293. Decline of the commerce of south Germany.—While the cities of north Germany were losing their hold on a growing commerce, the cities of the South found a large share of their trade taken from them by the discovery of the ocean route to India. The German cities (Nuremberg, Augsburg, Ulm, etc.) fought with desperation to maintain their commerce, and proof exists that they carried on an active commerce with Italy after they ceased to obtain there the Oriental wares, and had to content themselves with Italian products. Even this trade, however, fell to a large extent into the hands of the Italians, who flooded southern Germany and drove native Germans out of business.
The Germans were not entirely unprepared for the changes following the discoveries, for they had long gone in considerable numbers to the Spanish peninsula, by land through southern France or from a French or Italian harbor to Barcelona. Many Germans had settled in Portugal, and for a time the great merchants of south Germany shared in the Indian trade at its source, in Lisbon. The great German financiers shared also for a brief period in the commerce of the New World. The Ellingers and Welsers leased the copper mines of San Domingo; the Crombergers had silver mines at Sultepeque; the Tetzels exploited the copper mines of Cuba. The Welsers founded Venezuela by a military expedition which they financed, and held the country for a few years.
294. The chief cause of decline of German commerce in this period was political.—The most obvious explanation of the failure of Germany to take a place with the other states in the commercial expansion following the discoveries is the disadvantage of her position. It has been said that the diversion of commerce to the oceanic routes exposed the countries of central Europe (Italy, Germany, etc.) to a condition of commercial glaciation, such as Norway would experience physically if it lost the warm current of the Gulf Stream. The difference in distance of a few hundred miles in voyages of thousands does not explain the matter. No physical differences suffice to explain why Amsterdam rose and why Hamburg fell so rapidly. The weakness of Germany was not physical. Nor was it economic; German merchants of this period had more free capital, more business ability and greater energy than the merchants of any other country. Germany’s weakness was political. The payments which merchants and other Germans made in the form of taxes and loans to political authority did not form a single fund which could be used for furthering German interests at home and abroad. The money went to a great number of rival governments, and was consumed in their particular quarrels, not helping but actually hurting German business interests.
295. The natural outlets of commerce stopped by hostile states.—The political weakness of Germany enabled other states, now rising to power, to crumble off fragments of the country, in which they established a commercial policy hostile to German interests. Before long the mouth of every one of the large rivers which were the natural commercial outlets of the country had passed under foreign control. The Rhine was Dutch; the Weser Swedish; the Elbe Danish; the Oder Swedish; the Vistula Polish. Tolls hampered the passage of wares as effectually as though Germany were surrounded by a physical barrier on the sea side; and German ships almost disappeared from the ocean.
German commerce suffered especially by the rise of the Dutch to an independent position. So long as Antwerp was the great market of the Continent Germans traded freely with it, and through it to Lisbon. The substitution of Amsterdam for Antwerp was a most serious blow to German interests. The Dutch had very different ideas from those of the Flemish; they wanted to do all the trade themselves and to force other people to a position of commercial dependence on them. They made the lower Rhine practically useless for their rivals, raising the tolls sixfold and more, and thereby coming into a control of the trade as far as Frankfort on the Main.
296. The damage done by internal dissensions and by the Thirty Years’ War.—Germany was not only cut off from the outside world by tariff barriers, but cut up inside by the tolls of cities and territories. Every city on a trade route wanted to make itself a “staple,” i.e., have all goods passing the vicinity brought there for taxation and for sale. Frankfort on the Oder, for instance, demanded that all boats passing down the river Warthe should come up to Frankfort before they could continue their journey down the Oder to Stettin. The cities of Stettin, Frankfort, and Breslau, all situated on the Oder, instead of using that river for peaceable exchange, made bitter commercial war on each other with tolls and prohibitions. Conditions grew still worse after the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), a terrible conflict which, without exaggeration, cost Germany one hundred, perhaps two hundred, years of development. The physical means of transportation declined. On the Elbe, for instance, the dikes ceased to be repaired, the tow-path disappeared, the banks crumbled; and sand bars and snags became so common that navigation was difficult and costly. Tolls not merely doubled; they increased fivefold and more. Space is lacking for a description of all the evils; they were practically a reproduction of the conditions which happier states had left behind them five hundred years before.
297. Restriction of manufactures by the gilds.—German manufactures followed about the same course as that of the French which we have traced above. The gilds merited the term given them by an economist of the seventeenth century who said they were the “curse of Germany”; they seem to have been in some respects even more narrow than the French gilds. The same old evils reappear, but the reader must be asked to take these for granted and to direct his attention to some new aspects of the gild organization. Specially noteworthy are the obstacles put in the way of any man who desired to become a full member of a gild. Many gilds succeeded in making the exercise of the trade a family monopoly by the regulation that no man could become a master who did not marry the daughter or the widow of a master. One gild expelled a man because he had married a wife whose grandmother was alleged to have come from a shepherd’s family; other gilds expelled members because they had ridden an executioner’s horse or drunk with an executioner. A man had at best to pay very high fees to become a master, and this artificial restriction on the number of full members not only kept the ordinary workmen in a wretched position, but also raised the price of goods to the consumer.
The monopoly of the gilds became more oppressive all the time. Most of their money, except the considerable part they spent in carousing, they used in lawsuits and in quarrels with rivals. For miles around a German town the gilds permitted no competitors, and they made it a regular part of their business to hunt down and exterminate independent producers.
298. The eighteenth century marked by general depression, with some signs of improvement.—In Germany, in general, there was little improvement in conditions in the eighteenth century. The country was still intersected with tariff barriers. The Rhine was cut into four sharply defined parts, and the Elbe, by reason of tolls, had lost its trade in some wares of the first importance: steel, iron, copper, olive oil, wine, fish, etc. To the conflicts between cities there was still no end. The cities of southern Germany, weighted with taxes and surrounded by closed markets, declined still more in commercial importance. There were, however, some hopeful signs of progress. Two cities of the interior, Frankfort on the Main and Leipzig, were building up a business which rested not only on trade in wares but on dealings in bills of exchange, currency, commercial loans, etc. Beside the rise of these banking centers special importance attaches to the revival of commerce on the coast of the North Sea. Hamburg and Bremen seized the opportunity offered by the American Revolution and the European wars to which it gave rise to extend their trade as neutral carriers, and had soon passed their old rivals, the Dutch.
299. The rise of Prussia important mainly from the political standpoint.—Taking German commerce as a whole, we leave it in 1800 still depressed and sluggish. The picture would be incomplete, however, if nothing more were said. In one part of Germany there had been great activity for centuries; in the North and East, namely, where the ancestors of the present Emperor William II were building up the state of Prussia. This activity, however, was mainly political, and the history of it does not belong here; we can refer to it only as a most remarkable example of state-making, in which commercial and industrial interests were made subordinate to the establishment of a strong government over a united people. The Hohenzollern rulers did not succeed in making a rich state out of a group of scattered territories of which some were, in natural resources, among the poorest in Germany. They did make a strong state, which won for itself a place among the great powers, and later took the lead in unifying Germany.