‘The House has a right to ask for papers,’ he said, ‘because their coöperation and sanction is necessary to carry the Treaty into full effect, to render it a binding instrument, and to make it, properly speaking, a law of the land; because they have a full discretion to either give or refuse that coöperation; because they must be guided in the exercise of that discretion by the merits and expediency of the Treaty itself, and therefore they have a right to ask for every information which can assist them in deciding that question.’ Whence led the argument of the foes of the Resolutions? ‘The Constitution says that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. But treaties, whatever provisions they may contain, are law; appropriations may therefore be made by treaties. Then the shortest way to carry this treaty into effect would have been to add another article appropriating the money.’ Turning to the power of the House of Commons in the case of treaties involving an appropriation, he found an analogy to the constitutional power of the President and the Senate, in the power of the King to make treaties. But no one in England challenged the right of the Commons to appropriate or not in putting the provisions of a treaty into effect—and the speaker cited instances where the Commons had rejected treaties by refusing appropriations. ‘Are we in a worse situation than Great Britain?’ he asked. ‘Is the House of Representatives ... the immediate representatives of the American people ranked below the British House of Commons? Shall the Legislative power be swallowed up by the Treaty-making power as contended for here, though never claimed even in Great Britain?’ The issue raised by the opposition to the Resolutions was clear, and their rejection would be ‘tantamount to saying that the House abandons their share in legislation, and consents that the whole power shall be centered in the other branches.’
Such, in general, was the tenor of the argument for the Resolutions; while the Federalists insisted that the House possessed no power to refuse any appropriation called for by a treaty—and thus the discussion went round and round like a wagon wheel in motion. Sedgwick, in justifying the Senate’s power, made a blunder on which the supporters of the Resolutions seized and with which they played throughout the discussion. The Senators were safer than the Representatives, he thought, because the former were not chosen by ‘an ignorant herd, who could be cajoled, flattered, and deceived.’
At length the vote was taken, and the Resolutions adopted by 61 to 38. Gallatin and Livingston, chosen by the House, personally presented the call for the papers to Washington, who promised an answer after consideration. An answer, sneered Bache, which sounds like that which the King of France used to give to his subjects.[1122]
V
When Livingston introduced his Resolutions, Hamilton, in New York, was momentarily at sea. His first impression was that they were ‘of doubtful propriety.’[1123] Within a few days, after discussions with ‘those who think,’ he was persuaded that the papers should be refused—possibly on the ground that no purpose could be served unless impeachment proceedings against Washington were in contemplation.[1124] Here we have, in a flash, the political strategy outlined—to convince the people that the Jeffersonians were planning the expulsion of Washington from office. Again the Federalist war-cry—‘Stand by the President!’ But a week later, Hamilton wrote King that the papers should be refused on the ground that the House had nothing to do with treaties, and that they were laws of the land to which the House had to conform.[1125] Learning of the adoption of the Resolutions, Hamilton wrote Washington to refuse compliance and to await suggestions that would be sent the next day.[1126] Two days later, he was mortified at his inability to send the promised papers, but he was at work upon them. Meanwhile, the papers should not be sent because the instructions to Jay would ‘do no credit to the Administration.’ Some would disappoint and inflame the people.[1127] Two days after this, Washington sent his reply to the House, following Hamilton’s instructions and using some of his phraseology, even to the convenient suggestion of an impeachment.[1128] The House, with equal firmness and with a dignified moderation, responded with resolutions reaffirming its right—and the issue was made.[1129] Almost immediately the introduction of a resolution providing the appropriation threw the House into another month’s battle, on the treaty itself.
VI
Up to this time the congressional struggle had caused little excitement among the people. Now the idea that the Union itself was at stake was assiduously put out by the Federalist leaders. The Senate practically ceased to function. When Senator Tazewell called attention to the accumulation of business and urged action, King bluntly told him it was purposely held back, and that if the House failed to appropriate for the treaty, the Senate would consider all legislation at an end, and he would assume the Union dissolved. The next day Cabot expressed something of the same sentiment. In important commercial circles there was much loose talk of the dissolution of the Union.
The action of Washington, on the other hand, had aroused resentment and disgust. Jefferson, with his usual prescience, had foreseen it while hoping against it. ‘I wish that his honesty and his political errors may not furnish a second occasion to exclaim, “curse on his virtues, they have undone his country,”’ he had written of Washington to Madison three days before the refusal was sent to Congress.[1130] Madison thought the tone and temper of the presidential letter ‘improper and indelicate,’ and suggested that Jefferson compare it with ‘one of Callimus’ last numbers ... and the latter part of Murray’s speech.’[1131] It was reserved to Bache, as usual, to strike the harsh note. ‘Thus though his decision could not be influenced by the voice of the people, he could suffer it to be moulded by the opinion of an ex-Secretary,’ he wrote. ‘Thus ... though he has apparently discharged the nurse, he is still in leading strings.’
Meanwhile, the attacks on the Treaty were spreading consternation in all commercial quarters and infuriating the Federalist leaders. ‘A most important crisis ensues,’ wrote Hamilton to King a week after the debate opened; and he outlined a plan of action in the event the appropriations were refused. The President should send a solemn protest to the House and a copy to the Senate. That body should pass a resolution strongly commending the protest and advising the President to proceed with the execution of the Treaty. Then the merchants should meet in all the cities, adopt resolutions commendatory of the position of the President and Senate, and invite their fellow citizens to coöperate with them. Petitions should be circulated throughout the country. The Senate should refuse to adjourn until the terms of the members of the House had expired. Washington should send a confidential apology to England. ‘The glory of the President, the safety of the Constitution depend upon it. Nothing will be wanting here.’[1132]
Hamilton immediately set his machinery in motion, and thus, while the debate was at high tide in the House, the political leaders were busy with the country. King had written of the alarm of the merchants in Philadelphia. ‘Our merchants here are not less alarmed and will do all they can,’ Hamilton replied. Arrangements had been made for the insurance people to meet that day; the merchants and traders would meet the next. A petition would be put in circulation.[1133] Two days later, he wrote jubilantly of the action of the merchants. ‘Unexampled unanimity,’ he said. And more—‘persons to-day are going through the different wards’—presumably with petitions.[1134] That very day he was writing Wolcott that ‘the British Ministry are as great fools or as great rascals as our Jacobins, else our commerce would not continue to be distressed as it is, with their cruisers.’[1135]