19. Character and course of a commercial crisis. [Manuals of economics.]
20. Write the history of some particular crisis. [Bibliography in Jones, Bowker and Iles, and Palgrave; consult narrative histories of the period, and periodical articles.]
21. Effect of the gold discoveries about 1850. [Rand, Ec. hist., chap. 10, from Cairnes.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
This chapter touches so closely the field of economics that it seems unnecessary to duplicate the references which are supplied in abundance by the manuals on that subject. See for bibliography Bowker and Iles, and Bullock’s Introduction to the Study of Economics, N. Y., 1897. A full classified bibliography of commercial crises will be found in Edward D. Jones, Economic crises, N. Y., Macmillan, 1900, pp. 225-245. The book which covers most fully the topics treated here is Wells, **Recent econ. changes. References on special topics are given above.
CHAPTER XXXIV
COMMERCIAL POLICY
404. War and peace in the nineteenth century.—Although, for the convenience of a round number, the date 1800 has been chosen in this book to fix the beginning of the recent period, the great changes which marked the passing of previous conditions began with the French Revolution of 1789. The effects of the revolution were soon felt outside the country in which it started. In a few years the powers of Europe were engaged in a war which, with slight intermission, endured for almost the period of a generation, and ceased finally only with the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. Since 1815 commerce has enjoyed singular freedom from the vexation of war, and our attention will be occupied in this chapter mainly with the commercial policy of states at peace. The convulsive struggle, however, in which the century began, has such importance, commercial as well as political, that it demands more than passing comment.
405. French privateers and English commerce.—The commercial interest of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars centers in the contest between France and England. These two powers were the greatest commercial states of Europe, and France still retained important colonial possessions. England, however, had specialized in the development of sea power, while France now followed the course to which she had long been tending and sought to win the victory by the development of her power on land. After 1795 France abandoned the policy of maintaining great fleets to oppose the British, sacrificed the merchant vessels flying the French flag, and sought to destroy the commerce on which the life of England depended by sending out innumerable privateers to prey upon it. France enjoyed, apparently, an extraordinarily favorable position for making this policy effective. The port of London carried on more than half of British foreign trade; of the ships which contributed to its annual record of thirteen or fourteen thousand entries and departures, two thirds had to pass through the English Channel; and French privateers, sailing at sundown from a home port, could reach their cruising ground before it was light again. Some of the French privateers inflicted very serious loss on the British. A large one, captured in 1799, is said to have taken 160 prizes in four years, and to have cleared for her owners in Bordeaux five million dollars. English ships were forced to gather in convoys, sailing under the protection of ships of war. Fleets of 200 or 300 vessels were not unusual, and sometimes 500 or 1,000 were seen together, in dangerous places like the Chops of the Channel or the entrance to the Baltic. This system consumed the time and money of English merchants, and did not entirely prevent losses, which amounted perhaps to 2 per cent or more of the total volume of British trade. Still, the effort of France to crush her enemy by this means was clearly futile. France, on the other hand, saw her commerce decline until, as a literal fact, not a single merchant vessel flying the French flag was on the seas. In 1800 France received directly from Asia, Africa, and America less than $300,000 worth of goods altogether, and exported to those continents only $56,000.
406. Napoleon and the Continental System.—A new period in the war against commerce can be dated from the reopening of hostilities, after a brief interval of peace, in 1803. Napoleon, now the ruling spirit in France, found that a direct contest with the English on their own element, the sea, was hopeless. His schemes for the conquest of his great enemies may be summarized as follows: first, direct invasion, from which he was always deterred by the English sea power; second, a blow at England through her eastern empire, to which the Egyptian expedition was preparatory; and finally, the “commercial strangulation” of England by the exclusion of her goods from Europe. This last scheme, to which his efforts finally narrowed themselves, simply continued a policy which had already been applied in France, of excluding the wares and ships of British commerce. Napoleon was able, however, by his extraordinary successes on land, to extend the system of prohibition far beyond the bounds of France, and make it truly deserving of its name of Continental System. By 1809 he had closed to English trade all Europe except Turkey, Sicily, and Portugal. Decrees named from the place at which they were issued (Berlin, Milan), sought with savage thoroughness to stop all openings through which the English might carry on their trade and recruit their resources for the war against him. Commerce with Europe, according to Napoleon’s plan, was to be carried on exclusively by his allies or by neutrals like the Americans; and the English, by being totally excluded, were to be starved into submission.
407. English reprisals; the position of neutrals.—To these measures England replied with various Orders in Council which matched in spirit Napoleon’s decrees. As Napoleon sought to exclude England from European commerce, so England sought to drive the commerce of Napoleon’s allies from the sea, and, furthermore, to make neutral commerce aid her in her measures against him. An order of 1807 required any neutral trading with the Continent to stop at a British station both going and coming, to land and reship the cargo, and to pay certain duties. Its purpose was to make England the center and warehouse of the world’s commerce. Neutrals were placed between the upper and the nether millstone. In obeying the orders of either belligerent they exposed themselves to the punishment of the other. The merchants of the United States, who had profited by the early stages of the war to extend their commerce greatly, were forced into the seclusion of the embargo (to be described later), and were led in 1812 to the declaration of open war with England.