"Often they have not themselves seen the facts they report, and they have only gathered the hearsay evidence of alarmed, surprised, or bewildered people. … If a former preoccupation exists, if there is a tendency to believe that the enemy will come from one direction rather than from another, the gathered evidence is interpreted in one sense, however little it lends itself to being so interpreted. It is thus that great mistakes are made, which are sometimes the ruin of armies and of Empires."
Nothing could more definitely indicate the importance of accurate reconnoitring than the emphatic statement of this great soldier. Napoleon recognised that reliable information, concerning the doings of his antagonists, was all-important. A misunderstanding of some scouting report was, he knew, sufficient to lose the Commander-in-Chief a great action.
In any battle a Commander seeks, as has been truly said, to see what is going on "upon the other side of the hill."
The two armies are spread out, approaching each other. Each Commander has thrown forward a screen of men. These act, so to speak, as "feelers," seeking to come into touch with the enemy. Behind this screen of outposts comes the real strength of the army. Neither Commander knows how, when, or at what point, his opponent will develop his main attack. So they grope towards each other, any authentic news of a definite movement of troops being eagerly awaited.
If, as the result of any information brought him, one Commander-in-Chief can anticipate his opponent’s chief move, he may—by that stroke alone—succeed in winning the battle which ensues.
Thus it is that a Commander-in-Chief sits at his Headquarters, with maps in front of him, asking himself one vital question: "At what point, behind the wide-flung screen of his outposts, is my enemy developing his main attack?"
The cavalry scouts, and the scouts on foot, do their work as best they can. They strive, as far as is practicable, to pierce the barrier of men which the enemy has thrown forward.
The task of these scouts is dangerous; it is laborious; and it is slow. It is also haphazard. But, from the fragmentary news that is brought back to him, a Commander-in-Chief has to act as best he can.
Some of his scouts succeed; others return with nothing at all. There are serious gaps in the intelligence; much of it may be contradictory. Yet upon such intelligence as this a Commander-in-Chief has acted in the past, and will have to act in the future, unless he has the aeroplane scout placed at his disposal.
II. Work of a squadron of air-scouts described—Tasks of the pilot and observer—Combined reconnaissance by many machines—Effect of aeroplanes upon tactics.