist conclaves for ambassador. ‘Who but Hamilton would perfectly satisfy all our wishes?’ wrote Ames.[910] A correspondent of Rufus King was writing about the same time that Hamilton’s selection would give general satisfaction because he had ‘the full confidence of the merchants and the people at large’;[911] and King was replying that he wished Hamilton ‘may speedily go,’ since ‘then there would be some hope of our remaining at peace.’[912]
In truth, Hamilton’s relations with England’s representatives in America had been intimate. In the days of the agency of Colonel Beckwith, before a Minister was accredited, an intimacy had been established with Hamilton so close that Professor Bemis concludes that never afterward was Jefferson ‘able to conduct his office with thorough independence.’[913] That intimacy continued until the arrival of the Minister, and in the meanwhile Hamilton figured in the Agent’s confidential reports as ‘No. 7.’[914]
The Minister, with more assiduity than ability, was George Hammond, a young man of twenty-seven, who immediately established similar relations with the Secretary of the Treasury. Soon we find him reporting to Lord Grenville that he preferred to make most of his communications privately to Hamilton and to have no relations with Jefferson that were not absolutely necessary.[915] It is fair to say that in every crisis he found the opportunity to confer with the Secretary of the Treasury.[916] All this was known, in a general way, to the commercial element when it was urging Hamilton’s appointment as ambassador, and suspected by the people at large. Thus, when the rumor of his prospective selection spread, there was a roar of protest. ‘The object of a special embassy might as well be answered by commissioning Lord Grenville or Mr. Pitt,’ wrote Bache.[917] In the meantime, Senator James Monroe had formally protested to Washington against the appointment. The opposition was due to the reason set down in the memorandum of Hamilton’s warm friend, Rufus King: ‘Colonel Hamilton did not possess the general confidence of the country.’[918]
It is easy to understand how hard it was for the Federalists to abandon their chief. Thrill enough there is, in the thought of Hamilton and Pitt seated across the table in one of the dingy little rooms in Downing Street—so similar in precocity, brilliancy, and genius.
One evening four men sat in the candle-lit room of Rufus King in Philadelphia. There was Oliver Ellsworth, a powerful figure before the Senate and Bar; George Cabot, in some respects a saner leader than Hamilton; Caleb Strong, whose strength was in common sense and toleration; and King, who was a monumental figure. It was agreed to make an effort for Hamilton, and Ellsworth was designated to call at the Morris mansion for the purpose. Washington did not commit himself. Whereupon Robert Morris was sent to reënforce the plea, but on learning that not only Hamilton and Jefferson were being considered, but Jay as well, he sensed the situation and veered to Jay. The result was that Jay was summoned and offered the post. He took it under consideration. The next day Jay was overrun with visitors. Hamilton urged his acceptance, having in the meanwhile written Washington withdrawing his own name from the list of aspirants.[919] King, Strong, Cabot, and Ellsworth followed, demanding Jay’s acceptance as a duty. While Jay was deliberating, his party was thrown into a panic with the rumor that Madison was a possibility, and that Monroe had encouraged a hope in Pierce Butler with a promise of the support of the Jeffersonians. Jay accepted.