The party battles of the Jackson period

by Claude G. Bowers

But Clay was pressing Biddle, and the latter devoted the whole of December to feeling his way. “I think they [the Jackson leaders] are desirous to have the Bank question settled by a renewal before the next presidential canvass, with any modifications to free the President from the charge of an entire abandonment of his original opposition,” wrote one who had “seen a letter from the Private Secretary of the President to a gentleman” in Louisville.[444] “Last night I had a long conversation with McLane,” wrote the president of the Washington branch, “and I am authorized by him to say that it is his deliberate opinion and advice that a renewal of the charter ought not to be pressed during the present session, in which I concur most sincerely. The message is as much as you could expect. It shows that the Chief is wavering. If pressed into a corner immediately, neither McLane nor myself will answer for the consequences.”[445] From another correspondent Biddle learned that Barry, Woodbury, and Taney were hostile, being “under the influence of Blair, Lewis, Kendall & Co. who rule our Chief Magistrate”; that Blair had written a slashing attack upon the McLane report, which was only moderated after the Secretary of the Treasury had threatened to resign if the original were published. “I fear you will yet have trouble with our wise governors,” he added.[446] A Virginia Congressman urged reasons for an immediate application. Jackson’s popularity was on the wane, especially in Congress, and his reëlection notwithstanding being certain, he would have more prestige in the next Congress. Calhoun, still Vice-President, would be serviceable among the Bank’s enemies in the South, and McDuffie, a follower of Calhoun, would be chairman of the House Committee to pass upon the application.[447]

“My own belief,” wrote the wily Clay, “is that, if now called upon, he [Jackson] would not negative the bill, but that if he should be reëlected, the event might and probably would be different.” At any rate, all the friends of the Bank with whom Clay had conversed “expect the application to be made.”[448] In corroboration of Clay’s views, Webster wrote that, as a result of conversations, he had been strongly confirmed in his opinion “that it is expedient for the Bank to apply for a renewal of the Charter without delay.”[449]

Confused by such a medley of counsel, Biddle decided to have the situation studied on the ground. Thomas Cadwalader, a trusted Bank agent, could be depended upon to leave party considerations out of his survey, and on Tuesday, the 20th of December, this servitor took up his quarters at Barnard’s Hotel.[450] The next day found him closeted, first with McLane, who warned him of a certain veto, and advised him to canvass Congress to ascertain whether the Bank could muster the two thirds necessary to override it. A preliminary survey that day was discouraging, and the evening found the agent again with McLane, who reiterated his plea for a postponement until after the election. On Thursday the agent met McDuffie, who urged an immediate application until “staggered” by what Cadwalader had learned of the probable vote to override the veto. He then advised the Bank to feel its way cautiously. Friday found him dining with Senator Smith, a Democrat, who opposed the agitation of the question that session, since it would mean a Jackson and anti-Jackson vote, and lose the Bank ten votes it could depend upon the next year.[451] It did not take the sagacious agent long to sense the selfish political motives of the Clay leaders. “It is evident,” he wrote Biddle, “that W.’s [Webster’s] opinions are guided, in some degree, by party feelings—as seems to be the case with most of the Clay men.” In John Quincy Adams he found a cooler head, and one in whose judgment he had more confidence. Where Webster had urged that the application be made if “a bare majority in Congress could be mustered,” Adams favored postponement “unless a strong vote can be ascertained.” But, thinking the situation over on Christmas Day, and after another and more favorable canvass of the available votes, he began to lean toward the Clay opinion. In the case of a postponement some of the Bank’s friends would be “luke-warm,” Webster would be “cold or perhaps hostile,” if the Bank bent to the Government influence. After another conference with McLane, he thought he would advise the Bank to start the memorial. In this disposition he was confirmed by a visit on Christmas night from the brother of the Secretary of State, a Whig and a follower of Clay, who brought the solemn assurance that Livingston, McLane, and Cass would prevent the veto. The outcome of it all was that Cadwalader was won over to the Whig plan.[452] The moment the agent returned to Philadelphia, McLane, assuming the chilly dignity of resentment, wrote Biddle, restating his position and curtly declaring that he could not, “as one of the constitutional advisers of the President,” object to the exercise of his veto power.[453] But three days later, Webster, in a reassuring note, wrote that the decision to present the memorial was “exactly right.”[454]

The Whig politicians were determined that the Bank should be dragged into politics, and they had their way. The desire of Biddle to accept compromises proposed by McLane were ruthlessly brushed aside by his political friends. The story of the meeting at which Clay forced the issue is significant and dramatic. McLane had summoned Biddle to Washington and submitted a proposition for a recharter which, he contended, would meet with the approval of the President. After returning to Philadelphia and consulting with his directors, an agreement was reached to accept the compromise. Hurrying back to the capital, Biddle conceived the unhappy notion of first consulting with the political friends of the institution in the Congress, before calling upon McLane. Fatal error!

An historical political conference was called. There, of course, was Nicholas Biddle, financial American autocrat of his time, elegant, suave, polished to scintillation, a lover of literature, a brilliant conversationalist, with a graceful epistolary style, which was as dangerous to him as loquacity to a diplomat. He had been schooled in tact while serving as the Secretary of the American Legation at Paris under Monroe. Clever, unscrupulous, practicing diplomacy where

straightforward methods would have served better, he had assiduously cultivated public men until he had created a bipartisan Bank party in both branches of the Congress. In his Philadelphia home the great men of his day partook of his hospitality. Before Jackson reached the Presidency, the president of the Bank of the United States was in better position to foresee the proceedings of Congress than the responsible Chief Executive of the people. Instead of concealing his power, he loved to flaunt it in the face of authority. “Emperor Nicholas” smiled and bowed blandly to his title.

And there, of course, was Clay, leader of his party, the greatest genius in the Senate, seemingly destined to the presidential dignity, and for years one of Biddle’s most trusted friends and advisers. He had been on the pay-roll of the Bank as its counsel in Kentucky and Ohio.

There, too, was John Sergeant, there by right as chief counsel of the Bank, but there, too, by right, as Clay’s running mate in the election, for he had been nominated for Vice-President.