A history of commerce

by Clive Day

CHAPTER XVIII
THE MODERN STATE AND THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM

181. Growth of modern states under the influence of commerce.—If the modern reader is impressed, in studying the history of Europe before 1500, with the influence on commerce of the lack of strong government, he will be equally impressed, in the period from 1500 to 1800, with the strength of government and with the important part it played in commercial development. We have here to sketch in brief the changes in political conditions, leaving to later chapters a consideration of the details as they appear in the history of different countries. Commerce itself was the great force that broke the power of feudalism. Commerce crept through the barriers that kept localities apart; it established a circulation of wares through a large area of country; and it concentrated wealth in the cities which it built up. These were the very changes needed to allow the world to escape from feudal anarchy, and to construct a system of government similar to that which the Romans had employed. Kings had now subjects able and willing to pay taxes, and, by means of commerce, they could transport their taxes, turn the proceeds into any shape they chose, and apply them wherever it was necessary.

182. Decline of feudal power with the rise of mercenary armies.—A large part of the new revenues was spent by governments in strengthening their military position. Feudal lords were good fighters in the old-fashioned way, and would not give up their local power without a struggle. They had to yield finally, however, before the standing armies which kings called into existence towards the close of the Middle Ages. Feudal lords loved to fight, but they were only amateurs, after all, and did not make fighting a business. The mercenaries, on the other hand, whom kings collected as soon as they could afford the expense, were professionals, who submitted to a certain amount of discipline because they could make a living by doing so. Enterprising men collected a number of recruits, taught them to use their arms, and drilled them until they counted for far more than an equal number of untrained men; the leaders studied tactics and strategy, and knew how to make the most of their superiority. The leaders were perfectly willing to let their troops to any one who could pay the price, but as feudal lords were always in want of ready money the advantages of the new armies went almost entirely to the kings. The introduction of gunpowder in warfare increased the superiority of the mercenary armies, by adding to the value of training, and here again the kings, with ready money to invest in the latest improvements, had an advantage.

183. Growth in power of the central government as shown in the development of taxation.—By the year 1500 the process had gone so far that many of the states of Europe had assumed a shape substantially like that which they have to-day; and feudalism as a great political force was dead. Government could now proceed to develop on the basis of an extended territory. Some measure of the gain of the central government in power can be had by noting the increase of its resources from taxation. English taxes yielded about half a million pounds in the sixteenth century, seven and a half million in the next century, and about forty million towards 1800. In little over a hundred years the yield of taxes in Prussia increased twenty-eight fold. The revenue system was still crude and wasteful. Every European state followed at one time or another the practice of raising money by selling the right to hold an office. Every European state lost money, not only by the inefficiency of the revenue system, but also by corruption of officials; often half or more of money that the people paid in taxes never reached the treasury. In spite, however, of these inevitable faults, national resources were concentrated as they had never been before, and the central government gained a power before unknown.

184. Persistence of medieval conditions in the modern period.—From the modern standpoint no better field could be found for the use of this power than in the reform of internal conditions. Centuries after feudalism had lost its controlling position the local differences and the spirit of separatism which marked the feudal period remained to plague the merchant and the statesman. Commerce was hindered by local variations in laws and in weights and measures; by the persistence of barriers to the development of trade and manufacture which had grown up in the medieval system of tolls and gilds; by the maintenance of the class distinctions marking feudal society, and putting on a different basis the merchant, the agriculturist, and the noble. A country like England, which early threw off the most oppressive of its medieval institutions, gained a great start over countries where they were allowed to continue. Statesmen in these other countries recognized the need of reform, and made attempts to realize it from time to time; they made slow progress, not only because the task of reforming old customs was at best tedious and expensive, but also because their attention was distracted from the task for much of the time by the pressure of foreign affairs.

185. Attempts at reform, leading in many cases to over-regulation.—All the European governments in this period did pay attention to the development of internal resources. One of the chief features of the mercantilist theory, that animated government policy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the emphasis laid on the circulation of money and wares inside the country. The new national governments helped to further internal commerce by repressing disorder, and by reforming, to some extent at least, the system of laws and courts to which business men could appeal for the settlement of disputes. Most of the governments paid considerable attention also to the development of the postal system.

Governments could serve their people well in ways like these, but unfortunately they expended their energy on other objects that were useless or harmful. “The state moulds men into whatever shape it pleases,” was an idea of the time, which led to an enormous amount of government regulation. In few states of the Continent was a man free to seek his profit where he would; he was entangled in a network of government regulations that fixed the rules of his trade, the prices of his wares, even the articles which he might or might not consume. An excellent example is furnished by the grain trade, which governments regulated so strictly that in many cases laws caused the very famines which they were designed to prevent.

186. Attention distracted from internal reforms by foreign interests.—A consciousness that government regulation had gone too far for the interests of commerce grew strong before the end of the eighteenth century, when a school of thinkers, the physiocrats, protested earnestly against it. Their formulas, “don’t govern too much,” “let things alone” (laisser faire), were to be realized in the nineteenth century. At the time, however, they had little effect; the faith in the power of government was still strong in the minds of rulers, and their attention was distracted by other interests. When rulers had crushed the resistance of their subjects, and established their absolute authority, they had a surplus of power which they were inclined to apply abroad. The period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries is filled with strife between the European states, each attempting to get possession of some of the territory and power of a rival. The states of Europe were still young, with all the vigor and all the inexperience of youth, and not until they had tried conclusions with each other were they willing to settle down as they have done in the nineteenth century. It was said above that internal reform was the best object of government expenditure “from the modern standpoint.” Kings and peoples were not modern, and to a king of the time one of the best objects appeared to be a war with another king by which he might get more people under his power.

187. Wars occasioned by religious and dynastic interests.—In tracing later the commercial histories of the different countries it will be necessary to refer occasionally to these wars, but it will conduce to clearness if we stop a moment here to examine their causes and character. Some of the wars were religious, growing out of the Protestant revolution. The states of the South remained Catholic, and those of the North became Protestant with comparatively little opposition, but in the center, in France and Germany especially, where neither side had at first a clear supremacy, the Protestant movement led to disastrous civil wars.

Another series of wars may be called dynastic, as they grew out of the ambitions of rulers to extend their power in Europe at the expense of other ruling families. In the sixteenth century the chief contestants were Spain and France. Spain dropped from the first rank, and France and Austria continued the struggle for supremacy through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The dynastic wars seem to the student of the history of commerce as unfortunate as those that came from religious differences. They diverted men and resources from production to destruction; they checked at the same time commercial development and the reform of government.