IV. Dangers of a policy of "drift"—Experience which money cannot buy—Trained men, not so much as machines, the criterion of strength.
In connection with military airmanship, there is no policy more dangerous than that which may be summed up in the word, "drift."
It must be admitted that, until quite recently, the official policy in
England, as regards the war aeroplane, could thus be summarised:
There is no danger in shirking the responsibility of a definite aerial programme—despite the strides made abroad—because a fleet of war aeroplanes can be bought or constructed at any time, should urgent need arise.
It was not a policy such as this that the Admiralty pursued in connection with submarines. Here was a new and untried addition to naval armament Without hesitating, or waiting while some other country proved its value in actual tests, the Admiralty used common sense, and spent money willingly upon a fleet of submarines. A full test of their use, in actual naval warfare, has yet to be made; but the experimental nature of the machines has not deterred the Admiralty from making definite advancement with them.
Had the War Office pursued such a policy as this in regard to aeroplanes, we should now have a fleet of aircraft as large as that of any other nation.
It is an undignified attitude to watch other nations at work upon the aeroplane problem, without spending money, and then to step in at the last moment, and profit by their experience.
From the point of view of strict economy, and setting all other considerations aside, such a policy might find acceptance, were it not for circumstances over which those who advocate it have no control.
At any moment, for instance, while one country is waiting for another to evolve an ideal aeroplane, a war may break out. In such an event, a cheese-paring policy would place its advocates in an awkward position. Even granting that they were using experimental machines, the nation which actually possessed a well-equipped aerial fleet, at the outbreak of hostilities, would have an immense advantage over the country which did not.
Wars, when they do break out, generally come quickly. There would be little opportunity for a laggard nation to rush together an aerial fleet at the last moment; or, even if it could do so, lack of organisation would render such an air-force practically inoperative.